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How Public-Private Partnerships and Islam are related to Student Achievement: 
A Case Study of Pakistan 
 
Maham Mela 
 This dissertation tackles two research questions through two research methods – how 
public, private, and private and public-private partnership schools relate to student achievement 
(quantitative); and how Islam relates to parental educational decision making for school choice 
(qualitative). These questions are partly driven by the increase in public-private partnerships in 
Punjab, Pakistan, and by the recent worldwide focus on Islam. Quantitative findings show that 
when the educational outcome is educational quality measured by test scores, public-private 
partnership schools are related to a greater increase in student test scores than are private schools, 
and 5
th
 grade test scores show greater dependence on school type than 8
th
 grade test scores. 
Public-private partnerships can be positively related to test scores potentially because of their 
unobservable institutional characteristics. Qualitative analysis findings show that the ideal school 
type for a representative sample of parents incorporates both ―secular‖ and religious components 
in order to produce a second educational outcome - student ethics and civic identity. Combining 
answers to both research questions shows that both top-to-bottom interaction between the 
government and schools, and bottom-to-top interaction between parents and schools are 
important for informing education policy that aims to increase educational quality while also 
catering towards parental preferences. However, all established private and social goals of 
education – including efficiency, equity, school choice, and social cohesion – as well as cost 
considerations need to be further researched before deciding if and how to formulate a large 
scale public-private partnership policy.
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is not necessarily the easiest because it is difficult to include 28 years of my life in a few lines. 
Maybe this, and the sense of finality, is why most students leave it for the end. Of course I would 
like to thank everyone who participated in my life and gave me my experiences – both 
experiences I enjoyed and those I learnt from. However, the person who comes foremost to my 
mind is my father. Knowingly or unknowingly, he affected not only what I learnt, but also how I 
learnt it. In all aspects of life but most importantly in learning how to try my hardest to reach my 
potential (I‘m still trying Abbu!), uphold my principles and integrity, and have high yet 
achievable aims in life.  
 Mama, thank you is not a big enough word for you. In all respects. I don‘t even know 
how to articulate how I feel and think about you and in what ways you have affected and inspired 
me. I know this will make you more happy than anyone else even though you‘ve attended all my 
previous graduations and have to attend this one too. 
 Umer, Saalika, and the rest of my family and friends who made fun of me for being such 
a nerd – you don‘t actually know it but you made me all the more determined to accomplish as 
much as I possibly could. Sorry for not listening to you. Umer and Saalika especially – thank you 
for allowing me to vent on you and for the help, you definitely proved yourselves to be good 
younger siblings. I wish you both all the success and happiness in life inshaAllah. 
 This was before I became a masochist and enrolled in a PhD program, and then actually 
enjoyed the torture. During my program, the most important people were my professors and 
advisors who were so helpful and encouraging in everything and yet taught to re-evaluate what I 
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thought. I am not just saying this, I really mean it. Professors Henry Levin, Myra Strober, Martin 
Carnoy, and Monisha Bajaj and everyone else starting from my undergraduate life – I never 
called you by your first names because I guess I‘m old-fashioned but I also felt that teachers 
command a certain respect and this was one way in which I showed my respect. Thank you also 
for allowing me to meet your families. Amita, Radhika, and Amrit – what should I say? 
Everyone at Teachers College and Columbia University plus my program friends and classmates 
– I learnt from all of you. And again, I mean it. 
 I can never repay the sacrifices that some people made in order for me to attend my 
classes and write my dissertation. My husband – I‘m sorry the wedding got delayed because of 
me. Thank you for being so supportive throughout, even when I had to be away for long periods 
of time. And don‘t worry, you were always a pleasant distraction when you visited. My son – 
you‘re too small to realize it but your mommy ignored you a lot during your first year of life. 
Except for the reading and learning times we shared in the morning. But I did fill out your baby 
book regularly and made sure you dressed everyday like a tiny version of a preppy law school 
student. You should pray that I don‘t test all my theories of parenting on you. 
 The program planners and directors at all the government departments I visited, 
especially Sohail Raza. Thank you so very much for providing me with data readily and pointing 
me towards the right sources. This dissertation would not have been possible with you. 
 And lastly but very significantly – my laptopS and my hard-driveS (and other people‘s 
laptops I hogged just to make sure I had 10 backups of 10 years of my life) for not crashing on 





Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
  
This dissertation is an exploratory study of the relationship between student achievement, 
school type focusing on public-private partnerships, and Islam in Pakistan. The purpose of the 
first chapter is to present the background of public, private, and public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) in Pakistan‘s education context and discuss why it is important to study them. Related to 
this is the discussion of why studying Islam as a religion with regards to PPPs and education is 
also significant. Broadly speaking, this dissertation spans two levels of interaction – one between 
the government and schools that join to form public-private partnerships; and the second 
between schools and parents who choose schools for their child(ren). The ultimate purpose of the 
dissertation is to inform policy through combining the analyses of these two levels of interaction. 
This can allow the government to discern the type of education parents prefer for their children, 
and can then potentially choose to support the school type (mainly public, private, or PPP) that 
can not only best meet those parental preferences, but also fulfills the government‘s own 
educational goals (educational quality, equity etc.). 
This chapter is organized as follows: the first section in this chapter provides the 
introduction and significance of this dissertation‘s topic. The second section defines some terms 
including institutions, governance, and culture since they will later be used as concepts in 
examining the relationship between PPPs, Islam, and educational outcomes. The third section of 
this chapter presents a description of the current education system in Pakistan and its challenges, 
while the last section discusses potential solutions to these challenges especially those espoused 





1.1 - Introduction and Significance 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine school types, especially public-private 
partnerships (PPPs), in an educational context, specifically in Pakistan. As their name suggests, 
PPPs consist of both public (usually associated with the government) and private (usually 
associated with market forces) sectors. Studying PPPs and their implications for educational 
achievement can have worldwide implications. Among the most recent trends in PPPs in 
education, Patrinos et al. (2009) identify one where Muslim majority countries, such as Pakistan 
and Egypt, are establishing various types of PPPs in their primary and secondary education 
systems. This is possible especially because the World Bank funds and supports PPPs as a 
solution for low educational quantity and quality (Patrinos et al., 2009). Moreover, the disastrous 
events and worldwide consequences of especially 9/11 and the Iraq war have put Muslim 
countries and Islam in general under the scrutiny of media, foreign governments, and 
increasingly, academics. Therefore, from an academic and policy perspective, combining 
questions about PPPs in education with questions about Muslim majority societies is imperative 
in understanding and affecting development oriented educational change in these contexts. For 
instance, how can Muslim majority countries without formal PPPs in education learn from 
Muslim countries that do have them?   
Such an understanding will contribute towards two scant but growing bodies of literature. 
One, are PPPs associated with higher student achievement and hence higher individual, 
economic, and societal development?
1
 There have been studies that say yes (e.g. Lockheed & 
                                                 
1
 There is conflicting evidence for a causal relationship between student achievement and earnings (e.g. Card & 
Krueger, 1992). As described later, development is also not a straightforward term and can have different meanings 






Jimenez, 1996) and others that say no or not significantly (e.g. Carnoy & McEwan, 2001). Two, 
what is the relationship between Islam and education? Some recent examples of the second body 
of literature include Krueger, 2007; Goodwin, 2006; and Hefner & Zaman, 2007. However, the 
interest in religion and education in Muslim majority societies has so far tended to focus on 
madrassas (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja & Zajonc, 2006; Bergen & Pandey, 2005) and has not 
extended deeply into the ―mainstream‖ and/or parallel2 education systems, which are 
increasingly including PPPs in primary and secondary education.
3
 Mir (2001) touches on this 
point when, in a conference organized by the Brookings Institution, she raised a question about 
how and to what extent Muslims are involved in education policy making in Pakistan. In other 
words, she is implying questions about preferences of education consumers – primarily parents 
and students – being included in education policy. Moreover, Ameli, Azam, and Merali (2005) 
discuss how religion is marginalized in debates regarding globalization and education, which is 
surprising considering that religion is a player whose main aim is probably not economic growth. 
This dissertation attempts to reach a balance in dealing with the economics of PPPs as well as 
with discussing the role of religion in educational choice at a grass-root level, thus contributing 
towards research and policy literature on mainstream education.  
This dissertation is also significant because as Shafiq (2010) argues, much of the interest 
on Islam and education has remained at a macro level and that there is a need to conduct more 
micro level quantitative as well as qualitative research on the topic in Muslim majority countries. 
                                                 
2
 For instance, Saudi Arabia contains various different types of educational institutions – public, private, religious, 
and even schools based on certain ethnicities (Ministry of Education, 2009). 
 
3
 One exception to no religion in mainstream education is an emerging type of schooling institution that combines 






Since PPPs in education can lead to parent-school relationships that are necessary for both the 
success of the PPP (Levin, 1999) and increase in student achievement and competitiveness for 
the labor market, these parent and other micro level relationships can provide ground for 
qualitative research.
4
 In addition to quantitative analysis in this dissertation, I collect qualitative 
data on attitudes towards educational outcomes, hence using mixed methods research in 
examining the relationship between government policy (public, private, and PPPs), religion, and 
educational outcomes in Pakistan (e.g. student achievement). Although more complicated than 
choosing a single research method, using mixed methods has the advantage of providing more 
comprehensive and accurate results especially since PPPs relate to social interaction among 
multiple stakeholders (Manski, 2000). It is also important to qualitatively study religion in 
education because it is uncertain whether the higher net scholastic achievement of private 
government-dependent schools also corresponds to non-scholastic achievement, such as religious 
and moral attitudes of students (Dronkers and Robert, 2008). This question is especially difficult 
to answer through quantitative research because education data in Pakistan do not differentiate 
between religious and secular private schools. Thus, a qualitative examination of the role religion 
plays in students‘ educational choice and outcome(s) beyond test scores is significant. 
Therefore, overall in this exploratory study, I draw mainly on institutional and economic 
literature (especially on PPPs) to place religion and education as mechanisms for development 
(for instance, Barro &McLeary, 2003; Baker & LeTendre, 2005; Carnoy et al., 2005, 2007; 
Guiso et al., 2004; Shah et al., 2004; Wiseman & Baker, 2006). Although traditionally defined 
development itself is the not the focus of this dissertation, such literature is especially useful for 
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countries that have yet to meet their Millennium Development Goals including Pakistan, 
(Patrinos et al., 2009).
5
 Chapter 2 discusses research and empirical literature in more detail. 
One reason for choosing this dissertation‘s topic is based on my past research. My 
Master‘s academic research has examined the relationship between institutions and educational 
attainment (measured by net enrollment rates) at a cross-sectional country level. Additionally, a 
preliminary pilot study before this dissertation examined general attitudes towards religion in 
education at a grass-root level in Punjab, Pakistan. One of the main findings of my Master‘s 
research was that rule of law is significant in determining a country‘s educational attainment. 
Complementing this finding, Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2009) argue that ―lack of rule of law 
alters the choice between conventional provision and PPPs in favor of the former‖ (p. ii) because 
short term public provision is more suitable than a long term PPP contract that can be more 
expensive and inefficient. The pilot study showed that there are ambivalent opinions about if and 
how religion should be part of a country‘s education system. In this sense, evaluating specific 
PPP programs with a specific institutional context, such as the Punjab province in Pakistan, can 
bring forth differences in institutions, public versus private provision, suitability of PPPs, and 
attitudes towards religion in education. 
My doctoral dissertation expands upon both these my Master‘s research and pilot study in 
six significant ways: 1) it uses educational achievement rather than education enrollment data 
(i.e. roughly translates into educational quality versus education quantity); 2) it conducts a more 
micro-level analysis both quantitatively and qualitatively by examining schools and individuals 
                                                 
5
 PPPs seem especially important in Pakistan because other government reforms, such as the Punjab Education 
Sector Reform Program (2003-present) encouraged by the World Bank, whose policies included cash subsidies for 
girls and free textbooks, had less than desired effects on improving educational attainment (Program Monitoring and 






rather than countries; 3) it looks in depth at a specific program in Pakistan, which is a country 
that is under-researched in education despite having lower literacy rates and relatively new PPP 
policies than its neighboring countries
6
; 4) it looks at specific parental educational making 
decisions to see if religion plays a role in their school choice;
7
 and 5) it spans two levels of 
interactions – policy and grass-root.  
Based on the significance of the research topic I would like to explore PPPs with relation 
to government policy as well as parental educational decision making. Therefore, my two 
research questions are:  
 1) How are different school types – public, private, and public private partnership schools 
- related to student achievement in primary and middle
8
 education levels in Pakistan?  
 2) How does Islam matter for school choice and educational decision making?  
 
This chapter next describes some significant terms and concepts (a few of which have 
already been mentioned, such as institutions) in order to situate the dissertation‘s analysis of 




                                                 
6
 This is a general trend although there are exceptions. For instance, Barrera-Osorio and Raju (2011) just recently 
published a study on the Foundation  Assisted Schools Program in Pakistan. 
 
7
 Easterly expands on the significance of the specific versus general, especially as shown by some unsuccessful 











1.2 - Definitions 
        Before moving onto a description of Pakistan‘s education system and one of its public-
private partnership programs, it is important to briefly define this central term itself - public-private 
partnership (PPP). Grimsey and Lewis (2005) argue that there is no single definition of a PPP 
although PPPs involve at least one government or public party whereas the rest can be one or 
multiple private entities. According to Savas (2005), the term PPP is broadly ―malleable as a form 
of privatization‖ (Savas, 2005, p. 1). This malleability also makes the term less controversial for 
those who ideologically oppose privatization although the definition of privatization itself depends 
on which country is involved (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). For instance, in the U.S., privatization can 
refer to any shift of providing public services from the public to the private sector whereas in the 
United Kingdom, privatization refers to a clear transfer of the public asset to private ownership 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). Savas (2005) claims that PPPs present an example of the government 
delegating its tasks to the private sector whether it does so by providing funding to private service 
providers or by outsourcing the delivery of public services and goods. Typically, PPPs have been 
used for large construction projects, such as roads, airports, power plants, and bridges but more 
recently, other projects, such as schools and prisons, have also been undertaken by the private 
sector. Traditional PPPs are usually long term (20-99 years) and cover the construction and 
sometimes operation of the construction and service delivery projects. Overall, PPPs have been 
used as a means of governance and public management while theoretically including ―market 





      Another important concept in this dissertation is institutions, which is closely related to how 
PPPs are defined and used.
9
 Following Wiseman and Baker (2006), I divide the definition of 
institutions into governance and culture to facilitate analysis. Governance has recently become a 
complex word and concept (Stoker, 1998). This is partly because its definition, theory, and methods 
can be derived from many fields: institutional economics, international relations, organizational 
studies, development studies, political science, public administration, and Foucauldian-inspired 
theory (Stoker, 1998). Sometimes governance is used rhetorically in place of the word government 
and public administration tools (for instance, in Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) whereas at other times it 
is used as a framework to organize concepts (Judge et al., 1995). Shah et al. (2004) explain 
―‗governance‘ as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised—
including the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of 
the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them‖ (Shah et 
al., 2004, p. 2). This definition of governance has the advantage of being comprehensive in 
capturing the interaction between the government and the public, as well as the formation and 
implementation of policies (for instance, what is publicly and privately managed in education 
finance and management, which is one of the central concerns of this study). In other words, the 
outputs of both governance and government are similar, and the difference in their definitions rests 
                                                 
9
 Institutions also form a part of social capital of a community or nation (Serageldin & Grootaert, 1997; Edwards, 










         Implementation-wise, Stoker (1998) puts forth five main complementary propositions 
about governance and how it can be conceived conceptually and practically. They are as follows: a) 
a complex set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also go beyond the government; b) 
governance recognizes the boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues; 
c) governance identifies the power dependence involved in relationships between institutions in 
collective action; d) governance is about autonomous self-governing of various actors and 
stakeholders; and e) governance recognizes the authority to complete tasks that do not depend on 
the government‘s authority. 
In terms of PPPs, the first and second propositions are relevant in identifying the purpose and 
structure of PPPs because these propositions deal with the inclusion of the private sector in tasks 
that are usually perceived to be the government‘s responsibility – providing primary and secondary 
education. Inclusion of the private sector comes with certain regulatory mechanisms imposed by the 
government, which means that private schools have to ensure that they meet certain requirements 
even if the government is not involved in the micro-management of school operations (propositions 
three, four, and five). In this sense, the efficiency of PPPs in providing primary and secondary 
education can be seen as a process of governance.  
However, in this dissertation, institutions are used to refer to more than just efficiency in 
providing education (Stoker, 1998). For instance, this dissertation also examines how educational 
                                                 
10
 Stoker (1998) defines government as ―formal institutions of the state and their monopoly of legitimate coercive 





schooling decision making being related to religion can be interpreted as being related to cultural 
institutions. Cultural institutions can be defined as ―those customary beliefs, values, and social 
constraints that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to 
generation‖ (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2005). Significantly, culture can affect a country‘s social 
institutions by inculcating certain values in its people (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2005). Guiso et 
al. (2005) outline two major mechanisms for value production – education and religion. While both 
mechanisms transmit cultural preferences, religion also seems to affect individual attitudes that 
frame other institutions, such as tolerance, observing the law, and paying taxes. Further, La Porta et 
al. (1998) use religion as a proxy for culture to present evidence from cultural theories of 
institutions, which claim that countries that are predominantly Catholic or Muslim have 
significantly inferior institutions compared to other countries. Landes (1998) has argued that 
―Catholic and Muslim countries in particular have acquired cultures of intolerance, xenophobia, and 
closed-mindedness that retarded their development‖ (La Porta et al., 1998, p. 14). According to 
Knack and Keefer (1997), there is a high chance that low income Catholic and Muslim countries 
have low levels of social capital that leads to poor economic performance, especially if autocratic 
leaders instill lower levels of trust in a country‘s governance and cultural institutions.  
On a more positive note, Barro and McLeary (2003) suggest that ideas of hell and heaven 
in religion act as incentives for honest behavior. Moreover, religious institutions, such as 
churches for Christians and mosques for Muslims, can create social capital and affect social 
institutions (Barro & McLeary, 2003), which in turn can influence the kind of education parents 
prefer and choose for their children. In other words, in this dissertation, religion is used as a 





making. Although reverse causality is possible between culture and governance (with culture 
leading to corruption in governance, and vice versa), this can be addressed by using religion as a 
proxy for culture, since religion does not usually change over a lifetime and will therefore 
probably not affect governance. 
Since this dissertation seeks to examine the relationship between educational outcomes, 
and governance and culture with respect to school type in a Muslim majority country, an 
important question emerges of whether or not Islam (and its teachings) itself as a religious, 
political, social, and economic institution is associated with this relationship. Haqqani (2002) 
argues that schools teaching Islam (called madrassas) to children form an important part of the 
educational institutions in Muslim countries today although these madrassas also teach a diverse 
list of other sciences and humanities. Since it is not clear to what extent Islamic education is 
stressed in madrassas compared to other schools, it is difficult to infer that Islam as a religion and 
culture is the reason for low educational attainment in Muslim countries versus non-Muslim 
countries. Pink (2003) showed that although religion features to a large extent in Egyptian 
education, it is used to stress overcoming religious differences between Muslims and Christians 
for overarching national patriotism and social cohesion. This implies that Islam‘s relationship 
with culture and educational outcomes depends on the context. In this dissertation, although I do 
not look at cross-sectional country level data about religion and development, I examine religion 
and school choice in education at a micro grass-root level within a Muslim majority country - 
Pakistan.  
Having defined major terms, the next sections broadly describe Pakistan‘s overall context 





situate the analysis of PPPs (example of governance) and in later chapters, of religion (example 
of culture) in/and education. 
 
1.3 – Pakistan’s Context 
 First categorized by the World Bank in Asia and now in the Middle East and North 
Africa region (World Bank, 2012), the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a country bordering with 
India, China, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Arabia Sea. Pakistan has four provinces: Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province), Sindh, Punjab, and Balochistan. Punjab 
is the second largest province area-wise and the largest province population-wise (with more 
than 60% of the country‘s population). The 1998 census showed that total population was about 
132 million although recent figures have shown that total population is about 170 million 
(Government of Pakistan, 2011). 96% of the population is Muslim (76% Sunni and 20% Shia) 
and 5% consists of all other religious groups including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Jains. 
Ethnically, Punjabis form the majority (45%; CIA World Factbook, 2012; Government of 
Pakistan, 2011). Pakistan‘s major cities include Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad where Lahore 
(with a population of about 7 million) is also the source of my qualitative data geographical 
sample. In Pakistan overall, 36% of the population is urban (CIA World Factbook, 2010). In 
Punjab at least, the urban-rural divide in terms of educational institutions is similar to the 
population divide, which means about one third of Punjab‘s schools are urban (Punjab 
Department of Education, 2012). 
Economic facts can help to situate education in the context of whether or not higher 





1992). It is clear from Pakistan‘s data that low education occurs alongside relatively low 
economic growth and low GDP per capita (compared to for instance, India). The country has a 
primarily agricultural economy mostly based on wheat, cotton, sugar, rice, fruits etc. Although 
the agricultural sector has recently had a decreasing growth rate (Pakistan Economic Survey, 
2008), the total economy has grown at an average rate of 6.6 percent per year over the past five 
years (before 2008). During the six years before 2008, GDP increased by 4.5% per year and 
GDP per capita increased by 13.5% per year ($586 in 2002-03 to $1085 in 2007-08). The official 
unemployment rate was 5.3% in 2006-07 (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2008). In 2011, multiple-
dimensioned poverty (low income, health, fundamental freedom of action, resistance to natural 
disasters etc.) stood at around 50% of the population (United Nations Human Development 
Report, 2011). Expenditure-wise, education and health seem to have two of the smallest shares in 
GDP – 2.711 and 2.6% in 2009 (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2009) versus about 3.1% on 
education in India in 2006 (CIA World Factbook, 2012). Therefore, low earnings and low 
education (education statistics are described in more detail in the next section) are occurring 
simultaneously with or without any correlation. 
Structure-wise, Pakistan is a Parliamentary democracy. The Parliament consists of two 
houses – the Senate (upper house), and the National Assembly (lower house). The 100-member 
Senate is chosen by the President with the Prime Minister‘s suggestions (Government of 
Pakistan, 2012) while the 342-member National Assembly is chosen through an electoral 
process. Below them are the provincial assemblies whose members are also chosen through an 
electoral process. At the federal level, there are 37 ministries including one for privatization but 
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interestingly, not for education since education provision is delegated mostly to the provinces or 
is included under the broader ―development‖ framework. The federal government often decides 
budget allocation and country-wide policies while provincial governments often decide 
implementation of policies and arranges the micro-management framework. An example would 
be the various departments and sub-departments under the Ministry of Education that collect 
data, administer standardize tests, decides teacher salaries etc. Education provision and structure 
in Pakistan is described in more detail below. 
 
1.4 - Education System – Structure, Challenges, and Possible solutions  
 
According to Burki (2001), there are four phases of Pakistan‘s education system, each of 
which translates into four main aspects of the education system. The first phase began in 1972 
when educational institutions were nationalized leading to a permanent expansion of public 
education. The second phase in Pakistan‘s education politicized universities and colleges when 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto wanted to gain support for his political party. This helped in the expansion of 
another component of Pakistan‘s education system – the madrassas12. Graduates of madrassas 
can mostly teach only in Islam-related institutions, such as mosques or other madrassas. Another 
alternative is to join jihadi groups, which are gaining extensive media attention worldwide.  
The third phase of Pakistan‘s education system incorporated Islam into mainstream 
education more concretely by changing the school curricula. This occurred during the 1980s 
under General Zia-ul-Haq and foreign investors (who also expanded madrassas). This part of the 
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education system caters to approximately a million people in private schools, colleges, and 
universities. This sector has also developed links with foreign universities.  
The 1990s saw the fourth phase – investment by foreign donors and institutions through 
policies such as the World Bank‘s Social Action Program.13 This investment led to the formation 
of institutions that provided training for various skills - health sciences, business management, 
accounting, banking, finance, and information technology. This phase carried on into the next 
decade with even more international involvement, for instance, through the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). MDGs require all participating countries to have universal primary 
education. This has been the driving force in Pakistan for many government policies aided by the 
World Bank regarding education quantity and quality. These policies are implemented at both 
national and provincial levels. The structure of Pakistan‘s education system is described below. 
 
1.4.1 - Structure of Pakistan‟s Education System 
Education is divided mainly into national and provincial levels. Higher education and 
cultural centers are mostly the prerogative of the national Ministry of Education (MOE) while 
school level education falls mostly under the authority of the provincial education departments. 
This is partly evident from there being no federal Ministry of Education. Data gathering and 
information disbursement often occurs at the national level, such as in the Academy of 
Educational Planning and Management (AEPAM) and National Education Assessment System 
(NEAS) under the Ministry of Education although much of this data is collected  and provided 
by provincial education bodies. National and provincial ministries of education are related 
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mainly through finance where the national government disburses both conditional and 
unconditional funds to the provincial governments. Management is also somewhat related 
especially since some national level government bodies oversee higher educational institutes (for 
example, National College of Arts in Punjab). However, finance has more common ground 
between national and provincial education bodies than management (MOE, 2011).  
It is also important to discuss Punjab‘s system of education because this dissertation 
focuses on one province‘s schools. At a higher management level, Punjab‘s Education 
Department is responsible for standardized examinations in grades 10
 
and 12 through its Boards 
of Intermediate and Secondary Education in multiple districts. At a lower management level, one 
of the most relevant departments under the government of the Punjab is the School Education 
Department (SED), which can influence trends in enrollment and percentage of private schools 
etc. Besides determining how schools function, SED also runs several autonomous bodies 
including Punjab Examination Commission (PEC) and Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), both 
of which are data sources in this dissertation. Other autonomous bodies include Punjab Teachers 
Foundation, Punjab Textbook Board, and the Punjab Danish schools and Centers of Excellence. 
In addition to its regular monitoring and evaluation efforts for student performance
14
, teacher 
attendance, free textbooks, and online information database, SED‘s acts as a regulatory body for 
Punjab‘s private sector schools. Through SED, the Government of Punjab (i.e. Punjab‘s Chief 
Minister) has recently formed a school reform roadmap, which includes expanding education 
quantity and quality, teacher training, and data collection. The Punjab Education Department 
also began the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (PESRP) through which the 
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government attempted to implement education expansion policies, such as cash subsidies for 
girls and free textbooks in public schools. Significantly, PESRP also entailed the establishment 
of an information warehouse called the Program for Monitoring and Implementation Unit 
(PMIU), which has also been a source of quantitative data for this dissertation.  
According to Punjab Education Department‘ budget allocations, resources are divided 
and distributed based on programs (for instance, PEF and PEC). Most of the budget seems to 
target physical infrastructure and facilities with some emphasis on teacher training and 
evaluation (Punjab MOE, 2011). It seems as if management-wise, several functions and 
resources of education government bodies overlap; for instance, PEAS (Punjab Education 
Assessment System) and PEC perform similar functions of standardized testing but operate as 
two separate entities. Within this context, what are some of the challenges facing Pakistan‘s 
educational attainment and achievement?  
 
1.4.2 - Challenges to Pakistan‟s Education System 
A large challenge faced by Pakistan‘s Education System is that it is short of achieving its 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), one of which is ensuring universal primary education. 
This is despite an increase from 58 to 67 percent in male literacy and an increase from 32 to 42 
percent in female literacy from 2001 to 2006. This increase is, at least partly, because of the 
increase in private education. Reasons for not achieving its MDGs can be the numerous 
problems with education in Pakistan (e.g. Malik, 2007, 2009; Memon, 2007; Burki, 2001, 2005 
etc.). These problems include ―insufficient financial input, low levels of efficiency for 





teaching‖ (Memon, 2007, p. 48) as well as substandard curricula, dropouts, dual (English and 
Urdu) medium of instruction at the secondary level of education, cheating in testing and 
examinations, and overcrowded classrooms (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2002). These 
problems both arise from and result in poor school capacity (as well as low enrollment) and low 
quality of education. 
 
School Capacity 
Poor school capacity refers to inability to enroll more students as well as poor school 
inputs and resources. Since most education problems in Pakistan are inter-related, school 
capacity and student achievement are especially important to study because not only are they the 
result of educational problems, but they can also determine enrollment (for instance, because of 
repetition and dropouts as a result of low achievement) at each education level. Generally, some 
theories attempt to link the dropout problem with student achievement (e.g., Coleman, 1988; 
Newmann et al., 1992; Ogbu, 1992; Rumberger, 2011)15,16. Studying school capacity at the primary 
level is understandably significant because although Pakistan attempts to reach the universal 
primary education MDG, it still experiences high dropout rates throughout its primary school 
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years. For instance, 20 percent of enrolled students drop out from Kindergarten to Class 1 while 
40 percent of primary school students drop out by the time they reach Class 4 (Malik, 2009). 
Dropping out makes it difficult to reap the benefits of primary and secondary enrollment both for 
private and social rates of return although the rates of return (especially private rates in terms of 
earnings) for all countries are considered to be lower now than they were before (Psacharopoulos 
& Woodhall, 1985; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004).
17
  
School capacity is related to the dropout rate so that both can determine the employment 
level of a country. For instance, the 1998 unemployment rate for high school dropouts was 75 
percent higher than for high school graduates in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Education, 
National Center for Education Statistics, 2000). Even if high school dropouts were employed, 
they earned a much lower salary than their graduate counterparts.
18
 Therefore, school capacity as 
related to dropouts can have implications for not just educational attainment, but also for future 
returns to education. 
Considering rates of return as potential consequences of school capacity and enrollment 
is especially significant for developing countries such as Pakistan. This is because the rates of 
return to education in Pakistan have increased – overall rate of return was 4.6 % in 1986 and 
15.4% in 1991 (Katsis et al., 1998). Performing well in tests and staying in school is also 
significant because according to Katsis et al. (1998), returns to secondary education (13.7%) are 
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higher than returns to primary education (8.4%) in Pakistan. Other developing countries or 
countries in South Asia often show a lower rate of return on education than Pakistan because they 
also often already have a higher enrollment rate and income per capita (Psachoropoulos & Patrinos, 
2004). The chart below shows net enrollment rates (total enrollment minus repetition and dropouts) 
for selected countries within a similar band of income per capita. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Net enrollment rates (NER) for selected countries 
 
 Source: UNESCO, 2005. 
 
Pakistan shows the lowest net enrollment rate (68%) in 2005. As mentioned earlier, 





scores. Low school and education quality is another challenge faced by Pakistan in achieving  
universal primary education. This challenge is described in more detail below. 
 
Low School and Education Quality 
Many of Pakistan‘s education problems, such as low quality instruction, are related to 
lower salaries in most of the private sector (compared to the public sector), which lower 
incentives  for teachers to impart quality instruction (excluding high paying elite private schools, 
such as Lahore Grammar, Beaconhouse, and Convent of Jesus and Mary). Lower teacher salaries 
and incentives are in turn tied to the overall low expenditure on education in Pakistan. Total 
expenditure on education as percentage of GDP was 1.8% in 2000-01 and increased to about 
2.7% in 2009 (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2008-2009), which is still less than India‘s 3.1% in 
2006 (CIA World Factbook, 2012). Other countries comparable to Pakistan include Bangladesh 
(both South Asian and Muslim majority), with a 2.4% of GDP education expenditure in 2008; 
Iran (neighboring and Muslim majority) with a 4.70% of GDP expenditure in 2009; and Egypt 
(PPP policies and Muslim majority) with 3.8% of GDP expenditure in 2008 (CIA World 
Factbook, 2012). These numbers show that in general, countries with lower GDP per capita, such 
as Pakistan and Bangladesh, spend less on education than countries with slightly higher GDP per 
capita, such as Egypt and Iran
19
. Lower expenditure on education and lower education quality 
also means that there is less than required access to quality education for achieving MDGs. It 
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 This gender inequity is 
evident through the low gender parity index of Pakistan versus other countries as shown below. 
 
Figure 2 – Gender Parity Index for selected countries 
 
Source: UNESCO, 2005 
Note: GPI = Gender parity index 
 
 
Pakistan has the lowest gender parity index as well as the lowest net enrollment rate 
among nine countries selected by relative income and region. Lower education quality can also 
translate into lower student achievement. However, since Pakistan has so far not participated in 
standardized international tests (such as the Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study), it is impossible to make a definite claim about relative student achievement in Pakistan 
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versus other countries. Since low quality education is a possible indicator of low school capacity 
and other challenges in Pakistan‘s education, some potential solutions are policy alternatives to 
counter these challenges. These policy alternatives include improving quality of public, private, 
and increasingly, PPP schools. 
 
1.4.3 - Potential Solutions 
As mentioned above, policy options to address low school capacity and education 
performance in Pakistan include dealing with three types of schools – public, private, and PPP 
schools. According to Patrinos et al. (2009) and Table 1 in Chapter 2, finance and management 
provide useful criteria by which to classify school types. Finance in this dissertation‘s context 
refers to monetary funding in terms of grants or aid (not loans) that can be used to build and 
maintain school facilities, pay staff and teacher salaries, and be used for any other expense. 
Management refers to how funding is allocated and used for physical and human resources, 
school discipline, curricula etc.  
Some past and potential future attempts with each school type are described below.  
 
Improving public schools 
In this dissertation, public schools refer to schools that are run by Punjab‘s Ministry of 
Education. These schools are funded by the government (both federal and provincial) in terms of 
their physical and human assets. These assets include school building, facilities, and teachers and 
staff that are hired through the government‘s own employment system where teachers also get 





students where the Punjab government also has programs for free textbook distribution. 
Management of public schools begins at the district level, which is one level below the province 
as a political unit. Management at the district level has the authority to disburse funds, deal with 
human resources in schools, and monitor school building and facilities. Public school curriculum 
is decided at the provincial level and so are discipline policies for students, faculty, and staff. 
Therefore, both finance and management of public schools are the prerogative of the 
government. 
Improving public schools at the primary and secondary levels of education is significant 
because as Burki (2001) claims, the public education sector is beset by problems such as poorly 
trained teachers, substandard and outdated curricula, and corruption. Since the public school 
sector is the largest education provision system in Pakistan (in Punjab alone, 70% of schools are 
public), its problems can affect the largest number of students. Students graduating from the poor 
public education system mostly find jobs in the public sector, which is consequently managed by 
an incompetent workforce. This results in a vicious cycle between the education system and the 
policy making government.  
One of the methods to improve public schools‘ performance is to reduce the size of the 
public sector. The large size of the public education sector, as described earlier, is partly obvious 
by the sheer number of education departments in Punjab, which can lead to inefficiency in 
education provision and resource duplication. However, federal and provincial governments in 
Pakistan have been hesitant to reduce the size of the public sector, including education, because 
such a step would lead to large scale unemployment among the existing workforce (Government 





improve public schools is to increase school resources, such as expenditure per student, teaching 
materials, school facilities and infrastructure, teacher training etc. (Hanushek, 1996). However, 
like decreasing the public sector size, this method has also not been as successful as expected 
even in developing countries (Tooley, 2007). In Pakistan, this is true at least for Punjab because 
although the World Bank funded and encouraged the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program 
(PESRP) beginning in 2003 through free textbooks and transportation for girls, the program did 
not yield its desired results (PMIU, 2011; PESRP, 2011).  
In addition, there are also disagreements among policy makers, especially with changes 
in the ruling democratic party, so that policies are discontinued even if they could have been 
beneficial in the long run (Ministry of Education, 2012). For instance, the Higher Education 
Commission faced considerable political opposition in 2011 and the Punjab government 
suddenly shifted its focus to the Chief Minister‘s new ―roadmap‖ instead of focusing on 
improvement or lessons from past policies. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, the World Bank encouraged privatization of the public sector and 
establishment of more private schools to counter problems faced by the public sector (Burki, 
2001). Among others, Tooley et al. (2007) has also advocated the low cost private school 
approach.
22
 This private school improvement policy is already underway as is partly obvious 
through the increasing the role of the private education sector (Malik, 2009) and is discussed in 
the next section.  
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Improving Private Schools 
Private schools in Punjab are not run by the government except for a government body 
called Schools Education Department, which keeps track of the number of private schools and 
their locations etc. Private schools are also expected to be officially registered with the 
government although not all of them are. They are financed by individual owners or by non-
profit organizations. Hiring and firing of staff and teachers, student fees, and initial investment 
are all the responsibility of the school owner. Depending on the school size and enrollment, 
private school management can retain its authority at the owner level for small schools or can be 
delegated to even teachers for large schools. School curriculum for private school varies from 
following Punjab‘s state curricula to following the University of Cambridge‘s international 
curricula. Low cost private schools often follow the Punjab government‘s curricula for all 
subjects, which makes these schools easy substitutes if parents are dissatisfied with education 
delivery of public schools. 
Recently, private schools have been gaining popularity and are being established 
frequently especially in urban areas. According to the Federal Bureau of Statistics (2002), there 
were 36,096 private schools in Pakistan in 2002 out of which 66.4% were in Punjab, 17.9% in 
Sindh, 12.3% in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
23
, 1.5% in Balochistan, and 1% in Islamabad Capital 
Territory. About 61% of private schools are in urban areas. In 2005, the National Education 
Census showed that there were 76047 private education institutions (33 percent of all educational 
institutions). Out of the nine selected countries used in previous figures, Pakistan has the lowest net 
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enrollment rate but as shown below, it has the highest proportion of students in private schools (~30 
percent).  
Figure 3 – Percentage of primary school students in Private Education for selected countries 
 
Source: UNESCO, 2005 
 
For the above countries with available data, the private education expenditures as 
percentage of total GDP are 1% for India and 0.3% for Indonesia (World Bank, 2002-03).  
Although the same statistic for Pakistan is unavailable, private schools cost students about 4 
times as much as public schools in rural and urban areas alike (Pakistan Integrated Household 
Survey, 2002). Even with government subsidies for public and private schools, such as through 
PESRP, much of education costs are borne by families (e.g. uniforms, participation in field trips, 
standardized exams etc.) (Tsang, 1997). This can also lead to more income disparity where the 





gain skills that provide them with more high paying jobs (Rothstein, 2004). Elite private schools 
are especially considered an indicator of class and ability (PEF, 2011).  
However, private school enrollment in Pakistan is increasing despite higher costs and the 
government (sometimes through World Bank funding, such as in Balochistan) is encouraging 
private schools despite greater income disparity
24
. If this is an indicator of higher education 
quality (or at least the belief in it) in private schools, it can significantly inform policy. For 
instance, the government can adopt policies to lower private costs of education, perhaps through 
public-private partnerships, so that quality education is more widely accessible. Therefore, 
besides private schools, another policy alternative to increase educational quality is establishing 
public-private partnerships (PPPs). Like private schools, this policy is also fast gaining 
popularity especially since the World Bank supports PPPs through loans and grants. PPPs as a 
policy alternative in Pakistan are described in more detail below. 
 
Establishing and improving Public-private partnerships in Education 
Public and private are often seen as opposite ends of a spectrum such that PPPs can be 
seen as falling between the two ends – see Appendix D (Patrinos et al., 2009; Levin, 1999; 
Malik, 2009). Galetovic et al. (2009) agree with this classification since they categorize service 
provision into traditional/public, PPPs, and private. This also implies that one type of PPP can 
have a more ―public‖ component while another can have a more ―private‖ component, which 
can even depend on a country‘s context (Patrinos, 2009; Levin, 1999).25 
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Documents by the World Bank (e.g. 2006, 2009) argue for the success of PPPs by 
showing that Pakistan follows multiple PPP models to cater towards different educational quality 
needs. The first PPP model consists of public schools being aided by the private sector, most 
often a non-government organization (NGO). For instance, the Punjab‘s Directorate of Education 
had partnered with an NGO called Idara-e-Taleem-o-Agahi whose main purpose is to 
temporarily advise the Directorate on pedagogical and human services matters under an adopt-a-
school program. More specifically, the NGO dealt with low performing public schools to 
improve their budgeting, planning, management, and pedagogical skills (Sarwar, 2006 as cited in 
Patrinos et al., 2009)
 26
. The partnership usually lasted for about 3-4 years – one year to perform 
its function, and the last 2-3 years to transfer operations back to the Directorate. Another 
example is the NGO Cooperation for Advancement, Rehabilitation, and Education (CARE) hired 
by the district governments of Lahore and Sargodha in Punjab where besides management, 
CARE employed one-third of total 3000 teachers and the government employed the rest 
(Patrinos et al., 2009). For-profit education systems, such as Beaconhouse, also managed some 
public schools set up the Pakistan Railways (PR) under PR‘s regulation27. As will be discussed in 
later chapters regarding the general PPP structure, the Directorate‘s and district governments‘ 
arrangement with the NGO had the advantage of a contractual partnership instead of just the 
private sector donating funds to the adopted public school.  
                                                                                                                                                             




 Patrinos et al. (2009) refers to a World Bank document on PPPs in education. 
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Another common PPP model in Pakistan is public finance and private management. 
Public-private partnership schools, which here are the FAS program schools partnering with 
PEF, broadly have public finance and private management (PEF, 2004-2012). This means that 
the government provides subsidies to low cost private schools to cover student fees and even 
other costs if the subsidy is greater than student fees.  In return, these private schools are 
expected by the government to spend their financial resources on providing a higher quality of 
education for which they have to at least maintain a minimum level of school facilities. The 
government regulates these FAS program schools through two primary mechanism – one, if the 
school does not meet a minimum facility criterion, the partnership contract can end. Two, the 
government monitors the performance of these schools by conducting standardized tests called 
Quality Assessment Tests. If a school meets the test criteria, the partnership continues. In this 
sense, the government indirectly influences a school‘s management although theoretically, PEF 
does not interfere with the micro-operations of a school or how the funds are spent, teachers are 
paid, and staff is managed.
28
  
Beside subsidies to private schools, the government also supports vouchers through this 
second PPP model, especially to girls through the Urban Girls Fellowship, under the World 
Bank‘s Balochistan Education Support Project set up in 1995 (although this program was not 
successfully implemented for long) (Patrinos et al., 2009). For this project, partners included the 
government, private schools, and education consumers (through parent committees). However, 
these vouchers were also submitted to schools and were limited to 100 girls. Another example of 
public finance and private management PPP model was the Basic Education Support Program, 
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also set up by the World Bank in Balochistan but with different partners – the World Bank, the 
government, rural community schools, and private schools. The objective of this program was to 
set up more private schools (especially in rural areas) with a four year subsidy per student. 
A third PPP arrangement in Pakistan is where the private sector deals with both the 
public and private sectors. Patrinos et al. (2009) describe the Cluster-Based teacher training 
program that was implemented in Punjab to improve teachers‘ content knowledge and skills in 
clusters consisting of one public and two private schools. Another example is the Quality 
Assurance Certification Program that aids parents‘ school choice decisions by categorizing 
schools according to certain quality criteria and also providing capacity building training in both 
public and private schools. At a national level in Pakistan, the Agha Khan Foundation services (a 
private NGO) partners with the Directorate of Private Education to strengthen management 
practices and instructional skills in low cost private schools (LaRocque, 2008 as cited in Patrinos 
et al., 2009). Generally, these examples imply the private sector working with government 
bodies (Directorates) that in turn manage PPPs, fund private schools, and regulate private 
programs in public schools
29
. 
Additionally, at the very least, formal education for each child is also a public-private 
partnership because it can be called a school-parent partnership since a child learns from both 
home and school, and from how much the goals of each support or contradict each other (Levin, 
1999). However, formal relationships between the public education system and various private 
sector entities were ―modest in scope‖ compared to other school types (Levin, 1999, p. 124), at 
least for the U.S., which makes it interesting to examine their structure. These formal 
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relationships were modest in scope for other countries as well although over the past few years, 
PPPs in developing countries, such as Pakistan, have been rising in quantity and quality. For 
instance, in Punjab, Pakistan, the Punjab Education Foundation is the main public sector 
organization that partners with private schools through the 8 year old Foundation Assisted 
Schools (FAS) program, which now has more than 2000 partner schools (PEF, 2012).  
According to Patrinos et al. (2009)
30
, the rise of PPPs in Pakistan was facilitated by its 
correct implementation by both the government and the World Bank, which depended on 
allowing low cost private schools to meet demand for schooling. These low cost private schools 
were already on the rise since 2000 (Andrabi et al., 2008 as cited in Patrinos et al. (2009)) with 
an increase of 15,000 private schools within five years in both rural and urban areas. Enrollment 
of rural low income students in these private schools increased from 0 to 6 percent between 2000 
and 2005 so that when the Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) established its PPP program in 
2004, it was able to support an already increasing private school sector. Since PEF‘s flagship 
PPP FAS program is the largest in Punjab and the public finance/private management model is 
currently the most common in Pakistan (Patrinos et al., 2009), this PPP model is chosen to be 
compared to public and private schools in this dissertation. 
Based on the discussion above, this dissertation is aiming to compare the quality of 
education of PPP schools versus public and private schools using existing data on student 
achievement. This dissertation is also aiming to find out what parental preferences are when it 
comes to school choice in order to inform policy about potentially partnering with schools that 
meet these preferences. Keeping these aims in mind, the dissertation is organized as follows: 
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chapter 2 discusses the background and literature review of public, private, and PPP schools as 
means of improving educational quality. Chapter 2 also describes the specific PPP program 
being analyzed in this dissertation. In order to answer the first research question, chapter 3 
begins by outlining the data and then conducts a statistical comparison of all three school types. 
As a continuation, chapter 4 answers the first research question by first describing the specific 
empirical method being used, and then by empirically comparing public schools to both private 
and PPP schools. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the second research question. Chapter 5 describes 
the issues, literature review, and background of religion in education in Pakistan. It also 
discusses the qualitative methods being used to answer the second research question. Chapter 6 
attempts to answer the second research question by analyzing data collected through qualitative 
methods. Chapter 7 ends the dissertation by combining the analyses from both research questions 
and examining PPP dynamics, policy implications, and future research. 
The next chapter (chapter 2) discusses research and policy literature dealing with all three 

















Building on the previous chapter‘s introduction of three school types (public, private, 
and public-private partnership) and their relationship with education quality, chapter two 
discusses theoretical and empirical research literature relating these school types and education 
quality. The discussion focuses more on public-private partnerships (PPPs) in education and 
provides a background for comparing the effectiveness of the three school types in terms of 
increasing educational quality measured by student achievement. The chapter ends with a 
description of the specific PPP program (called the Foundation Assisted Schools program) 
being compared to public and private schools in this dissertation.  
From a broader research literature perspective, the study of school types can be seen as part 
of institutional economics
31, which has been making a ―quiet comeback‖ in the recent decades 
especially because the neo-classical model of economics is ―insufficient‖ (Krugman, 2009, 
accessed 02/19/10). Since education cannot be considered a pure public good (as described 
later), what is its institutional structure especially in Pakistan‘s context? In answering this 
question, I use the governance component of institutions as defined in the previous chapter
32
. 
How does education work as an institution? From an economic perspective, the production 
function is one possible way of describing and analyzing education (Carnoy, 2006; Hanushek, 
1995). All three steps of the production process in education – inputs, processes, and outcomes 
are highly debated. For instance, from an inputs perspective, is teacher certification necessary 
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to raise student achievement scores as an output (Hanushek, 1995)? These inputs go through a 
certain process in order to produce educational outcomes (Carnoy, 2006). In the traditional 
production function, institutions are the most important input (Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 
2004)
33
. Public, private, and PPP schools are three types of schools that act as institutions and 
possibly use different schooling inputs or at least process these inputs differently. The 
following is a discussion of these three school type structures and issues. 
 
2.1 – Public schools 
 
Since education serves both public and private interests (e.g. by instilling citizenship 
values and by making individuals more productive, respectively) (Levin, 1987; Minow, 2003), 
the first economic question to consider is whether or not education is a public good. Since the 
mass expansion of education (Green, 1990; Boli & Thomas, 1999; Boli, Meyer & Ramirez, 
1985), education and schooling citizens has been a state/public sector‘s responsibility in order 
to reproduce economic, social, and political institutions (Gutmann, 1987). However, a public 
good has to be necessarily non-excludable and non-rival. It can be argued that education is 
non-excludable in ―developing‖34 countries like Pakistan where education is mandatory for all 
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 Although some scholars suggest that a production function has only physical inputs (Schmid, 2005), others claim 
that institutions affect the use of such physical inputs and their allocation (North, 1991). According to Carnoy 
(2005), physical inputs can be considered the hardware of a production function, which would make educational 
institutions the software of the production function. 
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 Development is a widely debated term and unlike many other economic studies, in this context, it is used in a 
broader level that includes institutions and societal growth rather than just economic growth (Sen, 1999). Sen (1999) 
also includes freedom as both a cause and effect of development. Similarly, ―modern‖ is also a contested word that 
implies economic growth for some (Schultz, 1971; Rostow, 1991) institutional structures for others (Boli, Meyer, 
and Ramirez, 1985) and has yet other meanings for other theorists. However, a country is still the relevant unit of 





according to Education for All (―Learning for All‖ according to the World Bank‘s 2020 
Education Strategy) and the Millennium Development Goals (Jones, 2006). However, within 
educational institutions themselves, such as schools, specific resources can still be rival and 
excludable – for instance, a teacher‘s time cannot cater to all students simultaneously and if 
enrollment exceeds expectations, free textbooks might also not be available to all students.
35
 
This implies that instead of being a public good, education is a public service provided by the 
public sector (as well as the private sector) even if it has positive externalities
36
.  
Within this context, a public school can be defined as ―a school that is owned, funded 
and operated by government, with teachers and those supporting the work of teachers at the 
school site being employees of government‖ (Caldwell & Keating, 2004, p. 19). Structure-
wise, it is important to see if the finance and management of public schooling are centralized or 
decentralized. Centralization and decentralization can be related to arguments of efficiency, 
which is considered significant in producing higher quality education (Carnoy, 2006). In 
Pakistan, control of education is fairly decentralized until the tehsil level (equivalent of U.S. 
county) and financially, public schools depend on federal and provincial allocations of 
resources. Although provincial allocation of finance has the advantage of increasing equity in 
expenditure levels across districts and tehsils etc., it also means that the provincial government 
(or even the federal government at times) can impose a greater tax burden on the public, 
especially in the case of a general tax. Supporters of decentralization for both collecting 
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funding and/or expenditure also argue that local sources of funding can have the advantage of 
allowing residents to directly see the results of their contributions, possibly increase a sense of 
community participation and accountability e.g. in Brazil and Chile (Winkler 1993, Carnoy 
2006), and increase motivation for education achievement.  
Management-wise, another argument for decentralization, the sixth five-year plan of 
Pakistan discusses ―casualties‖ of central government control of education – low quantity and 
quality of education due to an increased financial burden (Government of Pakistan, 1982, p. 
318-319). In terms of curriculum reform (also referred to as the ―hardware‖ of the teaching 
process (Carnoy, 2006)), it can be argued that decentralizing curriculum control can increase 
achievement because of a community‘s greater ability to discern instructional needs (e.g. 
students‘ mother tongue), respond with greater sensitivity to local variation, and provide more 
choice for consumers (i.e. parents and students) (Bray, 1984).  
Conversely, what happens when local school resources are insufficient to meet local 
needs or where fiscal capacity varies across states or schools (a common occurrence in 
developing countries that can even lead to social unrest; Winkler, 1993)? Then central control 
and disbursement of funds can be helpful. Moreover, providing funding to public schools 
without expenditure guidelines (an example of decentralization) can exacerbate inequity and 
even reduce absolute enrollment etc. For instance, federal decentralization of resources in 
China increased inequality in educational attainment because of greater local government 
corruption (Chen, 2004). This can also be true of developed countries, such as for the 1965 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in the U.S., which could not prevent the 





regulations for education expenditure can ―permit more efficient deployment of these 
resources‖ (Guthrie 1997, p. 34) to, for instance, more disadvantaged schools. In turn, 
efficiency in using resources can increase achievement of low income students, and hence also 
reduce achievement inequity.  
In addition, as far as management and implementing reforms is concerned, 
decentralizing might not be ―good‖ because low income states and municipalities in 
developing countries, such as Pakistan, with weak accountability mechanisms are often unable 
to translate reform ideas (e.g. by Ministries of Education) into practice (Chile and Brazil; 
Carnoy & McEwan, 2001). Moreover, greater state effort to expand education can lead to 
positive externalities through building citizenship and social capital that, in turn, can increase 
educational achievement (Carnoy, 2006). In terms of curriculum reform, a central control is 
advantageous because redundancy in curriculum planning, reinventing the wheel, and resource 
duplication can be prevented to make curriculum more achievement related. It is also important 
to note that greater centralized school management in curriculum does not necessarily equal 
uniformity in curriculum. Many centralized developing countries attempt to ―differentiate the 
curriculum to meet the instructional needs of different social groups‖ (Winkler 1993, p. 109), 
and also interpret standardized scores data to increase achievement and equity.
37
 
For instance, one important aspect of implementing curriculum properly is having 
knowledgeable and skilled teachers that are often trained successfully at the federal level, e.g. 
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in Cuba (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005)
38
. This central training ensures that most Cuban teachers 
are well-versed in using math ―technology‖ in classrooms, not only facilitating student 
achievement but also promoting achievement equity due to uniformly high standard training
39
. 
In contrast, where schools have either a choice of which curriculum to implement, as well as 
where teachers are not trained centrally (e.g. in Brazil), student achievement can vary widely, 
especially when teachers cannot meet curriculum demands in low-income areas. Therefore, it 
seems that more central control of curriculum formation and management can lead to higher 
student achievement and equity in developing countries.
40
  
As a qualification, it is important to keep in mind that decentralization itself cannot 
occur without the prerogative of the central administration. Paradoxically, decentralization can 
even lead to greater control by the central government (Winkler, 1993; Roseneau, 2000) in its 
effort to ensure that authorities with delegated power are using it for the right purposes and 
with appropriate measures (Weiler, 1990). Moreover, the exact mix of centralization and 
decentralization can depend on the values attached to achievement, equity, and social cohesion 
by the society. For instance, those who highly value equity in education might argue for more 
centralized school finance and management while those who value achievement and productive 
efficiency might argue against centralized school finance and management (Winkler, 1993). 
Therefore, complete decentralization in school finance and expenditure, and school 
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2010), Pakistan‘s population stands at about 170 million (World Development Indicators, 2010). Moreover, Pakistan 
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state (CIA World Factbook, 2011). 
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management is not always ―good‖ for achievement and equity in developing countries. Thus it 
is obvious that the existence and quality of public schools will depend on both the communal 
fabric and government provision of public services. 
Summing up the discussion above, it seems that all public schools share some similar 
characteristics and pro-public-schools arguments, while other characteristics and arguments 
differ by the extent of decentralization of public education. Similar characteristics include the 
main funding source (government), faculty and staff (selected through a government 
mechanism), and certain mandatory facilities in all schools. Decentralization can differentiate 
school management, the process of faculty and staff selection, and fund disbursement. 
Arguments in favor of public education include focus on equity, wider access, and no or low 
costs of schooling. Decentralization can further argue for more targeted equity and access, 
more relevant curricula, and greater responsiveness to local needs. However, there are several 
disadvantages of public education and schools, which can form a basis of arguing in favor of 
private schools. 
One weakness of public education, especially in developing countries, is that it can lead 
to a vicious cycle of inequity through a self-actualization process. This is due to the difference 
between public and private school students and family backgrounds of these students 
(Dronkers & Robert, 2003). For instance, parents of private school students are possibly 
generally more well-off than parents of public school students since the former can afford to 
pay private school fees whereas public schools have no or very low cost of attendance. Lower 
income parents whose children attend public schools are also less able to provide their children 





running the household, which can decrease study time for public school students. 
Consequently, students from public school might also achieve a lower level of learning than 
private school students, which will not result in high earning jobs
41
. It will also result in private 
schools attracting more able students who further lead to better private school learning and 
performance. Conversely, public school graduates might become public sector employees or 
ill-trained public school teachers, thus reinforcing the cycle between education and earnings, 
and leading to greater income gaps between public and private school graduates. 
One of the issues to keep in mind when discussing public schools is that the public 
education sector does not only have a formal administrative and financial structure as described 
earlier, but there is also an informal structure in public education. An example of this informal 
structure is the tie(s) between management and teachers, which can in turn lead to an 
environment more conducive for better student performance (Dronkers & Robert, 2003). For 
instance, if school boards are willing to provide teachers with their desired resources, teacher 
absenteeism and protests against unfavorable school practices can decrease allowing teachers 
to focus on student learning.  
Therefore, both formal and informal structures of public education can influence 
teacher morale, motivation, learning environment, and hence the effectiveness of teaching and 
learning (Dronkers and Robert, 2003). This means that if public schools are arguably plagued 
with corruption, nepotism, bureaucracy etc. (e.g. Shah et al., 2004), unconstructive behavioral 
patterns of school management, teachers, and students are likely to emerge. These potential 
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weaknesses of public schools encourage establishment and government support of private 
schools, which are discussed below. 
 
2.2 – Private schools 
Education can be considered a productive private good if it can perform efficiently in a 
market setting (Carnoy, 2006; Friedman, 1962; Hoxby, 1996). This is in accordance with 
neoclassical welfare economics that shows that private education in a competitive market is the 
most efficient way to use education resources (Lamdin & Mintrom, 1997). In an economics of 
education context, schools (representing firms providing education as a good) compete with 
each other for students and parents (customers). In doing so and assuming perfect information 
for customers, education quality is supposed to increase (Friedman, 1962).  
Using this private good argument, privatization of education has been touted as a means of 
addressing bureaucracy and hence improving achievement and equity (The World Bank, 1988; 
Winkler, 1993 etc.) so that goals of high rates of return and economic growth can be achieved. 
Arguments for privatizing finance and/or management of schools draw upon claims of more 
choice and innovation; reflection of community interests; less corruption; lower costs for the 
government; greater flexibility; risk sharing; and higher efficiency in use of resources in order 
to raise educational achievement of students (Patrinos et al., 2009; Carnoy, Gove, & Marshall, 
2007; Lockheed & Jimenez, 1996; Winkler, 1993; Harrison, 2005; Orazem, 2000). In contrast, 
arguments against private schools include greater inequity in educational access and 
achievement; resistance from stakeholders; prerequisite of capacity building of public and 





increased costs in some types of private schools (Patrinos et al., 2009; Carnoy & Marshall, 
2005; Roseneau, 2000). It is clear that arguments for and against private schools include both 
financial and management components of education provision. 
Taking the production function approach for education, school finance can act as an 
input into the schooling production function where the desired outcomes are higher 
achievement and equity in achievement. Private schools do not receive any local, regional or 
nation level public funding and instead rely completely on fees, donations (especially low and 
middle cost schools), sponsorships, and parental fundraising. Elite private schools are 
especially dependent on high student tuition, facility, and extra-curricular fees although they 
also sometimes provide scholarships to high achieving but low income students to create a 
―cream-skimming‖ effect. Moreover, despite counter-arguments (by, for instance, Sarangapani 
(2009) who argues for completely public schooling), Jain and Dholakia (2010) suggest that one 
way of encouraging the private sector‘s growth is to encourage low cost private schools that 
pay low teacher salaries as a way of decreasing costs as well as increasing incentives to 
provide better facilities to students and staff. Tooley et al. (2007) also argue that low cost 
private schools with low teacher salaries do not perform worse than public schools with high 
teacher salaries, perhaps because of close teacher supervision in private schools versus low 
teacher attendance and supervision in public schools. 
Management of school inputs can be seen as a process in the schooling production 
function. Private goods are most often supplied by for-profit and non-profit organizations, 
including religious organizations, usually in an attempt to provide public services such as 





their independence is still somewhat threatened if the government sets criteria for some 
socialization of students, or if other influences, such as university admission criteria, determine 
private schools‘ curricula (Dronkers & Roberts, 2003). Moreover, teachers are an important 
component of how curriculum is taught to students so that not only are teachers inputs, they 
can also act as processes, for instance, through receiving teaching training. A disadvantage of 
the private school sector, at least in Pakistan, is that private schools do not have a vested 
interest in training teachers since it is costly. In contrast, all public school teachers are trained 
at a central training facility (PMIU, 2011). Yet, Harrison (2005) argues that public sector 
deployment of teachers will lower teaching quality because of an inadequate incentive 
structure whereas the involvement of the private sector will encourage teachers to be more hard 
working and effective because they have an incentive to be rewarded by the market (Hoxby, 
2001)
42
.  The greatest independence of private schools is their ability to admit their desired 
number and type(s) of students (Dronkers & Robert, 2003).
43
 
One of the problems with private schooling is that it can increase inequity. The concept 
of equity in educational opportunities and choice can be divided into horizontal and vertical 
equity (Reich, 2006). Horizontal equity refers to the idea that students with similar or different 
abilities should be able to access the same kinds of schools regardless of parental income – 
―one scholar, one dollar‖ principle (Wise, 1967). Vertical equity is the idea that students with 
greater ability should be able to access higher quality schools or that certain ―needy‖ students, 
for instance, those who are disadvantaged by lower income or disabilities, might require 
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additional resources to overcome such disadvantages (Reich, 2006). In other words, although 
equity is not just based on income, horizontal equity fiscally means treating similar students 
similarly and vertical equity means treating different students differently. While efficiency 
measures look at gains in educational attainment and achievement, measures for equity can 
consist of the same indicators but also examine the gaps among income groups. Private schools 
can violate both horizontal and vertical equity by choosing their students based on income or 
ability. 
Another argument against private schools is that assumptions of perfectly competitive 
markets, such as perfect information for all market players, are not realistic (Valila, 2005). 
Market failure can also occur through market monopolization, positive and negative spillover 
effects (externalities), and incomplete markets (Lamdin & Mintrom, 1997). Additionally, it is 
sometimes argued that private schools do not instill the necessary social cohesion and 
democratic values among students (Patrinos et al., 2009). These arguments claim that the 
public sector component of education leads to a functioning democratic society and using 
education as a private good can hinder society from achieving its public aim (Levin, 1991). 
This is considered an example of market failure and the only way to increase social welfare is 
to have the state provide a public good or service (Valila, 2005). Moreover, even if markets can 
provide efficient outcomes for public services, the public sector sometimes intervenes for 
reasons of equity and consumption of ―merit goods.‖ Education is an example of ―goods that 





public sector intervenes to ensure citizens attain at least a minimum level of education (Valila, 
2005, p.  97).
44
 
From the discussion so far about both public and private goods, it appears that they 
serve opposing functions (e.g. public service versus non maximization) and are consequently 
organizationally different. However, an important issue to keep in mind is that the distinction 
between public and private schools is still crude. This is because according to Dronkers and 
Robert (2003), both school types can have a similar historical friction between the Church and 
market forces, single Church and multiple churches orientation, affiliations (weak or strong) 
with multiple political parties, and recent versus traditional approaches to education. Different 
reasons can lead to different extents of state authority as well as different within-school 
organization and delegation of authority. Yet it is still possible that public and private schools 
serve the same function in society, especially if it relates to equity or a degree of 
socialization/social cohesion (Dronkers and Robert, 2003). Given this context, it is interesting 
to examine a new school type that combines public and private sectors through public-private 
partnerships, as described below. 
 
2.3 – Public-private partnerships 
 
According to the Punjab Education Foundation, ―PPP is an efficient and time tested 
mechanism to encourage and promote market-based social entrepreneurship‖ (Malik, 2007). 
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This sentence brings together several themes discussed in the literature regarding PPPs – 
efficiency, mechanism, market-based, and social entrepreneurship. These themes are also inter-
related; for instance, some mechanisms are more efficient than others. Friedman‘s 1962 
voucher proposal was one of the first formal PPP proposals to combine government funding 
with a market mechanism that was considered more efficient.  In the following literature 
review focusing on these themes, I rely to a large extent on Galetovic et al. (2009) and Patrinos 
et al. (2009)
45
 in laying the groundwork for my conceptual framework and details for PPPs. 
Generally, PPPs seem to be an increasing part of ―modern societies‖ that call for 
―flexible and diverse approaches‖ (Caldwell & Keating, 2009, p.i)46. Modernity now also 
refers to institutional development (Sen, 1999, The World Bank, 2010). One indication of 
institutional development is to combine the public and private into a unique partnership where 
developing countries are now following developed countries that have had PPPs since a while, 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia etc. For instance, in 
1999, there were about 40 education management organizations being traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange (Powers & Cookson, 1999).  
As far as PPPs as an institutional type are concerned, can PPPs act as inputs as well as 
processes in an education production function? This question is relevant since in PPPs like the 
Foundation Assisted Schools in Punjab, Pakistan, educational inputs including institutions 
(Rodrik et al., 2004) are processed through an institution itself - a PPP. Arguments in support 
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of and in disagreement with PPPs as well as the description of their structure help to answer 
this question. The next section describes the structure of PPPs. 
 
2.3.1 - Structure of PPPs 
There can be various types of PPPs according to how finance and management are 
assigned. This dissertation only examines the finance and management mechanisms of PPPs 
although there are other aspects that can be analyzed as well (for instance, family input, non-
profit partners etc.; Belfield and Levin, 2005). The reason is Punjab Education Foundation‘s 
own emphasis on only finance and management in terms of how it forms its public-private 
partnerships in the FAS program (PEF, 2009; PEF, personal communication, November 11
th
, 
2011). The box below shows this conceptually: 
 
Table 1 - Various divisions of management and finance in PPPs 
 Finance (f) 
Management (m) 
1. Public (m)/Public (f) 2. Public (m)/Private (f) 
3. Private (m) /Public(f) 4. Private (m)/Private(f) 
Source: Author‘s own analysis based on literature; Lamdin & Mintrom (1997). 
 
At one extreme, public schooling is an example of the first cell whereas purely private 
schooling or homeschooling is the other extreme shown in cell 4. In other cases, for instance, if 
education PPPs consist of private firms managing public schools, such as in Abu Dhabi, and 





Keating, 2004), then the financing will often come through user fees (i.e. student fees). These 
user fees could in turn be paid by the government on behalf of the students. This will 
correspond to the second cell in the box above because schools are public. If education PPPs 
consist of the public sector (Ministry of Education, local, provincial, or federal) supporting 
privately provided education, then the financing will often come through government 
subsidies/transfers (such as in the Foundation Assisted Schools in Punjab, Pakistan), 
guarantees, shadow fees
47
, and availability payments. This will correspond to the third cell in 
the box above because the schools are private.  
In other words, PPPs in education can be demand-sided (second cell)
48
 from the 
government‘s perspective because the government demands services of the private sector in 
managing public schools while often paying user fees itself. Jain and Dholakia (2010) argue 
that rather than government financing through for instance, vouchers, management of public 
education institutions by private entities is a more efficient way of using scarce resources (6 
percent of GDP) to improve educational quality in India. PPPs can also be supply-sided from 
the government‘s perspective (third cell) since the public sector provides funds so that private 
schools can deliver quality education on the former‘s behalf. The FAS program in Punjab (cell 
3 in Table 1), is an example of a supply-sided PPP (Patrinos et al., 2009). However, both 
demand and supply side financial incentive PPPs are essentially subsidies to the private sector 
without which the private sector would provide a ―suboptimal quantity and quality of the 
service in question‖ (Valila, 2005, p. 108). 
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 Despite differences in specifications, PPPs have one thing in common – a contract or an 
―interactive‖ arrangement between the public and private sectors, which makes them different 
from mere government concessions (Valila, 2005). For instance, Grimsey and Lewis (2004) 
define PPPs as ―...arrangements whereby private parties participate in, or provide support for, 
the provision of infrastructure, and [...] a project results in a contract for a private entity to 
deliver public infrastructure-based services.‖ According to the U.S. National Council for 
Public-Private Partnerships, a PPP is a ―a contractual agreement between a public agency 
(federal, state or local) and a private sector entity [whereby] the skills and assets of each [...] 
are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In addition [...], 
each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or 
facility.‖ 
In other words, the existence and structure of PPPs rely heavily on their incentive 
structure and this differentiates them from both public and private provision of education 
(Galetovic et al, 2009). For instance, when user fees are not possible, inputs for the primary 
and secondary education production function can be ―contractible‖ (where inputs often include 
teachers-student ratio, equipment etc.; Galetovic et al., 2009, p. 7) so that educational quality is 
not compromised. More specifically, a PPP from an economic perspective can include a) risk 
sharing, b) temporary ownership of assets by the private sector, and c) bundling of construction 
and operation (although this kind of bundling has not occurred in the education sector yet, 
Patrinos et al., 2009).
49
 Risk sharing and financing make PPPs similar to public provision of 
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services whereas asset ownership and bundling makes them similar to private provision of 
services (Roseneau, 2000). 
The optimal PPP in terms of achieving its objectives depends largely on the level of 
risk sharing between the public and private sectors because risk transfer to a private entity can 
increase productive efficiency through improving evaluation and management of a project‘s 
risks (Patrinos, 2000; Valila, 2005). However, to achieve or even recognize the optimal level of 
risk sharing depends on identifying and quantifying relevant financial indicators (Patrinos et 
al., 2009). This is especially difficult because there can be various types of risk – technical, 
economic, and political (von Hirschhausen, 2001) – as well as external risks (global) and 
internal (elemental) (de Lemos et al., 2001; PROFIT, 2001). 
More specifically from the education perspective, a PPP contract can relate to all three 
steps of the education production function – inputs, processes, and outcomes. The following 
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Table 2 – PPP contracts of the education production function 
 
Source: Cited in Patrinos et al. (2009). 
 
The FAS program can be interpreted as having two types of contracts: education 
services in order to produce student achievement as an example of educational outcomes; 
and/or facility availability and education services. Facility availability can be included in the 
contract because PEF requires a minimum quantity and quality of facilities in its partnering 
schools. These facilities act as inputs, which go through a process (PPP), in order to produce an 
educational outcome (e.g. quality education and hence student achievement). Although other 
support and operational services are not part of the contract itself, they are indirectly required 
in order for the PPP contract to remain valid. For instance, if human resources are ill-managed, 
teacher performance will be low and student achievement can suffer, which can make students 





The above example of the FAS program shows that PPP contracts have measures for 
student performance and other educational outcomes in the education production function so 
that related stakeholders in the PPP can be held accountable (Patrinos et al., 2009). PPP 
regulation is also significant such that a reduction in government expenditure on a certain type 
of educational policy that frees resources for other services can be offset by expenditure on 
monitoring, regulating, and evaluating PPPs (Levin, 1999; Roseaneau, 2000). For instance, the 
Punjab Education Foundation administers Quality Assessment Tests twice a year in the schools 
it subsidizes, which can lead to an overburden on teachers as well as time wasted on test 
preparation rather focusing on actual student learning (Malik, 2009). Therefore in the long run, 
over-regulation can even be counter-productive. 
It is important to mention here that rule of law is a significant prerequisite in designing 
PPPs (Galetovic et al., 2009). Rule of law also influences the functioning and outcomes 
achieved under an education PPP (Patrinos et al., 2009). In countries with weak rule of law, 
non-profit private organizations often partner with the state in order to provide education 
(Fagerlind & Saha, 1989). For instance, philanthropies, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, work internationally in developing countries, and non-government organizations 
(NGOs) such as Bunyad in Pakistan, effectively provide education to the poor that the state 
cannot. However, NGOs also come with their political baggage so that they do not necessarily 
always positively affect expansion of quality education (Fisher, 1997).  
A more informal yet equally (if not more) significant type of PPP is that of parents (private 
sector) and schools (public sector) (Levin, 1999). This is true especially if we examine the 





achievement in schools. For instance, well-off parents establish home atmospheres that are 
conducive to learning (e.g. use educated vocabulary); communicate effectively about school 
programs and activities; volunteer parental support; induce learning at home by helping 
students with homework; involve families in decision making; provide additional educational 
resources; and collaborate with the larger community (Epstein et al., 1997; Heath, 1983). 
Moreover, parents can also be involved in their children‘s schools through attending school 
events, being members of the parent-teacher association (if available), interacting with other 
parents etc. This is an example of parents (representing the private sector) partnering with a 
school that provides education as a public service. 
The next section begins to describe arguments for and against PPPs. According to 
Patrinos et al. (2009), the four main objectives of PPPs in education are increasing enrollment; 
improving educational outcomes; increasing equity; and reducing costs of the public sector. 
However, it is significant to keep in mind that several arguments in favor of PPPs are presented 
by policy advocates of PPPs, such as Patrinos et al. (2009), and Caldwell and Keating (2004). 
 
2.3.2 - Advantages and Disadvantages of PPPs 
According to Malik (2009), PPPs can have the advantages of privatization and 
decentralization without education becoming a privatized commodity especially because pure 
privatization is becoming increasingly less common (Galetovic et al., 2009). This is especially 
useful considering strong arguments on both centralization and decentralization/privatization of 





arguments in favor of PPPs is the same as for private schools – increase in efficiency of 
producing quality education – and is discussed below. 
Productive Efficiency 
One of the main justifications for using PPPs versus other policies in order to achieve 
the four objectives outlined by Patrinos et al. (2009) is that PPPs increase productive 
efficiency.
51
 Theoretically, this is made possible when competition arises among firms so that 
only firms that have a positive private and social value will remain in the education market. 
Friedman calls these ―neighborhood effects‖ that arise if positive externalities are identifiable 
and lead to social value (Friedman, 1962). ―White elephants‖ are filtered out of the competitive 
education market since they have a negative private value (Galetovic et al., 2009). This is 
especially true if PPPs are financed through user fees so that projects that are less profitable are 
dropped by the private party. In economics, the concept of Pareto optimality applies in 
efficiency, which states that no one can be made better off without making anyone else worse 
off. Ideally, more efficiency means more productivity and better educational outcomes 
necessary for incorporation into the economy (Harrison, 2005) where educational outcomes 
can include test scores, retention rates, drop-out rates etc. (Ferris & West, 2000)
52
. The private 
productive efficiency argument is a direct derivative of the public choice theory according to 
which, government bureaucracy is inherently wrought with inefficiencies (Buchanan, 1980).  
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 According to Valila (2005), allocative efficiency is not sufficient in determining the means of public service 
provision – conventional, PPPs, or private – because it is difficult to determine ex-ante which means will increase 
overall economic efficiency. 
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 As the qualitative analysis in Chapter 6 shows, parents choose schools depending on the schools‘ educational 
outcomes and reputation, which are not necessarily dependent on efficiency and can also depend on a school‘s 
student composition. Moreover, Levin and Belfield (2005) describe how families can choose schools based on the 






More specifically, productive efficiency in PPPs implies education production in a 
market mechanism. In the market, parents and families are assumed to be the consumers who 
demand education vouchers (an example of PPPs), and schools are the suppliers of education 
vouchers.
53
 Moreover, in economic terms, an ideal market would be perfectly competitive with 
no or minimal government regulation given sufficient public goods production (Friedman, 
1962). An example is school vouchers in the education system that are meant to increase 
competition among schools for attracting more students and parents who hold school vouchers 
and hence theoretically have been given more choice in their schooling decision (Patrinos, 
2000; The World Bank, 2006).
54
  
Productive efficiency is maximized when average costs are minimized for a given type 
and level of education, which arguably does not happen in the public sector if, for instance, it 
has public employee unions that maintain a high staffing level (Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1997; Harrison, 2005). PPPs also imply that the government can influence overall 
allocation of resources to education so that the public sector can determine allocative efficiency 
and the private sector can determine productive efficiency (Valila, 2005). If cost reduction by 
the private entity leads to quality reduction in education services, then allocative efficiency is 
reduced. In turn, PPPs often exist when there is a potential for market or public sector failure if 
consumer expectations or demands are not met. Public sector failure often leads to the 
privatization of education management, such as in Islington, England and the company Edison 
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the two markets depend on each other.  
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in the United States (Caldwell & Keating, 2004) although the success of this privatization is 
not guaranteed. For instance, schools managed by Edison did not necessarily perform better 
than similar public schools (Gill et al., 2005).  The latter has to be qualified by admitting that in 
reality, market and public sector failure can occur despite PPPs because of internal factors, 
such as corruption and nepotism (Farlam, 2005).  
Increasing competition ideally provides schools with incentives to: a) improve the 
schooling product - academic achievement; and b) decrease production costs. Improving 
academic achievement or any schooling product improves choice and productive efficiency. 
Decreasing production costs can affect both micro (school sites) and macro (overall 
infrastructure) levels.
55
 However, when comparing costs of producing education in different 
schools and infrastructures, it is important to define costs accurately and comprehensively, and 
compare units with similar students and services. This is significant in not only conducting a 
cost-benefit analysis of the education policy, but also in conducting a cost-benefit analysis of 
the PPP itself because transaction costs in PPPs (tendering, bidding, contracting, monitoring in 
a long term arrangement)
56
 can reduce gains in productive efficiency (Valila, 2005). 
Conversely, if costs are defined narrowly and discounted properly, then it is possible that a PPP 
will have a positive net benefit (Roseneau, 2000). Another way that PPPs can increase 
efficiency is to define the population that it serves – sometimes large consumers experience a 
cost decrease while small consumers experience a cost increase (Carlisle, 1998). In other 
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 This is especially true if voucher plans attempt to simulate a private market where students tend to come from 
high income and better educated families (Rothstein, 2004). In addition, when calculating and comparing micro 
costs for schools, micro costs should not be compared to overall district costs where the latter can include 
accommodating additional and special education children, teacher salaries, record keeping, transportation, providing 
information to parents, dispute adjudication, accreditation and monitoring of schools etc. 
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 For instance, in the U.S. context, monitoring costs should be budgeted as 10 percent of the contract value (Torres 





words, a PPP structure has to be defined in a way that provides incentives to produce education 
most efficiently at the least cost. 
In order to increase productive efficiency, cost-benefit analysis of PPPs is related to the 
value for money concept (resource efficiency) discussed in Grimsey and Lewis (2004). 
According to Andersen (2005), there are six main determinants of value for money of PPPs – 
competition; risk transfer; long term nature of contracts (including life costing); the use of 
output specification; performance measurement and incentives; and private sector management 
skills. From among these six determinants, competition and risk transfer (related to contracts as 
well) can be considered most relevant to productive efficiency so that the maximum value for 
money is obtained due to the optimum allocation of risk between the public and private sectors. 
Other determinants, such as output specification, are not necessarily as relevant to productive 
efficiency in education because outputs can differ for various consumers especially when 
parents prefer one school over another for their child(ren). 
Overall, PPPs are assumed to have productive efficiency because they have elements of 
the private sector, and hence are able to attain their goal of improving educational outcomes, 
including higher student achievement. The next section discusses how PPPs can also have the 
advantage of increasing equity in education. 
 
  Equity 
One of the main aims of PPPs in education is to increase equity (Levin, 1999; 
Roseneau, 2000). On a general level, equity is often defined as a measure of fairness in treating 





fairness refers to – schooling inputs (resources) or outputs; achievement or future income 
among pupils; or equity of expenditure/achievement among states, districts, classes, or pupils 
(Cohn & Geske, 2004). An example of inequity is the differences in expenditure per pupil 
(EPP) among states in the U.S.
57
 For instance, the spending ratio of high-spending to low-
spending districts often ranges between 3 and 9 (Cohn & Geske, 2004).
58
 Moreover, residential 
stratification in the U.S. forces parents in one district to send their children only to that 
district‘s school regardless of its quality and the parents‘ preferences. If parents prefer sending 
their children to a different school, they have to purchase property in that district, which can 
further increase inequity since low income families cannot afford this (West, 1996).  
Keeping these issues in mind, increasing equity in schooling can be defined as 
decreasing disparities in EPP among districts, reducing the relationship between school district 
wealth and spending per student, and providing similar educational choices to all families and 
students. Since several large scale PPP programs, such as the voucher system in Chile since 
1981, focus on school choice, it is interesting to examine that from an equity perspective. One 
consideration could be the mixing up of students. According to Jencks and Mayer (1990), 
learning also occurs through social interaction among different income groups and such social 
interaction is increased through PPPs, such as vouchers, which have the potential of allowing 
students to cross income-based district boundaries.  
Moreover, achievement and equity themselves can be inter-dependent (Sennett & Cobb 
1973; Carnoy & Marshall, 2005) and low levels of both have often been blamed on 
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―‗bureaucratized‘ public education‘‖ (Carnoy & Marshall, 2005, p.5). Better educational 
quality not only means higher student achievement and hence more productive workers, but it 
also means that better educational quality is itself a result of more efficiency in education 
―mechanism[s]‖ (Malik, 2009; Carnoy, 2006). In this sense, PPPs often have a ―pro-poor‖ 
approach (Malik, 2009). According to Feldstein (1998), this should mean focusing on reducing 
poverty rather than on reducing inequality because in status quo, from a Pareto efficiency 
perspective, a high income group is made better off (has access to better education) without 
making a low income group worse off (maintaining little or no access to better education). 
Theoretically, if PPP programs such as vouchers do provide better educational access to low 
income groups by making such education more accessible, it would automatically reduce 
education inequality. 
An advocate of school choice PPPs, Moe (1995) acknowledges evidence of a 
―skimming effect‖ that can persist where students from relatively well-off families are able to 
select themselves into relatively higher quality schools. However, Moe (1995) attributes it to 
program design rather than school choice itself meaning that differences in program design or 
government regulation can alter this tendency. Yet, although vouchers are specifically designed 
to increase choice among public and private schools and also (often) to target economically 
disadvantaged families, Fuller and Elmore (1996) find evidence that the stratification or 
skimming effect is prevalent across various program designs. This means that in the case of 






It is important to note that although the public sector is often seen as non-discriminating 
and providing equal opportunities to all, it can intentionally or unintentionally harm the 
disadvantaged, especially if political interests serve the policy makers to put less pressure on 
education reform (Harrison, 2005)
59
. This leads the poorest or most disadvantaged group to 
stay in schools that are not being improved so that the status quo does not change. Another 
scenario is where public schools are available to wealthier neighborhoods while the 
government tries to encourage the private sector to cater towards the poorer neighborhoods that 
lack schools. However, if these private schools charge student fees, it is even more difficult for 
students from low income households to access schools despite government subsidies. This 
was the case with the Social Action Program in Balochistan, Pakistan in 1994 that tried to 
encourage girls to attend schools through its Urban Girls‘ Fellowship Program where the 
World Bank provided $3 per girl per month of school attendance (Orazem, 2000).  
In the case of the Foundation Assisted Schools program, schools under contract have an 
enrollment limit so that the argument of free market competition that school choice and PPP 
advocates push forward (such as Hoxby, 1996) is constrained. This is because despite an effort 
to increase educational quality, ―good‖ private schools might be forced to limit their 
enrollment so that some students have to remain in the ―less good‖ private or public schools, 
thus not fully realizing the equity aspect of PPPs. Moreover, PPP schools might still not 
increase equity in student achievement because of parental preferences in choosing schools. 
For instance, parents might choose a lower quality school because they prefer its location or 
religious orientation to its average student achievement (Goldhaber, Showalter, & Eide, 2004).  
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 For instance, school vouchers might not provide the best results for equity if they either lead to more corruption in 
the school system (Murnane, 1983) although it is also counter-argued that corruption already exists in school 





Therefore, well-defined equity in PPPs often consists of a trade-off between quantity 
and quality of education depending on school location (e.g. income-based districts) and 
program design (e.g. student vouchers versus school subsidies). PPPs in education can even 
lead to greater inequity if programs, such as student vouchers, are improperly targeted or their 
amount is insufficient to serve the purpose of allowing low income students access to more 
private schools. There is also a trade-off between different goals of PPPs - greater efficiency in 
producing quality education indicated by student achievement can lead to less equity if there is 
a cream-skimming effect. Other goals of PPPs, arguments for and against them, and their 
relationships among each other are discussed below. 
 
School Choice 
Productive efficiency and equity are also related to the school choice debate where 
PPPs, especially in the form of vouchers, increase schooling options for students and their 
parents. Friedman‘s (1962) writings paved the way intellectually for the support of market 
incentivized schooling. Becker (1992) is another renowned scholar who advocates school 
choice because of the inability of public schools to impart required skills to its students. 
According to the criteria developed by Patrinos et al. (2009), vouchers represent one of the 
most integrated forms of PPPs that theoretically should lead to more school choice. One stream 
of literature or ―policy camp‖ that includes business groups, market theorists, policy advocates, 
religious groups, and entrepreneurs (Powers & Cookson, 1999, p. 105) argues that market 
driven school choice will cause positive individual and institutional changes, and parental 





Commission, 1996; Moe, 1995). The other policy camp including school boards, teacher 
unions, school administrators, policy advocates, liberal foundations, and academics are not as 
enthusiastic about widespread school choice because they perceive public education as the 
―cornerstone of democracy‖ (Powers & Cookson, 1999, p. 105)60.  
Other arguments related to school choice claim that although choice can enhance student 
learning by allowing families to choose schools that match their needs and culture, this argument 
by itself cannot justify a voucher plan because choice can be increased within just the 
municipal/public schools as well (Comer, 1989). Moreover, although parents choose schools 
based on school quality (assuming that they can afford it because of the voucher), their choice 
might not give them high utility or satisfaction. This is because the utility from ―freedom of 
choice‖ can depend on how informed parents‘ decisions are; consistency of preferences during 
their child(ren)‘s school years; and the extent to which constraints in compulsory primary and 
secondary schooling and school homogeneity reduce the utility of choice (Vawda & Gauri, 
2003). Another argument against parental school choice is that parents will not necessarily make 
rational decisions for their children (Carnegie Foundation, 1992; Levin, 1991; Bridge, 1978; 
Wells & Crain, 1992). However, ―not all parents need be good shoppers to create the 
competition necessary to promote educational excellence. All customers benefit from the more 
careful shopping of what may well be only a small minority‖ (Flew, 1987, p. 100). Plus parents 
can quickly learn how to make informed decisions (West, 1996). There are also empirical 
examples of parents with low education who make rational schooling choices for their children 
(Fossey, 1994) so that arguments against parental school choice can usually be countered. These 
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rational school choices are not necessarily based on a school‘s teacher quality or academic 
results because parental preferences might lead them to rationally choose schools based on 
proximity, race, and SES of students (Buckley & Schneider, 2002). 
By extension, this implies that freedom of choice available to parents also depends on the 
extent to which the principal (for instance, the Chilean government and then the municipal 
government) gives autonomy to the agents (schools) to improve their education quality. Another 
line of literature argues that parents do not necessarily want choice in terms of exiting schools 
and finding new ones. Rather, parents will first try to ―fix a school‖ before changing it if they 
feel that student mobility, especially at specific stages in education, can increase dropout rates 
and lower achievement (Swanson & Schneider, 1999; Hirschman, 1970). 
 Assuming that parents have perfect information about goods, costs, and benefits, 
Tiebout (1956) outlines a model where local preferences can be revealed to the local 
government, for instance, in housing markets. The model can also be extended to schools 
where parents choose residential districts based on district school quality, where arguably 
equity and social cohesion issues can also arise if the communities are diverse and/or unequal. 
Information is a major issue in enhancing school choice because school quality is very difficult 
to assess (Lamdin & Mintrom, 1997). Moreover, perfect information is a theoretical 
requirement for education to work as an efficient private good. We have seen earlier that 
markets fail to meet the perfect information assumption. However, Schwartz & Wilde (1979) 
argue that schools might have a greater incentive to distribute (perhaps exaggerated) 
information about themselves in order to attract more consumers. In addition, informed 





that information about schools is insufficient and inaccurate although this is arguably more true 
for high income than low income groups (Schneider, Teske, & Marschall, 2000). Yet, even in 
the case of imperfect information, school choice can function. This provides a pro-PPP 
argument although costs of forming and maintaining partnerships might not agree, as discussed 
in the next section. 
 
Financial cost of PPPs to governments 
It is important to note that in the discussion above of PPPs and the 
advantages/disadvantages of their public and private components, sources of government 
finance are not examined in detail (except for mentioning taxation as a possible source of funds 
and discussing control of these funds). Among others (e.g. Patrinos et al., 2009 as mentioned 
above in their four main PPP objectives), Caldwell and Keating (2009) claim that PPPs lead to 
―better educational outcomes and at lower costs for government,‖ so that more funds are 
available to the public sector (Caldwell & Keating, 2009, p. i). Another related argument can 
be how public provision of a service is financed through distortionary taxes while the private 
sector or PPP financing will not have this distortionary effect on consumers (Galetovic et al., 
2009). 
In contrast, the argument that PPPs relieve the government‘s finance burden can be 
false because ―resources saved by the government upfront when choosing a PPP over 
alternatives such as conventional provision are offset by the loss of future revenues‖ (Galetovic 
et al., 2009, p. 8). In other words, although the government can reduce its own current costs 





now accrue towards the PPP. This shows that it is important to keep a long term perspective 
when drawing a PPP contract. It is also important to remember that private financing is not 
necessarily efficient and effective so that ultimately the public sector might have to spend more 
in rescuing a private provider of education (Valila, 2005; Patrinos et al., 2009). In addition, the 
distortionary effect of taxation only occurs if the government provides subsidies and not when 
PPPs are financed by user fees. Moreover, initial government savings through a PPP can be 
canceled by the opportunity cost of not collecting user fees (Galetovic et al., 2009) so that the 




Social capital and Cohesion 
Another argument for PPPs is that they provide an increased opportunity for buiding 
social capital and social cohesion (Caldwell & Keating, 2004; Levin, 1999, 2005). Social 
capital was first used in the context of school education (Putnam, 2000, p. 19).
62
 Social capital 
can be further divided into bridging social capital (across groups) and bonding social capital 
(within groups) (Putnam, 2000). School choice itself is considered a ―social movement‖ 
(Cookson, 1994; Henig, 1994; as cited in Powers & Cookson, 1999) with opposing points of 
view by multiple stakeholders. According to West (1996), ―personal advancement‖ through 
school choice enables parents and students to make decisions and contribute towards society. 
In turn, this individual participation can increase the overall social capital. However, it can be 
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 By L. J. Hanifan, a state supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia, who considered social capital to be ―those 
intangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy and 





counter-argued that school choice increases bonding social capital and reduces bridging social 
capital because parents choosing certain private schools are more likely to join parent-teacher 
associations and interact with other children‘s parents from the same school (Putnam, 2000; 
Manski, 2000).  
It is assumed that public education is more conducive to democratic and socially 
cohesive attitudes among students because it provides the basis for ―knowledge, values and 
loyalties that form the foundation of the liberal democracy‖ (Caldwell & Keating, 2004). 
However, private schools are also believed to play that role through instilling knowledge and 
support for civic rights (this is not a new argument and was also outlined by Alves & Willie, 
1987). An example of public and private sectors coming together to increase social capital 
through education is the Education Action Zones in England (Caldwell & Keating, 2004). In 
contrast, opponents of school choice have also argued that the values instilled by private 
schools are more ideological and sectarian than egalitarian and democratic (Smith, 2003; 
Carnoy et al., 2003). Evidence for these claims is mixed. For instance, positive social capital 
through school choice has occurred more in Catholic schools than non-religious and non-
Catholic religious private schools (Backiny-Yetna & Wodon, 2009a). However, there is still 
too little research to make definite claims.  
Moreover, PPPs are becoming increasingly popular where ―residualism‖ is high i.e. 
public schools are considered a ―safety net‖ for those who do not have access to private 
schools where the latter are perceived to be important social capital building units (Caldwell & 
Keating, 2004, p. 19).
63
 However, in order to build social capital, both public and private 
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entities in PPPs should follow similar purposes in terms of citizenship and democracy building 
in schools although enforcing rules to maintain these similar purposes ―remains centrally a 
public task to be pursued according to democratic means and purposes even while seeking 
efficiencies‖ (Minow, 2003, p. 1257). Interestingly, a significant portion of the school choice 
debate has revolved around the ability (or lack of it) of public versus private schools to instill 
the necessary ―basic‖ skills in individuals to participate in a democratic economy (Lamdin & 
Mintrom, 1997). In other words, achieving the ―good as well as the best‖ implies public 
accountability when the public sector partners with private entities, religious or secular, and 
non-profit or for-profit (Minow, 2003, p. 1259). 
One specific aspect of social capital is trust (Pretty, 2003). Trust and its relationships to 
various concepts can fall into multiple social science disciplines. Within economics, trust can 
be related to both private and social returns (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009) because it 
underlies all transactions and agreements. Since PPPs are agreement and contract-based, trust 
becomes a very significant determinant of their success. From a qualitative perspective, trust 
increases social cohesion and engagement in the community, which often leads to more 
cooperation and willingness to help and share information. In turn, schooling is a major 
influence on the level of trust among individuals (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009)
64
. Helliwell 
and Putnam (1999) claim that the relationship between schooling (for instance, overall level of 
attainment) and trust is even causal because it teaches individuals to interact meaningfully with 
each other and hence increase social cohesion. In this sense, parental educational decision 
making can indicate parents‘ level of trust in a given school system or curriculum, which can 
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theoretically be significant in affecting government policy about the types of schools to 
subsidize.  
Overall, social capital and social cohesiveness depends on social interaction and the 
collective decision making process (Manski, 2000). Public schools are assumed to increase 
social capital because multiple stakeholders participate in a collective decision making process 
(Henig, 1994). Whether or not this is true for PPPs remains to be seen. By following the logic 
for public schools, PPP schools should lead to even more social cohesiveness because there are 
more stakeholders involved and hence a more complicated collective decision making process 
is undertaken, which requires a certain degree of trust to be built among these stakeholders. 
However, it is important to mention that social cohesion, interaction, and capital are not 
only goals of PPPs, but also educational outcomes that PPPs can aim for through the education 
production function. Below is a discussion on if education PPPs have been successful in 
achieving their specified goals.  
 
2.3.3 - Have PPPs in education been successful? 
This question can be answered by using the example of vouchers
65
, which are one of 
the most prevalent forms of education PPPs across the world and have been widely debated. 
Vouchers are especially significant since much of the PPP and public versus private debate 
centers around parental choice in schooling (Levin, 1999). Since school vouchers are part of 
education systems that have a social purpose, it can be assumed that school vouchers aim to 
fulfill a similar social purpose. We know that this purpose includes increased student 
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achievement, preparing young students for democratic participation in societies (nations, 
regions, and communities) as well as allowing free choice of schools, such as through a market 
mechanism (Friedman, 1962; Chubb & Moe, 1990). Vouchers can differ based on how they are 
financed, managed, regulated, and how much information is available about them (Levin, 
1999). When analyzing the feasibility and effectiveness of school vouchers, four main criteria 
can be used – freedom of choice; productive efficiency; equity; and social cohesion (Levin, 
2002; Belfield & Levin, 2003).  
If we examine productive efficiency of school vouchers, we should keep in mind that 
productive efficiency refers to the ―maximization of educational results for any given resource 
constraint‖ (Belfield & Levin, 2003) from both a micro (within school e.g. maximizing test 
scores) and macro perspective (overall education system e.g. transportation) (Levin, 1999). At 
best, the evidence for vouchers has been mixed. Some initial studies (e.g. McEwan & Carnoy, 
2001) found that Chilean private voucher schools modestly outperformed public schools 
depending on how productive and efficient a private voucher school was. For instance, 
Catholic voucher schools were more efficient than non-Catholic voucher schools. Using cross-
sectional data, Mizala and Romaguera (2000), and Sapelli and Vial (2002, 2005) concluded 
that students in private voucher schools perform better than students in public schools. Low 
income students were especially found to achieve higher scores after receiving vouchers 
(Anand et al., 2009).
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 Other studies conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s do show an 
annual positive gain in both math and reading scores when comparing voucher schools in 
Milwaukee to schools outside Milwaukee (Hoxby, 2003; Chakrabarti & Peterson, 2008). Even 
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when only the lowest income schools outside Milwaukee are compared to Milwaukee voucher 
schools, the average achievement gains were positive over 1998-2005 (Carnoy, 2007). Among 
developing countries, Barrera-Osorio and Raju (2011) studied the FAS program in Pakistan 
and concluded that the program did help in raising average student achievement in the 
participating schools.  
In contrast, when using longitudinal data and identifying control and treatment groups 
through a natural experiment in Chile, Mizala and Repetto (2009) found small positive gains 
(4-6% of one standard deviation) that were statistically significant but not ―economically 
relevant‖ (Mizala and Repetto, 2009, p. 6). Ignoring selection bias and looking at the overall 
effect of vouchers, Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) found that there was no significant difference in 
achievement in voucher and non-voucher schools. The most recent quasi-experimental research 
shows no difference between voucher schools and public schools in Milwaukee (Wolf, 2011). 
Another study by Lubienski and Lubienski (2006) examines mathematical achievement using 
the 2003 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) and concludes that after 
controlling for demographic and school characteristics, students in public schools usually 
outperformed students in private, charter, or Catholic schools (by 7 points in 4
th
 grade and 4 
points in 8
th
 grade). They also conclude that in terms of school choice, education policy that 
encourages private schools should be re-evaluated since parents still mostly choose public 
schools. Moreover, the market assumption of parental demand leading to higher quality 
education is also questionable since the fastest growing private school sector – conservative 





Overall, the best research (although research design is still not ideal) finds small, 
statistically insignificant gains in student achievement as a result of education vouchers (Rouse 
& Barrow, 2008). More broadly, Goldhaber, Showalter, and Eide (2004) contend that there is 
little evidence of increased school choice having a significant and conclusive effect on the 
academic achievement of disadvantaged students in urban areas. Roseaneau (2000) states that 
this is the case for PPPs in general as well. Studies have also shown that large scale voucher 
plans in public schools tend to be relatively inefficient in increasing market competition and 
efficiency in education production. Before making the unqualified claim that vouchers increase 
competition and efficiency, it is important to determine how much schools depend on voucher 
funds, especially private schools. It is possible that only a small portion of a school‘s funds are 
derived from vouchers so that the school does not have a large incentive to compete for 
families with vouchers. Moreover, unlike a perfectly efficient system, there is imperfect 
information for parents (especially low income families) to make the optimal schooling 
decision (Levin, 1998; Schneider, Teske, & Marschall, 2000).  
However, even in earlier studies, since the voucher results were only significant for 
Catholic schools, efficiency will decrease if macro costs outweigh social benefits. From a 
macro efficiency perspective, aspects of an efficient overall education system, such as 
transportation, are also not necessarily available to all families who want to enroll their 
children in high quality but far off schools (Jencks, 1970; Levin, 1998). Addressing issues of 
imperfect information, transportation, and regulation can reduce productive efficiency because 
they might be more costly than the present system (Levin, 2002). These inadequate supporting 





Therefore, implementing a voucher plan in a representative context in the U.S. was estimated 
to raise public educational costs by 25 percent, and if the associated achievement gain is not 
significant enough, then a voucher plan will reduce even current levels of efficiency. 
Discussions of whether or not a voucher system or a PPP in general is successful 
somewhat assume that the government is efficient although this is not necessarily true. For 
instance, ―government failure‖ through corruption, unreasonable levels of bureaucracy, and 
general lack of training can also prevent the correct formation or at least the correct 
implementation of voucher programs (Galetovic et al., 2009, p. 10). This can be especially true 
in developing countries or where education PPPs are established as short-term policies only to 
gain political appeal (Patrinos et al., 2009). According to Harrison (2005), the political nature 
of the public sector with its lack of information and incentives, and pursuit of personal rather 
than collective objectives deems it unsuitable for education provision. This is even more 
important if the government provides education at a price lower than its cost and if there are no 
―price signals‖ that depict consumer preferences (Harrison, 2005, p. 198).  
Additionally, often the public agency responsible for designing and allocating the PPP 
contract, and monitoring it is the same. Galetovic et al. (2009) call this ―bad governance‖ (p. 
16) because it leads to conflict of interests (for instance, through the bidding process) as well as 
inefficient project selection. Lack of proper training of public and private governance 
institutions for evaluation can also significantly reduce PPP efficiency (Stiglitz & Wallersten, 
1999). To counter this, the Commonwealth Government in the 1980s established an ―open 





There has also been discussion on whether PPPs in education increase equity in student 
educational attainment and achievement. Programs such as target vouchers are deemed 
successful in reducing the gap in attaining quality education especially for girls, disadvantaged, 
and students in far-flung areas (Angrist et al., 2002; Carnoy & McEwan, 2001). Others suggest 
that PPP programs that increase choice can lead to greater inequities, at least in the U.S. 
context. This is especially true if higher income families are able to add to the voucher value to 
choose an expensive, higher quality school for their children (Levin, 1999). However, this 
argument assumes that other educational inputs, such as facilities, are provided in the higher 
quality school whereas that is not necessarily the case. For instance, a cash subsidy program for 
girls in Bangladesh increased enrollment but the quality of education did not necessarily 
increase since the number of teachers did not increase (Raynor & Wesson, 2006). Another gap 
is between rural and urban areas. PPPs have been shown to work more effectively in urban 
areas than in rural areas perhaps because of greater teacher absenteeism and turnover in rural 
areas (Orazem, 2000). 
Attitudes towards PPPs often depend on individual beliefs and attitudes rather than on 
actual evidence (Carnoy & Levin, 1985). Often politicians implement policies that they believe 
the public prefers, such as involving the private sector in education provision. If citizens 
believe in strong social cohesion and equity, individual, family, and business preferences might 
not be important considerations. In this sense, there is a dearth of literature on evaluating PPPs 
from a top-down as well as a bottom-up perspective. 
Overall, most of the evaluation of PPPs has been quantitative (for instance, in the 1990s, 





Rouse, 1998;Witte, 1996a) and not free from weaknesses, such as endogeneity and selection 
bias, which has led to a methodological debate. The outcome variable is usually test scores or 
the gain in test scores whereas the background variables (e.g. choosers or non-choosers; 
minority groups; income strata) are often contested (Witte, Thorn, Pritchard, & Clairborn, 
1994; Powers & Cookson, 1999; Rouse, 1998). One weakness of analysis of PPPs in education 
is its ex-post nature, which does not necessarily lend itself easily to an experimental or quasi-
experimental analysis although there are exceptions (such as Wolf, 2011 on Milwaukee‘s 
voucher program). However, although there are various ways of trying to separate the causal 
effects of PPPs (such as vouchers) – Heckman correction models, regression-discontinuity, 
propensity scores, instrumental variables, difference-in-difference methods, experiments – 
qualitative analysis at the grass root level is still significant in determining the ―real‖ 
experience of PPP customers, implementers, and school reform (some past examples include 
Fowler, 1996; Jimerson, 1998; Rofes, 1998; Wells, 1996). In addition, since there are 
differences among regions and their characteristics (Eldridge, 2001; Teese et al., 2002 in 
Australia), different methods can be applicable in multiple areas. In addition, parental 
preferences might conflict with those of the state – private goals versus public goals (Levin, 
1999) - and hence before making a conclusive claim, more contextual analysis is required 
(Backiny-Yetna & Wodon, 2009), which I am doing through this study. 
The above discussion brings us back to the relationship between PPPs, institutions, and 
economics and if PPPs are or will be successful in education policy making. Galetovic et al.‘s 
(2009) warning about incomplete contracts, especially about risk sharing, is considered 





well-designed. The important ingredients in making PPP successful include the various 
stakeholders and their consent – the wide communal sector; the business sector; and a 
―masterful‖ government (Mead, 1998) with political will, political feasibility, electoral support, 
and political constituency agreement enhance the success and survival for partnerships such 
that important decisions are made at the top (Roseneau, 2000).   
The next section briefly describes the specific PPP program that will be the focus of this 
dissertation‘s comparison between the three school types (public, private, and PPP schools).  
 
2.4 - Pakistan as a case study of PPPs 
By describing the Foundation Assisted Schools program in Punjab, this section aims to 
build the background of two main questions in choosing to analyze a specific PPP – what is 
being studied, and what are the performance measures being used for assessment? (Galetovic et 
al., 2009). In this case, an education-related partnership is being studied through comparisons of 
student achievement with other school types. The data and methodology chapters (chapters 3 and 
4) will build on how the analysis will be conducted. 
Rather than a universal school choice program, the Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS) 
program funds low cost private schools so that students can receive quality education free of 
cost. The FAS program seems to be a local phenomenon that is restricted to districts 
(geographical entity smaller than a province). It appears less controversial than a program where 
the government attempts to increase choice among public schools, such as in the United States. 
This is because private schools, at least theoretically, already have a choice element whether or 





controversy attached to the FAS program because it seems to be closely monitored by its 
sponsoring government organization (Punjab Education Foundation (PEF)) – at least as far as the 
general principle of more regulation leading to less conflict is concerned (Galetovic et al., 2009).  
Before going into detail about the FAS program, it is important to describe its sponsoring 
organization – Punjab Education Foundation. Although Pakistan has had education PPPs in all 
four provinces,
67
 the ones established in Punjab and managed by the Punjab Education 
Foundation (PEF) since 2004 are deemed the most efficient (Malik, 2009). PEF is an 
autonomous government body established in 1991 that aims to promote education by 
―encouraging and supporting the efforts of the private sector [technical and financial assistance] 
in providing education to the poor, through public private partnerships‖ (PEF, 2009). Through 
the Punjab Education Act-XII of 2004, public-private partnerships with private schools were 
encouraged in order to achieve higher quality of education. PEF‘s self-defined functions can be 
divided into three broad categories – financial assistance, technical assistance, and any other 
function assigned by PEF‘s Board of Directors. Public-private partnerships fall under both 
financial and technical assistance. For instance, the Foundation Assisted Schools program not 
only provides subsidies to private schools, but it also provides capacity building through teacher 
and staff training when the partnership begins. Moreover, PEF‘s general financial and technical 
assistance, such as monetary incentives, professional development programs, and school 
rankings based on student scores are aimed at improving teacher quality and school management. 
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Financially, as a government body, PEF is primarily funded by Punjab‘s Ministry of 
Education although donations and grants form a small proportion of its funds (PEF, 2011).
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These funds are controlled mostly through PEF‘s Managing Director. The management is headed 
by government officials although its field and program officers can also be hired through a 
private application process. The government officials in PEF can include Punjab Government‘s 
administrative secretaries; principal secretaries to the Minister of Education; special Secretaries 
of higher education and of schools; all Chairmen of Punjab‘s Board of Intermediate and 
Secondary Education; and the managing and program directors of PEF. Therefore, from both a 
financial and management perspective of its programs, PEF seems to be primarily a government, 
public sector organization. The organization runs several programs simultaneously – Foundation 
Assisted Schools (FAS); Continuous Professional Development Program (CPDP); Academic 
Development Unit (ADU); New School Program (NSP); Monitoring and Evaluation; and the 
Education Voucher Scheme (EVS). EVS is a form of public-private partnership where low 
income households are provided vouchers to attend certain private schools. ADU is responsible 
for conducting standardized tests for all programs, which includes Quality Assessment Tests for 
the FAS program.  
PEF‘s flagship program is the private partner Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS) 
program. PEF has detailed data about their infrastructure, student characteristics, and their 
achievement test scores obtained through Quality Assessment Tests (QATs). In 2009, about 1779 
schools and about 808,010 students were participating in the FAS program (PEF, 2009). There 
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deposit account; welfare fund account; special waqf account; general provident fund account; pension and 
commutation fund account; and endowment fund account. Briefly, a waqf is an Islamic welfare organization and is 





has been a 40-45% per year increase in net enrollment despite PEF withdrawing funding from 
about 50 schools per year due to schools‘ low performance on the QAT. If less than 67% of a 
school‘s students pass the QAT69, the school is given a warning as the first penalty. If the same 
school again shows a less than 67% pass rate in the subsequent QAT, PEF withdraws its funding 
and cancels the partnership contract. 
The FAS program schools are shown by the map below and the following figure. Some 
districts are more densely covered by the FAS program than others. While the number of FAS 
program schools has increased overall since the program‘s establishment, the density coverage 
over districts has remained about the same. 
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 Passing the QAT means obtaining more than 67% on the test. Funding withdrawal also depends on other PEF 











Source: The World Bank, 2008 as cited in Barrera-Osorio and Raju (2011). 
 
Figure 5 - 2010 District-wise coverage of the FAS program (only for main FAS districts) 




Number of primary, 
middle, and secondary 
private schools 
Share of Program 
Schools 
    Bahawalnagar 186 447 0.42 
Bahawalpur 258 871 0.30 
Jhang 126 686 0.18 
Lodhran 118 284 0.41 
Multan 191 1411 0.14 
Muzaffargarh 220 690 0.39 
Rajanpur 107 226 0.47 
        
Source: Author‘s own calculation.  
Notes: (1) Program school information provided by PEF (2010) 
 (2) Total number of private school information provided by Corinne Sianes using the  
National Education Census (2005) quoted in Barrera-Osorio and Raju (2011) 
 
   
In districts with a high program schools share of all private schools, such as Bahawalpur 
and Rajanpur, the number of total private schools also tends to be less than in other districts. 
Since the FAS program considers fewer private schools an indication of a low income district, 
the FAS program will establish more partnerships in such areas to increase their quality of 
education. In 2009-10, the FAS program had the following district-wise breakdown (please see 








Figure 6 – District-wise FAS program schools in 2009-10 
 
Source: Punjab Education Foundation (2010). 
 
The FAS program has three components – student subsidy, teacher rewards, and 
monetary incentives to schools (usually principals) to improve academic performance (Patrinos 
et al., 2009). According to Lara, Mizala, and Repetto‘s analysis (2009), student-based subsidies 
to schools act almost like a voucher system because they increase school choice for parents and 
reduce costs for families. These subsidies can be funded through tax revenue and be allocated to 





are rural, 38% are urban, and 7% are in urban slum areas. The districts Bahawalpur, 
Bahawalnagar, Multan, and Muzaffargarh have the highest concentration of FAS program 
schools.  
PEF focuses on primary (up to grade 5), middle (grades up to 8), and secondary (up to 
grade 10) schools. It finances FAS for Rs. 350 (~US$4.11) per student per month for primary 
and middle level students, and Rs. 400 (~US$4.71) per student per month for secondary level 
students. For PEF to continue its aid to private schools in the FAS program, at least 67 percent of 
the students in these particular schools have to score above 67 percent in the QAT. There are 
unstipulated cash incentives for schools and teachers – Rs.50,000 (~US$588) for the best 
performing school in a district and Rs.10,000 (~US$117.65) each for five teachers in a school 
where more than 90 percent of students have scored more than 40 percent in the QAT. Schools 
receiving these subsidies for primary, middle, and secondary school students are not allowed to 
charge these students for any other school related expense, such as penalties, recreation, field 
trips, books, stationery etc. Additional programs have been established by PEF to complement 
FAS but are not included in this analysis. For instance, there is a Continuous Professional 
Development Program (CPDP) for teachers in both FAS and non-partner private schools (Malik, 
2009, p. 13). Overhead and supervision cost of the FAS program is Rs. 19.05 (US$0.22) per 
student. Monetary transfers to schools are made online through the Bank of Punjab in the 
specific tehsil/district of the school.
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 Another school subsidy program in Pakistan was set up by the World Bank‘s Social Action Program in 1992 to 
raise girls‘ enrollment in both rural and urban areas (Orazem, 2000). Considered successful in terms of enrollment 
and sustainability, its PPP components are different than those of the FAS program and given data for Balochistan‘s 
subsidy program, Punjab and Balochistan‘s programs could have provided an interesting comparison in terms of 





Since this dissertation analyzes student achievement as the dependent variable, it can be 
argued that the FAS program‘s academic performance measurements can actually work 
paradoxically and reduce the overall student learning achievement (van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). 
This can be true for various reasons including students and teachers focusing on performing well 
in only the measurements of quality education (such as QATs)
71
 rather than the actual 
educational quality. Another reason can be the number of performance indicators. For instance, if 
there are few performance indicators, such as only QATs for the FAS program, then all aspects 
of high quality education are not necessarily measured, such as teaching quality, curriculum, 
student motivation etc. In addition, if increasing both quality and equity of education are the 
objectives of the FAS program, these goals can conflict with each other. This is because if FAS 
funding depends on how well students perform on QATs, then the private schools can attempt to 
accept only high performing students, thus reducing equity. In contrast, if a private school 
attempts to increase equity by accepting disadvantaged students who might not perform well on 
QATs, it will risk losing its funding from PEF and hence have a lower chance of providing a 
high quality education. Underlying these performance measurement problems is the largest 
assumption of all – the quality of education can be measured by student test scores. As van Thiel 
and Leeuw (2002) argue, measuring performance is one of the most difficult components of 
public policy. 
As described by PEF (2004-12), its foremost aim is to increase the quality of education, 
which it attempts to monitor through standardized student test scores. Indirectly, this implies that 
                                                                                                                                                             










by providing financial resources to private schools, PEF expects its partner schools to use that 
funding such that the production of quality education increases. The partnering school has an 
incentive to increase the quality of education because under economic theory, a profit-
maximizing school will want to satisfy its current and future customers. In this sense, it seems 
that out of the four goals of PPPs, productive efficiency is deemed the most important goal and 
outcome by PEF and its partnering school.  
PPP contracts can be divided into seven main forms – management services; support 
services; professional services; operational services; education services; facility availability; and 
facility availability with education services (Patronis, et al., 2009). When studying PPPs in 
Pakistan through examining the FAS program, I will attempt to categorize its specific contract 
into one or more of the seven forms mentioned above depending on the contracts‘ finance and 
management components (related to bundling and ownership components). This categorization 
can be useful because it can point towards aspects of PPPs – financial and managerial – that can 
act as characteristics related or unrelated to student achievement. 
Moving forward, the following four chapters examine the two research questions – how 
school types relate to student achievement, and how Islam relates to educational decision making 
- from two approaches. For the first research question (spanning chapters 3 and 4), existing 
information is used to quantitatively compare student achievement in public, private, and PPP 
schools. The next chapter begins answering these research questions by first outlining 
quantitative data and variable descriptions before moving onto the following chapter that 










This chapter sets the background for discussing the relative student achievement of 
public, private, and PPP schools where student achievement is used as an indicator of school 
quality
72
. Given that public, private, and PPP schools will be compared in this dissertation in 
terms of their education quality, it is first important to mention that I do not in any way attempt 
to establish a causal relationship between any variables in this dissertation. This study is the first 
step towards only examining a relationship, if it exists, between school types and student 
achievement in Punjab, Pakistan. The chapter begins by describing data collection and the 
description of each dependent and independent variable. Then it outlines the empirical 
methodology I will use, its mechanics, and its suitability for my first research question. Next, the 
chapter describes some weaknesses in quantitative analysis.  
Before operationalizing the theoretical equation that represents the first research question, 
I describe the data and variables in detail. 
 
3.1 - Data for Quantitative Analysis 
The geographic sample will be limited to the Punjab province in Pakistan because Punjab 
has the most information available on education (both in terms of size and accuracy), especially 
on public-private partnership schools that are established by PEF. It also has more than 60 
percent (CIA World Factbook, 2010) of Pakistan‘s population (including immigrants from other 
provinces) so that the findings can be applicable to a significant portion of Pakistan‘s society. 
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Moreover, primary schools have a larger student population than higher level schools because of 
a high dropout rate from one level to the next (about 60 percent from primary to secondary 
education, and about 80 percent from secondary to higher secondary; Ministry of Education, 
2011), especially in rural areas. Therefore, in order to exploit as many observations as possible, 
both primary and secondary schools are part of the analysis. 
Almost all rigorous studies on student learning and achievement use or attempt to use 
student level data especially because it enables the analysis to control for household and family 
characteristics that could otherwise potentially bias the result(s). However, this study examines 
school level learning and achievement data because of student level data unavailability in 
Pakistan, which also leads to issues of model specifications. Hence the results should not be 
interpreted according to the criteria of causal inference. Although standardized test results are 
collected for each student through Quality Assessment Tests in the case of PPP schools, and 
through the Punjab Examination Commission (PEC) in the case of all public and private 
schools
73
 including PPP schools, test scores
74
 are aggregated at the school level while specific 





Other school based studies include early studies of Chile‘s voucher program with data up till 
1997. These studies showed varying results. For instance, Carnoy and McEwan (2000) showed 
that Catholic private vouchers performed better than public schools rather than non-religious 
private voucher schools. However, Mizala and Romaguera (2000) concluded that when a 
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 Although participation in PEC exams is mandatory, not all private schools take these exams. However, all PPP 
schools in the FAS program have participated in PEC exams. 
 
74
 Compatibility of these test scores is not necessarily a straightforward issue so that only Punjab Examination 
Commission test scores are used for the quantitative analysis. 
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comprehensive set of controls was used, there was no significant difference between public and 
private subsidized schools. This dissertation examines a school organization model that works 
similarly to a private subsidized school in a public-private partnership so that one reason why 
this dissertation is important is to see whether or not findings from other countries are similar to 
findings from Pakistan. Consequently, although not ideal, school level studies can at least point 
in some future research directions.  
For the first part of the quantitative analysis in Punjab, I create a dataset combining 
various data sources that are described below. School level data can be obtained from 3 main 
sources – the National Education Census 2005 (NEC)76; Punjab Examination Commission 
(PEC); and the Education Management Information System (EMIS) managed by Punjab 
government‘s Program Monitoring and Implementation Unit (PMIU).  
The Punjab Examination Commission‘s (PEC) data covers all public and private schools 
in Punjab (more than 70,000 and more than 30,000 respectively). PEC designs its own 
standardized subject tests for English, Mathematics
77
, Urdu, Social Studies, Islamic Studies, 
Elective Subjects (Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and Humanities), and Arabic (only for 8
th
 
grade). These tests are based on the state-mandated Punjab Textbook Board. The number of 
schools that are covered by PEC might be less than the actual number of public and private 
schools because of differences in school registration, the number of schools that might have shut 
down or been ―ghost‖ schools, and incomplete private school participation (partly because 
students have to pay out-of-pocket to take PEC exams). In contrast, the number of students 
                                                 
76
 NEC has been conducted once so far in 2005 and covers all of Pakistan including its four provinces and northern 
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measures would have to be aggregated at a very high level, preventing useful interpretation of results. 
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taking the PEC examination could be more than the students registered through public or private 
schools because some students take the exam privately and not through a formal educational 
institution. However, these private candidates are excluded from this dissertation‘s analysis.  
PEC‘s exam is administered by PEC representatives, and students are assigned individual 
ID numbers and are divided into exam centers, which are then aggregated to the ―markaz,‖ union 
council, tehsil, and then the district level. For the purposes of this dissertation, the PEC data that 
could be obtained are 2008 onwards. In my analysis, I use the PEC 2009-10 examination scores. 
This is mostly because first, the electronic databases for the FAS program schools (the treatment 
group) are available only for 2009-2010. Databases for previous years have been destroyed 
through a technological fault and the database for 2011 is still under construction (PEF, personal 
communication, October 10
th
, 2011). Second, the 2009-10 PEC information is more detailed in 
terms of the type of information presented (for instance, the 2009-10 PEC information includes 
standardized and adjusted exam scores whereas the previous PEC‘s exams did not).  
The EMIS database is managed by PMIU and covers all public schools in Punjab (more 
than 70,000). It includes details about schools, such as enrollment, school facilities, teacher 
characteristics etc. There are two time frames for the EMIS database. One is their monthly 
monitoring reports and the other is their yearly ―census‖ reports. The yearly census contains 
more information than the monthly monitoring report and according to PMIU staff, is also more 
accurate than the monthly monitoring reports because they are validated (personal 
communication, September 10
th
, 2011). This could be possible because for instance, if a teacher 
is absent during a particular month‘s monitoring but is usually present in the classroom, the 





well. Therefore, for the analysis in this dissertation, I use EMIS yearly census data rather than its 
monthly reports. 
Although there is EMIS that contains school information, as well as other government 
bodies, such as Punjab Education Assessment System, there is barely any similar data source for 
private schools. The only relevant and more recent sources I am aware of that collect private 
school data is the National Education Census in 2005, and PMIU that is expanding its functions 
to also obtain more information about private schools (partly from the School Education 
Department). The National Education Census cannot be used because of its different coding 
system (as detailed earlier) so that the only source we are left with is what the PMIU has 
collected. For the year 2009-10, PMIU has validated information for all private schools in 
Punjab, which is another main reason for using 2009-10 data from all sources.
78
 This information 
includes the same indicators as for the public school variables so that it is easier to merge this 
data with students‘ PEC exam scores.  
For PPP schools, information about the FAS program schools is obtained from the Punjab 
Education Foundation‘s FAS program department. This information includes data from the FAS 
monitoring reports of various schools conducted throughout the year. The monitoring report 
collects data on various school characteristics, such as school facilities and enrollment. 
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 For 2011, so far, seven districts‘ private schools‘ information is available. The seven districts whose private 
school information has been collected include Faisalabad, Bhakkar, Khanewal, Jhang, Nankana Sahib, Toba Tek 
Singh, and Hafizabad. Out of these, only Bhakkar and Jhang have a somewhat high proportion of PPP schools, 
which is the main treatment. The total private school sample for these seven districts is about 7400 schools. 
Moreover, since data is still being collected, matching EMIS codes have not yet been assigned so that schools in the 
private school database in PMIU, and private schools from the PEC database have to be matched with school names. 
Since there could be duplicate schools if this method was adopted simply even if I first sorted the schools by 
political division (district, tehsil etc.) as well as by gender and enrollment, the sample was drastically reduced (from 
about 7400 to 1039 for grades 5 and to 8). In turn, several key observations might have been excluded where the 
only difference was in spellings in PEC versus PMIU private schools data. This is an additional reason why 2009-





Electronic information from only 2009-2010 is available since past monitoring report results 
have either been destroyed or lost while reports from 2011 have not yet been completely 
compiled. Since FAS program schools have also participated in PEC exams, I matched each 
program school with its corresponding entry in the PEC and PMIU databases to gather consistent 
data. This was done manually because FAS codes did not match with either PEC or PMIU codes 
for private schools. Moreover, the school specifics from PEF are fewer than the specifics 
available from PMIU. To include further information about FAS program schools as well as to 
check its accuracy, PEF‘s information about school and community specifics is again validated 
against that information available from PMIU. For this, I went through all FAS program schools 
one by one to match them with the private schools available from PMIU. This was significant 
because often school spellings did not match among the different datasets so that matching 
through statistical software would not only have been incomplete, but would have also yielded a 
reduced and biased sample from the FAS program schools. Through a manual check, the schools 
and their information from PEF, PEC, and PMIU almost always overlapped perfectly and more 
information about school characteristics could also be attached to FAS program schools.  
As a summary, information about test scores and covariates will be obtained from the 
following sources: 1) Test scores – Punjab Examination Commission (PEC); 2) Enrollment 
Information of all schools – PMIU; 3) Enrollment information of PPP schools – PMIU (cross-
checked with FAS monitoring reports); 4) School characteristics – PMIU (cross-checked with 
FAS monitoring reports); 5) Teacher characteristics – PMIU (cross-checked with FAS 






3.2- Sample Description 
Overall, the sample is 100,260 schools (primary sampling units or PSUs) in 132 tehsils 
(strata) set in a survey design. For the first part of the empirical analysis, public and private 
schools are matched using propensity-score matching (described in more detail in the next 
chapter) to ensure that the control and treatment group share similar characteristics, such as 
school location, gender, medium of instruction etc. After mapping the propensity scores of both 
control and treatment groups, it is clear that after a propensity score of 0.65, only private schools 
are part of the treatment group. Therefore, I dropped observations after a propensity score of 0.65 
when there was hardly any overlap. The remaining sample included 72,454 schools (primary 
sampling units) in 125 tehsils (strata) where the ratio of the number of public to private schools 
remained the same as in the total sample of 100,260 schools. For the second part of the empirical 
analysis, public and FAS program schools are matched using propensity score matching. This 
matching yields 53,162 schools (primary sample units) in 124 tehsils (strata). Descriptive 
statistics for each matched sample (public-private and public-FAS) are in Appendix A. The 
operational model being used in this dissertation is described in the next section. 
 
 3.3 - Operational model 
 I use the following theoretical equation: 
Average School Test Score (T) = a + S + I + F + P + C + e
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 where S stands for school background and institution characteristics including school 
type, medium of instruction, registration status, urban/rural, and school age; I stands for school 
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infrastructure including school facilities; F and P stand for faculty/teacher and student/pupil 
characteristics including sanctioned minus filled teaching posts, teacher-student ratio, % male 
teachers, total enrollment, % boys enrolled; C stands for community characteristics including 
school management committees; and e is standard error. Dependent and independent variables 
are described below in more detail. 
 
3.3.1 - Outcome variable – average school test scores. 
Ideally, I would use both education quantity and quality as dependent variables to see 
how school choice can be related to both measures. This is because some studies have shown 
that PPPs and school choice affect one variable more than the other, often depending on location. 
For instance, Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2005) showed that school choice in Chicago affected 
school completion rates to some extent but not overall student scores. Education quantity can 
have various measures – enrollment, years of education, school completion, dropout rate, 
repetition rate, and current enrollment status for children of school going ages. Another 
possibility is to use an index; a variable closely related to dropout rates – school completion – 
has sometimes been used as an index rather than as a continuous or discrete variable by itself. 
Another example can be an age and gender-specific schooling index, such as in Birdsall (1982), 
where the index is the ratio of child schooling to mean child schooling in a particular age-gender 
group. Jamison and Lockheed (1997) have also used deviations from the mean schooling as the 
dependent variable.  
However, such specific student level data for dropout rates is not available so that a 





information available in detail is school and class enrollment. Data about repetition, dropouts, 
and transfers is not available so that student-level analysis is very difficult. Even more 
significantly, longitudinal data is not available because even if the same schools are in the 
database, they have a different identifier code every year and this difference is not systematic so 
that there is no way of knowing which identifier code belongs to which school. These data issues 
force the dissertation to focus on education quality measured by average school test scores rather 
than education quantity. 
Average school test score is a continuous dependent variable
80
. It is calculated through 
the Quest software using Rasch Modeling (Punjab Examination Commission (PEC), 
http://www.pec.edu.pk, accessed December 21
st
, 2011). Scores are assigned to students through a 
criterion referenced system. Since PEC‘s standardized exams also include open-ended questions, 
PEC is moving its conceptual framework of designing and grading exams from Bloom‘s 
Taxonomy (Bloom et al., 1956) to Structure of observed learning outcomes (SOLO) Taxonomy 
(PEC, 2011; Biggs & Collis, 1982). This is because according to some literature (e.g. Biggs & 
Collis, 1982), Bloom‘s taxonomy of asking questions of varying difficulty levels does not 
represent a student‘s actual mental growth. In contrast, SOLO Taxonomy can help to classify the 
varying quantity and quality of student responses to the same questions.   
For the purposes of this dissertation, I use PEC‘s original scores (I standardize them 
myself later) rather than adjusted scores because the adjustment process itself is dependent on 
various factors and does not necessarily provide an accurate result. Moreover, there is not a large 
difference between the original versus adjusted scores so that association with other covariates in 
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the analysis is easier to discern if original scores are used rather than adjusted scores that already 
depend on other internal or external factors (AEPAM, 2011).  
School test scores are available for English, Urdu, Mathematics, Islamic Studies, Social 
Studies, and Science. Until 8
th
 grade, Science refers to a subject combining Physics, Chemistry, 
and Biology. Converted from a logit scale, 50 is the maximum score for each subject, which is 
then again converted into a 0-100 scale (in percentage point terms). Test score distributions are 
described Appendix B. Estimations through empirical analysis focus only on Math, English, 
Urdu, Islamic Studies, and Science because of three main reasons – one, Social Studies is a 
subject that is more emphasized after grade 5 so that it is not included in the analysis; two, 
international standardized test scores, such as PISA and TIMSS
81
 also focus on languages (albeit 
not Urdu), Math, and Science; and three, the consequence of PEF revoking the partnership if 
partner schools do not pass the QATs does not depend on Social Studies scores.  Islamic Studies 
is included in the analysis because of its significance for the second research question in this 
dissertation, which relates student achievement and Islam.
82
 Therefore, the analysis conducted in 
this dissertation focuses on English, Mathematics, Urdu, Science, Islamic Studies, and the total 
test scores. 
 
3.3.2 - Explanatory variables 
School, teacher/student, and community characteristics are described in this section. 
School characteristics mostly deal with school type, school age, location, medium of instruction, 
                                                 
81
 PISA stands for Program for International Student Assessment and TIMSS stands for Trends in International 
Math and Science Study. 
 
82
 Of course, the actual curriculum and teaching  besides just the school‘s mission are significant factors in 





registration status, infrastructure (classrooms, electricity etc.), and level of education (primary, 
secondary, high etc.).  
School type is public, private, or public-private (i.e. a FAS program school). There are 
separate variables for a school being private in general, and a school being a FAS private 
program school. School location is either urban or rural. The medium of instruction in a school 
has three categories in reality – Urdu, English, and Urdu-English. Among both public and private 
schools, the dominant language of instruction is Urdu while Urdu-English medium schools come 
next. Urdu is the dominant language possibly because of it being the national language and also 
because many of the curriculum books available from the Punjab Textbook Board are written in 
Urdu (personal communication, Secretary of Basic Education, October 10
th
, 2011). As far as 
Urdu-English medium schools are concerned, they refer to the languages subjects are taught in 
(for instance, Islamic Studies, Natural Sciences, and Mathematics can be taught in Urdu or 
English depending on the school‘s preferences); and language to be spoken in school (the official 
policy in these schools prefers English although children still converse among each other in Urdu 
and some teachers feel comfortable mixing Urdu with English). Additionally (based on class 
observations, interviews, and personal experience), essentially even English medium schools 
function like Urdu-English schools because they still often teach some subjects in Urdu (e.g. 
Islamic Studies) and students and teachers also converse in Urdu. Therefore, school medium is 
categorized as 0 for Urdu medium and 1 for English and Urdu-English medium. 
Some infrastructure variables have three categories – for example, electricity is available 
(value of 1), unavailable (value of 0) or is in the process of becoming available (value of 3). I use 





assume that it should not affect initial school choice since in all probability, parents (if they are 
passive citizens) will keep their children in the same school if they believe in an eventuality (e.g. 
electric wires being fixed) (Minow, 2003; Hirschman, 1970). Registration status also has three 
categories – unregistered, registered, and registration under process. Registration under process 
(a value of 3) is turned into a 0 because the school year started with the official registration status 
as still unregistered. Therefore, most school characteristics are dummy variables and take on 
values of 0 or 1 except school age, which refers to the duration of a school‘s establishment. 
Primary and middle school levels are dummy variables that take on 2 values – 1 if a school is 
at a primary level (up to 5
th
 grade) or middle level (up to 8
th
 grade) and 0 otherwise. For public 
schools, all school levels indicate that the school also includes younger levels; for instance, a 
middle school (even if it is on a separate campus) will also include classes up to grade 5 and will 
not be restricted to only 6-8
th
 grades. For private schools, the same is true except possibly for 
higher secondary schools that are considered to be colleges. The FAS program in 2009 mostly 
funded only primary and middle schools so that the analysis in this dissertation will focus on 





 grades).  
Teacher characteristics include the total number of teachers, and the number of 
sanctioned and filled teacher spaces in public schools. Out of the last two variables, I created a 
third that calculates the difference between the number of sanctioned and filled teachers to more 
closely capture teacher shortage in public schools, if any. Other teacher-related variables were 
the percentage of male teachers in a school, and the student-teacher ratio. According to Card and 





However, the information about teacher qualifications, measured by the highest academic 
degrees attained by a teacher, was not included in most 2009 datasets although it is being 
collected in 2011
83
. Student characteristics included school size (total school enrollment) and 










 grade enrollments, sanctioned/filled staff, school location, student-teacher 
ratio, school area, and partnership status (FAS program school or not). However, these 
interaction terms are not presented in the empirical analysis because they were non-significant. 
Community characteristics are important to include as covariates because the social interaction 
between parents/community and schools can also be a form of public-private partnerships 
(Levin, 1999). For public schools, the public-private partnership is represented by school 
committee members. Community characteristics available from the PMIU data include 
information about school management committees (SMCs) that are mandatory for at least all 
each public school. Functional or not, these SMCs consist of various community and school 
members – parents, general stakeholders, teachers, and a chair person. There are various SMC 





. For private schools, public-private partnerships community information is unavailable 
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 I also tried the empirical analysis by forming a school SES index using the school covariates and infrastructure 
variables. Some of the main explanatory factors, such as the student-to-teacher ratio for private schools, were 
especially important in the factor analysis because they explained a large proportion of ―uniqueness‖ so that I used 
these variables separately in the models instead of in an index. 
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 I also constructed an index that looks at community involvement in a school by conducting factor analysis for the 
school council variables. Out of these, the number of meetings, number of women, and number of teachers were the 
most important variables in the estimation results. Therefore, instead of using the community involvement as an 






although in reality, these PPPs can be represented by parent-teacher meetings, school fairs, 
events for parents (such as the Annual Day), workshops to train parents how to complement their 
children‘s learning, open house events etc. (although data for these are not available). A measure 
for socio-economic status was available at the aggregated tehsil level and although it was first 
used in the analysis, it is not presented in the final quantitative analysis because its level of 
aggregation prevented the useful interpretation of its estimates. 
 Using these variables, the specific methodology employed to conduct the empirical 
analysis in this dissertation is discussed in the following section. 
 
3.4 – Methodology 
What exactly is the treatment that the first research question is analyzing in terms of how 
school types relate to student achievement? In general, there are two treatments - being a private 
school or being a PPP school (that is, a school participating in PEF‘s Foundation Assisted 
Schools (FAS) Program). Being a PPP school has two steps – being a private school and then 
being a FAS program partner school. More specifically, participating in the FAS program 
implies that these PPP schools already have certain characteristics and receive other ones 
through the FAS program. For instance, before becoming partners, FAS program schools have to 
meet certain criteria – a minimum enrollment of 100 students (35 at the primary, 45 from 6th to 
8
th




 grades) and a maximum of 500 students; a minimum number 
of facilities (this requirement is not fixed and is less stringent than the facilities requirement after 
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 I assume that the influence of PPPs‘ institutional characteristics is captured by the school type variable because 
these are part of the treatment of choosing to be in a FAS program school. Ideally, it would also be important to 
include a variable that specifies student or household identity, such as citizenship, so that we can examine the 
association between a possible citizen identity (which can measure social capital and cohesion) with the type of 





partnership); and a passing average school score on an initial test administered by PEF. This 
initial test is simpler than the Quality Assessment Tests that partner schools later have to take to 
ensure a certain level of educational quality as measured by student test scores. Both the 
preliminary and QATs are based on the state curriculum decided by the Punjab Textbook Board. 
In this sense, there are 3 initial components of the treatment of a PPP school – enrollment, 
facilities, and a minimum level of student achievement. After becoming partners, the treatment 
becomes more specific and the conditions include – a minimum of 100 and maximum of 500 
students; a certain standard of physical facilities; and a 67% of students passing the QATs. 
Ideally, conducting an experiment or utilizing a natural experiment (if there is a policy 
that converts public/private schools into PPP schools) where it is possible to identify 
participating schools, would be considered to yield the most accurate results because the 
experiment will lack endogeneity and selection bias. Although there are criticisms of even this 
gold standard of randomized controlled experiments (such as problems associated with their 
successful implementation, replicating the study on sub-groups, and mistaking externality for 
exogeneity (Deaton, 2009))
86
, it is still considered the best available evaluation method for 
policies (Duflo & Kremer, 2003). Since the information used in this dissertation is not from a 
natural experiment, the study is designed as an exploration where the treatment has to be 
constructed. In comparing school types and their relationship to test scores, I will conduct 
ordinary least squares as well as propensity score matching analysis in a survey design.  
Ideally, an additional, multi-level descriptive analysis using hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM) should also be conducted for each village/union council/tehsil/district/other geographical 
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 This mistake is not necessarily corrected by RCTs because since ―exogeneity is an identifying assumption that 






division separately to validate results from other analyses
87
. However, the number of 
observations per geographical division (the only usable division is a tehsil), especially for FAS 
partner schools, is too small to produce valid results. Moreover, HLM is most useful if student, 
family, or classroom data are used, which is unavailable for this dissertation. Although instead of 
HLM, dummy variables for each village/other geographical distribution can be used in the OLS 
analysis, it can not only get cumbersome, but it will also neglect to incorporate unobservable 
factors that can be common at varying levels of management. Therefore, although it can be an 
area of potential future research, it is not feasible to include the HLM analysis in this dissertation 
because it would not provide results very different from the OLS analysis. Identifying the 
specific factors that can increase or decrease educational achievement will be based on existing 
literature (e.g. Carnoy et al., 2005, 2007) and will include institutional/school background 
(public vs. private or FAS program school, rural or urban, medium of instruction, school age, and 
registration status); school infrastructure and facilities; teacher (student ratio, total number of 
teachers, % male teachers); student (total enrollment, % of boys); and community (school 
committee, SES etc.) characteristics.
88
 
Since there can be possible selection bias (such as parents selecting a PPP school over a 
public one due to unobservable factors) in studying the relationship between schooling inputs 
and output, I will use propensity score matching as the empirical methodology. Propensity score 
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 Literature has shown some characteristics to be more important than others in determining student achievement. 
For instance, school expenditure, resources, and class size are often not found to be as significant as teacher quality 
(Hanushek, 1995). However, school characteristics will be included in the analysis because they are being tested in a 






matching is useful in addressing the self-selection bias issue (although it does not necessarily 
deal with endogeneity) and is described below.  
 
Methodology - Propensity score matching 
Propensity score matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) seems to be one of the best 
available techniques to use given the first research question and to counter selection bias. Since I 
compare PPP schools with non-PPP schools and data are not available longitudinally in the 
national education census, it is not possible to determine past and current average school test 
scores. Therefore, schools have to be matched on certain observable characteristics. The 
technique will be reliable if a student and school‘s unobservable or unavailable attributes, such 
as convenience (measured by indicators, such as the average distance from its students‘ 
households and by available facilities) or family size do not influence the school‘s average test 
score and whether or not a student enrolls in that school. However, if a student is enrolled in, for 
instance, a primary-only school rather than a school that goes up till the secondary level, it can 
say something about the student‘s family characteristics and preferences (Lara, Mizala, & 
Repetto, 2009). Therefore, selection bias (as well as endogeneity) will exist if an unobservable or 
unavailable characteristic not only affects which school is chosen, but also affects the outcome 
(the average test score of that particular school).  
Propensity score matching (PSM) attempts to reduce the selection bias by creating a 
counterfactual, which is what test scores private schools would have achieved if they had similar 
characteristics as those of public schools. PSM calculates the average treatment effect on the 





within the common support area. Although I do not claim causality in this empirical analysis, the 
average treatment effect acts as a jumping board for further research by serving as a technique to 
further understand the possible relationship between school types and test scores. 
Essentially, a propensity score is the probability of belonging to a treatment group (e.g. 
Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Each observation in the dataset is assigned a propensity score 
according to which it is assigned into a treated or untreated group. This also solves the 
computational problem of otherwise matching on covariates that might be multi-dimensional or 
time-lagged (Ashenfelter, 1978; Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). Calculating a propensity score implies 
that if conditioning on a vector Xi of covariates can solve the selection bias problem, then so can 
calculating a propensity score P[Ti = 1| Xi] where T is treatment status of whether or not a school 
is private (Rosenaum & Rubin, 1983). The school covariates that public, private, and PPP 
schools are matched on include school location (rural/urban); total enrollment and % boys; 
number of total teachers and % male teachers; student to teacher ratio; medium of instruction; 
school facilities (e.g. electricity, sewerage, drinking water, toilets, library, playground, 
laboratories etc.); number of classrooms and open-air classrooms; school area and covered area; 
school education level; registration status; duration of school‘s establishement (i.e. age of 
school); and school management committee characteristics. 
The propensity score is determined over intervals of equal number of schools between 
both public and private schools. If the propensity score is different for the intervals, the interval 
is sub-divided (that is, the number of schools in each interval is reduced). This is repeated until 
the propensity score is the same for both types of schools. This is also known as the Balancing 





schools were matched on are calculated and if they differed, higher order terms of that variable 
and/or interaction terms are tested until the means are similar for both public and private schools. 
In this case, schools were matched closely on some covariates, such as school location, and not 
closely on others, such as registration status. Tables 3 and 5 in Appendix A provide a summary 
of school covariates after matching. 
Similar to regression analysis, matching assumes ignorability, which means that selection 
bias stems from the observed covariates of units; however, the difference is that regression 
estimates treatment effects through a linear function whereas matching looks at individuals with 
the same covariates. Mathematically, the conditional independence assumption for causal 
inference through matching can be written as: 
 E[Yij | Xi, Ti] = E[Yij | Xi], for j = 0,1  
where Y is the outcome test score, X is a vector of covariates, and T is the treatment 
status of 0 = public school, 1 = private or FAS program school. 
This means that: 
  E[Y1i – Y0i | Ti = 1] = E{E[Y1i| Xi, Ti = 1] – [Y0i | Xi, Ti = 1 | Ti = 1} 
  = E{E[Y1i | Xi, Ti = 1] – [Y0i | Xi, Ti = 0]| Ti = 1} 
And similarly: 
  E[Y1i – Y0i] = E{E[Y1i | Xi, Ti = 1] – [Y0i | Xi, Ti = 0]} 
which provides the average treatment effect.  
I used the nearest-neighborhood matching method to calculate the propensity score. This 
method was chosen among other propensity score methods (kernel matching, radius matching, 





question, number(s) of treatment(s). For instance, in this dissertation, there is one treatment at a 
time so that Mahalnobis matching is not an ideal choice since that focuses on multiple 
treatments. Moreover, the size of the private school sample is much smaller than the public 
school sample so that matching with replacement ensures a reasonable size since it allows one 
observation to be matched to multiple observations instead of being removed from the matching 
pool after one match. Nearest-neighbor matching is also preferable to other matching methods 
because it assigns a weight to the closest matched observation versus other observations so that 




The overlap between treated and control groups in shown in Appendix B. More 
specifically, matching public and private schools through propensity score matching reduces the 
overall sample size from 100,260 schools to 72,454 schools due to non-overlap although the 
proportion of private school to public schools remained the same. Matching public and FAS 
program schools reduces the sample to 53,162. The sample sizes are still relatively large enough 
to hope that the law of large numbers will allow estimates to approximate those of the population 
(Baum & Katz, 1965). I primarily use data from the 2009-10 academic year since that had the 
most comprehensive and validated information with the least amount of missing values among 
all datasets. However, where cross-sectional data is available for 2005 onwards, for instance 
through EMIS and PEC, a separate analysis for each year can be conducted to compare the 
results with the cross-sectional analysis. This can be an area of potential future research. 
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 In Pakistan‘s case, control and treatment schools did not have very different distributions of observable (and 






The propensity score matching method is only one of the techniques used to account for 
selection bias. Other methods include the Heckman correction method. However, given the 
assumptions of the Heckman correction method (normality is the most significant assumption; 
Heckman, 1979), they are not met in data so that propensity score matching provides a better 
alternative. One of these assumptions of the Heckman model that makes propensity score 
matching method more attractive is that of having a significant block of observations in the two 
extremes of the normal distribution, which can lead to nonlinearity (Inverse Mills Ratio) (Puhani, 
2000). Estimates from the Heckman correction model are sensitive to these non-linearities while 
propensity score matching methods are not (Drake, 1993). In other words, even if models are not 
correctly specified in terms of their dimension(s) or parameters, the results of estimates and the 
average treatment effect are not directly or significantly influenced by propensity score 
matching. Since the treatments of being a private school or a FAS program school are 
dichotomous variables, their parameters are not simple to gauge or define. This makes propensity 
score matching a more suitable method compared to Heckman‘s correction method. 
One of the problems associated with propensity score matching is that estimating the 
propensity score itself can have issues in terms of which variables the two groups are matched 
on. For the purposes of this dissertation, I used all available observable school covariates; 
however, unobserved variables are still unspecified and unaccounted for, such as school 
management, parental preferences, PPP contract etc. (Ashenfelter & Card, 1985). Propensity 
score matching might also inflate the standard errors by assuming equal sample sizes of control 
and treatment groups. Another frequent weakness of this method is that it can drastically reduce 





matching (with the same ratio of private to public schools) and about 50 percent was retained 
after the public-FAS program matching, the sample size should not be a weakness, which makes 
propensity score matching a feasible strategy to use.  
The quantitative methods and data can be wrought with many other weaknesses and 
biases as well, especially since student level data is unavailable for this dissertation. These 
weaknesses and biases, and possible solutions are described in the next section. 
 
3.5 - Challenges to comparing achievement 
Unobservables and omitted variable bias 
Although several PPP schools are oversubscribed and enrollment has to be limited
90
, the 
basis of limiting enrollment is unclear (one possibility is keeping only students who score above 
a certain amount in the standardized tests or who pass the admission test). If the basis of limiting 
enrollment is unbiased, provided the motivation to apply for a PPP school was unrelated to test 
scores, the scenario would have resembled a natural experiment (Allcott & Ortega, 2009). 
However, since there is no student level data available, it is difficult to exploit the possibility of 
an exogeneous school choice. 
In addition, it is not possible to identify schools that were previously purely private and 
are now PPP schools because available data are only ―post-treatment‖91 and do not differentiate 
among school types or duration of school establishment to such an extent. Movement into and 
out of the treatment group is somewhat fluid because based on QATs and other school facility 
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 However, starting in 2011, PEF does not have a maximum enrollment cut-off although there is still a minimum 
requirement of 100 students in a school. 
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requirements, partner schools are either included or excluded from the FAS program schools. 
Excluded schools can re-apply for the next phase of FAS program applications. Yet, the data 
available for this dissertation do not provide a comprehensive, longitudinal list of school status 
(i.e. partner or not partner over time). Hence using an accurate identification strategy is the only 
solution for a credible exploratory analysis. 
 
More about Unobservables 
As mentioned earlier, after becoming partners, these FAS program schools have to pass 
QATs to ensure their continued participation in the program. For this reason, these treatment 
schools possibly have other components in their treatment that might not be available in other 
private or public schools – a more rigorous curriculum-teaching methodology than other private 
and public schools, better quality teachers, and a more dedicated and diligent administration. 
This is possibly related to the management aspect of the education provision. Although the 
curriculum is the same as that of other schools, FAS program schools usually emphasize English, 
Mathematics, Urdu, and Science because these are the subjects QATs are based on (personal 
communication, PEF, September 5
th
, 2011). At least until 8
th
 grade when students have no 
electives, we can assume that compared to public and other private schools, FAS program 
schools in general place more emphasis on subjects that QATs also emphasize. However, this 
might not be true for other elite private schools, such as Lahore Grammar School (LGS, personal 
communication, September 14
th
, 2011). Yet, this emphasis is difficult to measure unless 





observed. This was not feasible given the limited scope and scale of this dissertation – although I 
did have discussions with some school principals - but is a potential area of future research. 
 Since administration effort is also unobservable except perhaps employing better quality 
teachers and/or maintaining school facilities, teacher quality is the only treatment component that 
can potentially be observed through, for instance, teacher qualification. Moreover, teacher 
motivation is related to teachers‘ confidence in their ability to teach, which in turn can raise 
students‘ motivation and performance (Hoy, 2000). However, non-FAS program schools can 
also engage teachers with similar qualifications so that the difference – if there is a difference – 
can lay more in teacher motivation and effort rather than qualification. This is especially because 
of the teacher and school incentives offered by the FAS program (the FAS program is described 
in more detail at the end of chapter 2).  
Therefore, post treatment (i.e. after becoming partners), teacher and administration 
engagement as well as curriculum are unobservables since it is unclear which direction the 
association follows: treatment leading to student achievement or student achievement forcing 
certain aspects of the treatment. This leads to endogeneity in the quantitative analysis. 
 
Selection bias 
Selection bias is one of the inherent problems for econometric analyses. Deaton (2009), 
and Dulfo and Kremer (2003) agree about the problems inherent in using non randomized 
evaluation methods, specifically large and unknown biases resulting from selection issues or 
specification errors. One reason for this, as mentioned earlier, is that in retrospective non 





conclusions (Duflo & Kremer, 2003). Another potential source of this selection bias is schools‘ 
participation in the FAS program because it is possible that only private schools in urban areas 
have access to information about the FAS program. However, FAS program schools are selected 
from a pool of applications that is fairly representative of all private schools in Punjab. This is 
because PEF advertises its program each year in a way (almost all media sources and local 
agencies etc.) that all schools have an opportunity to apply including schools in rural areas that 
might not receive newspapers with these advertisements because there is ―strong networking 
among schools‖ (FAS, personal communication, October 3rd, 2011). This enables almost all 
private schools to be aware of the FAS program although schools that do apply for FAS program 
partnerships are still self-selected perhaps based on their registration status and location 
(rural/urban).  
Moreover, although higher teacher salaries in public schools are supposed to attract better 
quality teachers, selection bias can occur because certain teachers might want to choose schools 
that already have higher achieving students (due to reasons ranging from family background
92
 to 
self motivation to peer effects), have lower enrollment, have the teacher incentives offered by the 
FAS program, and have students that are easier to discipline. 
Another problem, especially for evaluations conducted over time, is attrition where 
participants in either the control or treatment group drop out or transfer schools. This is even 
more problematic if the dropout rate is different for the control versus treatment group. Attrition 
not only changes the sample size, but it also biases the sample if those who drop out or transfer 
share a certain non-random characteristic. In this dissertation, the sample is scaled up to the 
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school level; however, since we are examining school choice, various types of students in their 
specific schools can share characteristics that students in other schools do not. The lack of 
information about these characteristics increases selection bias. 
Parental preferences can also lead to selection bias. Parents who are more aware of the 
qualities and reputations of schools or have access to more information will have an advantage in 
trying to enroll their students in those schools. Parents who have strong connections are also in 
an influential position to have their child(ren) attend a school of their choice. Controlling for 
selection bias resulting from parental preferences is very difficult in this dissertation because 
there is hardly any student or household level data available.  
 
Ability based bias 
Another limitation related to selection bias that Lara, Mizala, and Repetto (2009) mention 
when evaluating Chile‘s voucher program (related to school choice) is ―ability based selection.‖ 
This can occur because schools are familiar with students‘ abilities and hence can ―sort‖ and 
choose whom to admit so that it is not a random assignment to voucher schools. This bias in 




) versus in 4
th
 grade (Lara, Mizala, and Repetto, 
2009). While this can be a problem in secondary schools in Pakistan‘s sample, public primary or 




 grades have to admit all applying 
students. However, this could pose a potential selection problem in some private schools where 
applying students often have to take school admission tests and interviews. This could be more 
prevalent in some FAS program schools that have to maintain a certain test score level in order 





a minimum level of 100 students so that schools do not always have a choice about whom to 
admit if they want to increase enrollment and retain their partnership status. Conversely, after 
becoming partners with PEF, FAS program schools have to cap their enrollment at 500 students 
even if the new applying students have higher ability than the current students.  
In addition, parents of students who have higher abilities or are self motivated could 
approach private subsidized schools with the perception that these schools will have higher 
educational quality and hence improve their children‘s academic achievement (selection bias). 
Moreover, although identification strategies including propensity score matching assume perfect 
knowledge on behalf of the parents and clear preferences for private subsidy or public schools, 
that is not necessarily the case. When parents enroll their child in kindergarten or first grade, 
there is even more uncertainty (for themselves, for schools, and for researchers) about their 
preferences and motives so that school assignment is not necessarily random.  
 
Using the “survey” command in Stata 
When it comes to the technical aspects, I use Stata 11 to specify that data is from a survey 
so that several problems that could be exacerbated by specifying data as randomized can be 
avoided. For instance, if we specify data as randomized, standard errors might be 
underestimated, which can lead to statistically significant results but these results will not be 
significant if data is used as a different sampling design e.g. survey.  
The elements of using a survey design can include sampling weights, post-stratification 
weights, strata, and replicate weights (if PSUs and strata are not used)
93
. Using data from NEC 







and EMIS does not need sample weights since principal sampling unit is the school where all 
schools are included. Sampling is done with replacement where all school cases are unique. 
Strata can depend on the level of analysis that we are interested in – village level, urban level, 
tehsil, or district. In this case, tehsil is the stratum of interest. However, again, all strata (and not 
a sub-sample of strata) are used. This reduces inaccuracy in point estimates and in standard 
errors. 
The above case is true if in reality all schools are included in the data. This is not always 
possible because of missing data due to lack of information or in the case of private schools, 
perhaps not all private schools have participated in PEC exams in 2009. The latter is unlikely 
because PEC participation is mandatory or even if some schools have still managed it to avoid it, 
that sample is very small and unrepresentative of the overall school types (it usually consists of 
the elite private schools; PMIU, 2011). However, unlike experimental or quasi-experimental 
data, idiosyncratic observations due to, for instance, analysis of a subpopulation (e.g. only female 
public schools), are not deleted in a survey analysis. This is because although idiosyncratic cases 
are not used in the analysis, they are used in calculating standard errors.  
 
Missing Data and measurement error 
Another limitation of this dissertation‘s analysis could be using a dataset that can have 
observations missing for one or more variables, as well as measurement or reporting error. 
Missing data and measurement error can occur because of various reasons – unreadable 
information; inaccessible schools (because of, for instance, security issues); school principals 





during the data collection process; students or teachers being absent during collection (hence 
affecting enrollment and student-teacher ratio) etc. In this dissertation, measurement error is 
assumed to be negligible although it is important in interpreting the findings. The missing data 
problem is exacerbated because various datasets have been merged so that even for the same 
schools, different variables can have missing values. Moreover, if data is obtained from different 
agencies, such as PEC, PEF, and PMIU, all individual data might be of higher and lower quality. 
Simply dropping the observations with missing values will drastically reduce the sample size and 
also bias the data towards certain types of schools. Therefore, missing data analysis or data 
imputation (depending on how much of it needs to be imputed) might yield different, more 
representative, or even more robust results. 
In this dissertation, I have used imputation by chained equations (ICE) for the multiple 
imputation method. This is especially true for variables (and not observations) that have a high 
proportion of missing values. Multiple imputation means using different datasets for the analysis 
where each dataset has different imputed values for variables with a high proportion of missing 
values. It is assumed that data is missing at random.
94
 Moreover, multiple imputation method for 
missing data does not mean multiple results because results are combined to provide one 
estimation table. ICE is useful because it is intuitive and does not assume multivariate joint 
distribution (Royston, 2004)
95
. It also does not require a very large sample size although that is 
not an issue here because I am using all schools in Punjab. This method is also advantageous 
                                                 
94
 In this dissertation since many datasets are used, it is possible that these missing values might not be random in 
terms of the collecting agency‘s efficiency. However, all the collecting agencies used in this analysis validate their 
results so that missing values can be considered random and not due to the skills of a particular agency. 
 
95
 I also tried to conduct propensity weighted regressions; however, it did not give significantly different results than 






because it shows standard errors based on the uncertainty in the analysis due to missing values. 
However, weaknesses of ICE include more mathematical rather than theoretical soundness, as 
well as the possibility of conditional densities incompatibility (Allison, 2002).  
While most observations had imputed values for variables, some observations were not 
included in the analysis, as described below. 
 
Exclusion of Data 
Data that is excluded from the analysis are the observations that are listed as only 
―Private‖ because these observations refer to private student candidates that might or might not 
be enrolled in school but still participating in PEC examinations. Since the analysis is at a school 
level, these observations are not relevant or desired because they can bias results since they are 
not associated with any school covariates. 
  Chapter 3 has discussed data sources, variable descriptions, and the propensity score 
matching methodology, all of which are combined - and the weaknesses of quantitative methods 
kept in mind - in the following chapter to conduct the empirical analysis in order to answer the 










Chapter 4 – Results - School Type and Student Achievement  
 
 
This chapter begins the empirical analysis based on the data description and methodology 
outlined in the previous chapter. Through the empirical analysis, I attempt to answer the first 
research question, which aims to explore the relationship between student achievement and the 
three school types (public, private, and public-private partnership (PPP)) schools. In doing so, I 
first describe the comparative achievement statistics of the three school types. These statistics in 
turn set the background for more detailed comparisons through propensity score matching. Next, 
using the empirical methodology, all three school types – public, private, and PPP – are 
compared with respect to their relationship with test scores. This comparison is especially 
significant because results can potentially inform government policy about which school type is 
most efficient at producing high quality education. This can have further implications about 
which school type the government should encourage. The chapter ends with a discussion of the 
findings with a focus on PPP schools. This discussion is continued in the last policy-related 
chapter that synthesizes answers to both research questions. 
As emphasized in earlier chapters, I do not suggest causal inference through the empirical 
analysis but rather this is a preliminary exploration of how public, private, and PPP schools in 
Punjab, Pakistan, relate to student achievement. Before discussing results from the empirical 








4.1 - Descriptives of Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are student test scores – total, Math, English, Urdu, Islamic 




 grades. Almost all subject scores pass the normality test 
conducted visually through histograms, and box and whisker plots (Appendix B). Histograms are 
more useful for presenting scores by intervals while box plots are more useful for detecting 
outliers. Test scores for 8
th
 grade follow a normal distribution more accurately than 5
th
 grade 
scores. Islamic Studies scores falls most neatly into the normal distribution curves versus other 
subjects. A W-statistic through the Shapiro-Wilks test was also calculated that showed that the 
dependent variables are normally distributed.  
When public and private schools in the overall sample are compared, private schools 
always seem to perform significantly (statistically) better than public schools shown by their 
higher test scores (8
th
 grade Math is the only exception). Please see Table 1 in Appendix A. Total 
scores in 5
th
 grade for private and public schools have an average of -0.041 and 0.065 standard 
deviations respectively. The smallest difference between private and public schools in 5
th
 grade 
scores is in Math (0.023 standard deviations) and the largest difference is in Islamic Studies 
(0.122 standard deviations). Private and public school scores for 8
th
 grade are -0.008 and 0.012 
standard deviations respectively. Unlike all other subjects, 8
th
 grade Math scores do not seem to 
have a significant difference between the two school types. Moreover, the largest difference in 
public and private school scores is in Urdu and Science (0.024-5 standard deviations) perhaps 
because of more qualified or motivated teachers or students who want to perform well so they 















 grades. However, the difference is lower in 8
th
 grade than in 5
th
 grade. Science is the 
highest scoring subject and Math is the lowest scoring subject. Between languages, schools score 
higher in Urdu than in English. Comparing FAS program schools with non-FAS program 
schools, the difference in mean score for all subjects is much greater than the difference in mean 
scores between private and public schools. Moreover, unlike private schools, all differences 
between FAS and non-FAS schools are significant.  
The next section describes test score differences between public and private schools after 
both school types have been matched on various school characteristics, such as school 
infrastructure and background, teachers, and student characteristics etc. 
 
First Matched Sample – Public and Private schools 
After matching, private schools have higher average test scores than public schools for all 
subjects as shown by Table 2 in Appendix A. The 5
th
 grade mean total scores are -0.040 and 
0.106 standard deviations for public and private schools respectively. Islamic Studies is the 
highest and Math is the lowest scoring subject in both grades. Mean scores in 8
th
 grade are -0.010 
and 0.026 standard deviations for public and private schools respectively. This shows that 
although small in absolute terms, test scores differences according to school type are generally 
larger in 5
th
 grade scores (about 0.146 standard deviations difference in 5
th
 versus about 0.036 
standard deviations in 8
th
 grade).  Moreover, the difference in private and public school test 
scores is least in Math for 5
th
 grade and in Urdu for 8
th





After attempting to achieve balance, independent variable descriptives in the public and 
private school matched sample are shown in Table 3 in Appendix A. The next section continues 
with test score differences after public schools have been matched with FAS program schools. 
 
Second Matched Sample – Public and FAS program schools 
The mean for 5
th
 grade total scores is -0.015 standard deviations for public schools and 
0.521 standard deviations for matched FAS program schools (Table 4, Appendix A). Compared 
to test score differences between public and private schools, test score differences between FAS 
and public schools are significant and larger
96
. Overall test scores for FAS program schools are 
also higher then test scores for private or public schools. For instance, in 5
th
 grade, English has -
0.012 and 0.407 standard deviations for public and FAS program schools respectively. The 
lowest scoring subject in this case is Math for both public and FAS program schools and the least 
difference in test scores is in Math (0.189 standard deviations).  
Mean total scores in 8
th
 grade are -0.007 for public schools and 0.253 for FAS program 
schools. Again, 8
th
 grade test scores in general are higher for FAS program schools than private 
or public schools. Moreover, the difference between FAS and public school total scores is more 
pronounced for grade 5 than for grade 8 (0.535 and 0.260 standard deviations respectively).  
There are two additional points that are important to consider when comparing differences 
among school type. One, reasons for higher FAS program school total scores could include FAS 
                                                 
96
 The minimum scores in 5
th
 grade for private and FAS schools are usually greater than in public and non-FAS 
schools respectively. However, the maximum can be greater for other schools – private or public. Yet in the case of 
8
th
 grade scores, FAS schools have both a higher minimum and a higher maximum total score (versus FAS and non-
FAS schools respectively). Greater minimum scores for FAS program schools could potentially show that FAS 
program schools help the weakest students to perform better (who would usually score lowest on tests) while the 







program schools choosing to admit high achieving students or high ability students choosing to 
apply for a FAS program school, thus leading to selection bias, which can allow FAS program 
schools to score higher in general. However, it is also true that the average enrollment for each 
FAS school in the matched sample is less than the maximum 500 allowed by PEF (Table 5 in 
Appendix A)
97
 so that these private schools may enroll more students in order to maximize 
profits. This will mean that FAS program schools might not use a student‘s academic 
performance as the main criterion for admission so that selection bias from the school‘s side is 
reduced even if sources of selection bias - applying students have certain family and/or student 
characteristics – continue to exist. Two, although I have provided student achievement in 
standard deviations, test scores are used in percentage points to determine how a student has 
performed in a given test. In percentage point terms, relative to other subjects, Islamic Studies is 
the highest scoring subject among all school types although it is neither a subject that is tested by 
the FAS program, nor is it the determining subject for a student passing a certain grade. It will be 
interesting to see if the empirical PSM analysis in the next section also shows a unique behavior 
of Islamic Studies test scores.  
 
4.2 - Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
 As outlined in the previous chapter, the samples being used have been created through 
the propensity score matching (PSM) method where public-private, and public-FAS program 
schools have been matched on multiple covariates including school gender, location, facilities 
etc. Dependent variables include all subject and total scores for grades 5 and 8. The main 
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independent variables of interest are being a private school, and being a FAS program partner 
school. Analysis is done separately for each independent variable of interest so that first the 
overall relationship of a private school with school scores can be seen, and then the relationship 
between a more specific type of private school (i.e. FAS program school) and subject scores can 
be examined.
98
 Each subject is also analyzed separately because there can be differences in the 
facilities, teacher experience, and student background among subjects. The next section deals 
with the first treatment – being a private school.  
 
4.2.1 - Private schools propensity score matching analysis 
In conducting this chapter‘s first empirical analysis, I use the matched sample (72,454 
schools obtained through public-private propensity score matching). This section first presents 
the 5
th







 Standardized total test scores are regressed on school background, school infrastructure, 
student, teacher, and school community characteristics (Table 6, Appendix A)
99
. The variable of 
interest is whether or not a school is private. Results show that being a private school is 
associated with an increase of 0.119 standard deviations in total 5
th
 grade test scores. In terms of 
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 There is sufficient evidence in the literature (Alderman et al., 1995) to suggest that test scores as well as responses 
to treatments can differ between boys and girls. Although schools in the current data were registered as either male 
or female, enrollment figures showed co-ed schools. This prevents a gender-specific analysis although it is an area 
for possible future research. 
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 I only present the final models in the empirical results tables because coefficients are often consistent across 







other school background characteristics, a school in an urban location is associated with an 
increase of 0.045 standard deviations in test scores. If English is the medium of instruction – 
which is true for more private schools than public schools – total scores will be 0.105 standard 




 grade scores are also higher 
if a school is only a primary level school versus going up to higher education levels. A registered 
school gains about 0.082 standard deviations over an unregistered school. Registration status can 
be difficult to interpret because although almost all public schools and FAS partner schools are 
registered, all other private schools might not be registered. Therefore, a positive coefficient for 
registration status can imply that the school is high achieving regardless of school type.  
 Out of school infrastructure variables, only drinking water, having a playground, 
electricity, sewerage, number of toilets, and a new construction (toilet, classroom, repair) have 
significant (and negative) coefficients while a library has a positive and significant coefficient. 
Having a library in the school can facilitate learning so that it has a positive coefficient (0.09 
standard deviations). One reason for the negative relationship of the first six variables with 
student test scores could be that construction mostly occurs in low scoring public schools that are 
often in need of repair. Another reason could be that amidst disturbances created by new 
construction, students find it difficult to study and teachers find it difficult to instruct so that 
student scores can be influenced adversely. Some high-achieving students might even transfer 
from one school to another to avoid disturbance. Parents making school choices can also base 
them on facilities rather than a school‘s average achievement. Moreover, it is important to look 
at past achievement in schools to see if resources are being focused more on schools that are low 
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 I added an interaction term between school type and medium to the model; however, it was not significant and 






performing. If this is the case, then adding school resources will not immediately show a positive 
association (Hanushek, Rivkin, & Taylor, 1996). In addition, there could be measurement error 
in terms of misreporting (Hanushek, Rivkin, & Taylor, 1996) by principals and school personnel, 
especially in the case of private schools that are not monitored by the government. 
 A one standard deviation increase in student-teacher ratio is associated with a 0.007 
standard deviations increase in total test scores. A one percentage point increase in male teachers 
is associated with a 0.037 standard deviations increase in total test scores. This implies that male 
teachers can help students to perform better in tests perhaps because female teachers are not as 
highly trained (Andrabi et al., 2010) or because they face difficulty in maintaining class 
discipline.  A one percent increase in the number of boys in a school is associated with 0.014 
standard deviations increase in total test scores. This could be because an increase in the total 
number of students can imply generally reducing class size and hiring more teachers, or because 
boys score higher in 5
th
 grade scores than girls.  
The coefficient for the percentage of teachers among school management committee 
(SMC) members is 0.0132 standard deviations, showing that he or she might be able to better 
guide SMC members about a school‘s needs and hence help in raising test scores. The other 
significant school committee variables are its total number of members and meetings both with a 
negative coefficient, maybe because overall, the school committee is not very functional or 
useful to meeting student needs. 
 Coming to subject scores, coefficients for private schools among all subject scores are 
positive and significant. Being a private school has the highest coefficient for Islamic Studies 





coefficient (0.047). The small private school coefficient for Math scores can exist because of the 
belief in innate ability versus school‘s value added, which teachers can reinforce as well 
(personal communication, PEF, December 4
th
, 2011). Lara, Mizala, & Repetto (2009) discuss the 
same issue for Chile
101
. Coefficients of independent variables for Islamic Studies scores are 
usually lower or less frequently significant than coefficients of independent variables for other 
subjects. Being an English medium school seems to matter most for English and Urdu subject 
scores (0.070 standard deviations). School infrastructure and teacher characteristics exhibit 
similar trends as in the case of total test scores (negative coefficients for infrastructure except 
library; positive and negative coefficients for percentage of male teachers; positive coefficient 
for student-private ratio). School size (i.e. total enrollment) does not show a consistent pattern 
and neither do school committee members (except the percentage of teachers). For instance, the 
percentages of female and parent committee members have a positive association with Islamic 
Studies test scores while the opposite is true for Science test scores where the percentage of male 
committee members have a positive association. 
 From the above discussion, there are some trends that are clear. Private schools are 
always associated with higher score than public schools. Registered schools, schools with more 
male than female teachers, English-medium schools,  primary schools, and urban schools also 
tend to perform better than unregistered, schools with more female teachers, Urdu-medium, 
higher education level, and rural schools. School age is non-significant.
102
 Having a library in the 
school is always associated with higher test scores. However, all other infrastructure types are 
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 Chile is comparable to Pakistan only if it is a low or lower middle income country. 
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 This could imply that longer established schools perform better on PEC exams perhaps because of more 
experienced teachers, a well-designed curriculum, better infrastructure etc. Conversely, the positive coefficient for 





almost always negatively related to test scores. Male teachers tend to perform better than female 
teachers and the higher the percentage of teachers in the school committee, the higher the test 
scores.   
Besides these patterns in coefficients and significance, it is important to keep a few things 
in mind. One, generally the coefficients for each variable, including the variable of interest, are 
small in magnitude. Second, the amount of variance explained is small for all subject and total 
scores. This might change if another identification strategy, such as instrumental variables, is 
used or if there are other covariates. However, given the data, these adjusted R-squares are the 
highest possible I could obtain through the propensity score matching method. Third, negative 
coefficients for some variables, such as school infrastructure, some school committee members, 
and total number of teachers, can be because of various reasons – for instance, omitted variables, 
such as family background that can potentially influence school choice, and/or community 
regulations regarding expenditure. Moreover, these models should not be considered fully 
specified. Instead, the empirical analysis in this dissertation is an attempt to only add to 
understanding about school types in Punjab‘s context and does not predict school effects. 
The next section discusses the relationship between 8
th
 grade test scores and independent 









 grade  
 The most important finding from this analysis is that the coefficient for private schools is 
non-significant (Table 7, Appendix A). This is in direct contrast to 5
th





same coefficient for the variable of interest was positive and significant. The other main finding 
is that coefficients for all variables are much smaller now than they were for 5
th
 grade. For 
instance, an urban school is related to a 0.019 standard deviations increase in total test scores 
while English as a medium of instruction is related to a 0.072 standard deviations increase in test 
scores (versus 0.045 and 0.105 respectively for 5
th
 grade scores). Among school infrastructure 
variables, new construction, electricity, toilets, and a playground have negative coefficients 
while a library and school area have positive coefficients. A larger school area perhaps means 
more classrooms, more labs, and more teachers, which are all considered related to greater 
educational attainment and by extension, student achievement (Hanushek, 1995). Student-teacher 
ratio is positively related to total test scores. An increase in sanctioned minus filled teachers is 
negatively related to total test scores, which is intuitive because it means that the number of 
teachers in public schools is less than required by the government. The percentage of male 
teachers is positively related to a 0.031 standard deviations increase in total test scores implying 
that male teaches perform better than female teachers for reasons discussed earlier (e.g. more 
trained and better able to maintain class discipline). The coefficient for percentage of boys in a 
school is now negative and significant for total score, meaning that girls often tend to score 




. Among school committee members, the percentage of teachers 
has a positive association with total test scores of 0.011 standard deviations. 
Moreover, the coefficients for private schools are also non-significant for all subject test 
scores. No school covariate is consistent in its direction of the coefficient (positive or negative) 
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 For instance, boys tend to be more ―rowdy‖ and not only pay less attention in class, but also make it more 
difficult for others to study (Fennema et al., 1990; personal communication, PEF, November 14
th
, 2011) and girls 






and significance except medium of instruction, student-teacher ratio, percentage of teachers in 
school committees with positive coefficients, and new construction with a negative coefficient. 
This implies that there is no specific trend about boys scoring consistently higher in all subjects 
(unlike 5
th
 grade trends), hence agreeing with other research that depicts girls performing better 
than boys academically in some subjects (Skaalvik & Rankin, 1994 on Norway; Younger & 
Warrington, 1996 on Britain). 
In addition, 8
th
 grade models explain even less variance (have even lower R-squares) in 
test scores than 5
th
 grade models. Since there is a high dropout rate from the primary school level 
(up to 5
th
 grade) to middle school (up to 8
th
 grade), a possible assumption is that students who do 
not drop out are self-selected, which can contribute towards selection bias because of individual 
and family backgrounds rather than school characteristics. There can also be selection bias 
because private schools themselves might have certain criteria for admission, such as an 
academic admission test. However, in large private schools, there can be an incentive to enroll 
more students to maximize profits. These are possible reasons why empirical analysis in this 
dissertation, which focuses on school attributes, is not able to capture most of the variance in 8
th
 
grade test scores. 
 So far, the empirical analysis section has discussed private schools as the variable of 
interest in order to then move onto discussing public-private partnership (PPP) schools as the 
main variable of interest. This means that the treatment is schools belonging to the Foundation 
Assisted Schools (FAS) program while the control group is public schools
104
. These two school 
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 Another example of propensity score matching to look at effectiveness of PPPs in education was conducted by 
Allcott and Ortega (2007) (as cited in Patrinos et al., 2009) on 2003 cross-sectional data from Venezuela. Results 
showed that PPPs were associated with 0.08 standard deviation increase in Math and 0.1 standard deviation increase 





types were matched because since they are both publicly funded, they can have policy 
implications in terms of which school types the government should support financially and 
managerially.  
It is possible that the next section will show higher coefficients for FAS program schools, 
especially since there was also a greater difference between FAS and public schools test scores 
than between private and public school test scores. I expect that adding FAS program schools as 
a treatment variable (1 if a school is a FAS program partner; 0 if not) will solely or at least 
mostly capture the association between test scores and FAS program schools
105
. This means that 
the coefficient for a FAS program school can possibly capture the relationship of tests scores 
with unobservable characteristics of being a PPP program (the treatment). In reality, these 
characteristics might be observable through interviews or in-person visits to these schools. 
Although I did briefly interview some principals of FAS program schools, their answers will 
mostly help in discussing results of the empirical analysis rather than using the unobservables 
they mention (such as management and teacher quality) in the statistical models due to lack of 
available data. This can be a topic for future research that asks for principals‘ and parents‘ views 
of unobservable characteristics, such as teacher motivation and management efficiency. I attempt 
to reduce the gap of such understanding, at least to a small extent, later in the dissertation 
through my second research question dealing with parental school choice.  
The next section discusses being FAS program schools as the main variable of interest. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
105
 Part of the reason is that public schools have already been matched with FAS program schools. Another reason 
could be that facilities will most probably not differ vastly between public and FAS program schools because FAS 










 grade  
 When average school total test scores are the dependent variable, being a FAS program 
school is associated with a 0.537 standard deviations advantage in test scores (Please see Table 8 
in Appendix A). This is in contrast to results from the previous section where a private school in 
general estimate was smaller (0.119 standard deviations) in test scores. This implies that the FAS 
program school coefficient possibly captures the relationship of unobservable characteristics of 
these PPP schools that are different from both public and overall private schools. 
This implication can be reinforced by similar i.e. mostly unchanged coefficients, 
directions, and significance of other school covariates compared to when private schools were 
the variable of interest. For instance, if a school is urban, the coefficient in both types of analyses 
(for private school as the treatment and the FAS program school as the treatment) is 0.047 and 
0.055 respectively. An English medium school is now associated with a 0.086 standard 
deviations increase in FAS program total test scores. New construction, which can be a 
disturbing factor because of the various forms it can take – flooring, storage spaces in 
classrooms, blackboards, furniture for students and staff, toilet facilities, drinking water 
fountains, gates etc. (PMIU, 2010) – has a negative coefficient of -0.098. Other significant 
infrastructure variables include number of classrooms, a playground, drinking water, number of 
classrooms, and number of toilets with negative coefficients and a library with a positive 
coefficient. The student-teacher ratio, percentage of male teachers in a school, and the number of 





members, an increase in the percentage of teachers and number of total members are respectively 
associated with positive 0.016 and negative -0.017 standard deviations changes in total test 
scores. Interestingly, the percentage of men in SMCs is positively and significantly associated 
with test scores. Again, these trends are similar to those for private schools and hence show that 
the hypothesis stated earlier seems to be confirmed – the increase in test scores associated with 
FAS schools seems to be because of their own unobservable PPP characteristics.  
 Different subject scores exhibit varied relationships between a FAS program school and 
average subject test scores. In Math, being a FAS partner school is expected to increase test 
scores by 0.204 standard deviations while being a private school is only associated with a 0.022 
standard deviations  increase in test scores. Other subject test scores also behave similarly – for 
instance, English test scores are associated with a positive 0.433 coefficient for a FAS program 
partner. The coefficient for a school being a FAS partner school is the lowest (0.310) for Islamic 
Studies and the highest for Science (0.630). Other than these differences, coefficients for other 
covariates show similar patterns although they can differ slightly in terms of which school 
infrastructure or school committee member – men, women, total members etc. – are significant 
for individual subjects. 
 Overall, all coefficients for being a FAS partner school are positive and significant, and 
larger than coefficients for being a private school. However, the extent of test score variance 
explained (i.e. adjusted R-square) by adding FAS program schools into the analysis is smaller 
than the adjusted R-square when private schools were the variable of interest. 8
th
 grade scores are 








 grade  
 The main finding for 8th grade total scores is that being a FAS partner school is positively 
and significantly associated with test scores unlike when private schools were the main variable 
of interest, which had negative and non-significant coefficients for 8
th
 grade test scores. On 
average, FAS program schools can score about 0.245 standard deviations higher than a similar 
(matched) public school. (Table 9 in Appendix A). Among other school background 
characteristics, English as a medium of instruction is associated with a 0.031 standard deviations 
increase and an urban location is associated with a 0.016 standard deviations increase in total test 
scores. From the school infrastructure variables, new construction, school area, number of 
classrooms, and a playground have negative coefficients and a library has a positive coefficient. 
The student-teacher ratio is positively associated with 8
th
 grade total test scores while a higher 
percentage of boys has a negative coefficient. Among school committee member variables, the 
total number of members has a coefficient of -0.004 and the percentage of men in the committee 
has a coefficient of -0.006 whereas only the percentage of teachers is positively associated (0.012 
standard deviations) with a one standard deviation change  in test scores.  
 Subject-wise, similar to 5
th
 grade, Islamic Studies shows the smallest association of being 
a FAS partner school with test scores (0.158 standard deviations) while science test scores show 
the largest association (0.212 standard deviations)
106
. While coefficients of other independent 
variables have no consistent pattern of variation among subjects, the R-square for Math is higher 
than for other subjects.  
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In general, the scale of magnitude, significance, and ranges of how being a FAS partner 
school is positively associated with test scores are less for 8
th
 grade versus for 5
th
 grade. This 
difference could potentially be because 8
th
 grade students who have not dropped out after 5
th
 
grade can be somewhat self-motivated or have different family backgrounds than other students 
who have dropped out. This further implies that students in 8
th
 grade rely less on school 
characteristics to perform well in tests than students in 5
th
 grade whose scores are more strongly 
related to school type. Yet, it is still interesting to see that although being a private school was 
not significant for 8
th
 grade scores, being a FAS program school is both positive and significant 
for 8
th
 grade scores.  
Given the above results, the utility of the previous empirical analyses through propensity 
score matching versus an ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis is still questionable because the 
upward bias in OLS estimates can be canceled by the downward bias due to measurement error. 
Therefore, the utility of propensity score matching is technically tested through regression tests. 
 
4.2.3 - Regression tests 
 Before the propensity score matching (PSM) analysis, I conducted ordinary least squares 
(OLS) analysis. However, I do not present OLS results here because the analysis would have 
been repetitive
107
. I also checked for the six assumptions of OLS regressions. The residuals are 
almost near mean 0 and are mostly evenly spread out, implying that the OLS analysis is not 
heteroskedastic (see Appendix B) so that OLS estimates are BLUE - Best Linear unbiased 
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 Moreover, I focus on the PSM analysis since the aim of this dissertation is to ultimately inform government 
policy and it is more useful to present empirical results from a method that is usually considered more credible by 





estimator. The standardized residuals are also normally distributed and there are no outliers in 
the dataset. 
A Chow test (Chow, 1960) was performed on the dataset to see if the coefficients for 
covariates for public, private, and FAS partner schools were significantly different from each 
other to warrant an analysis that is aimed at countering the selection bias i.e. propensity score 
matching. The Chow test is often used in time-series analysis when there are structural breaks 
and also in policy evaluation when the impact of a policy is determined in terms of coefficients 
(are they different or not) for different sub-groups in a dataset. In this case, the sub-groups would 
mean public, private, and partner schools. The test statistic looks at the sum of squared residuals 
for the entire sample and by different subgroups, as well as the number of observations in each 
subgroup. The Chow test was performed for all covariates and dependent variables in this 
dissertation and showed that there was a significant difference for covariates for all three types of 
schools. This implies that PSM analysis added significantly in accuracy towards the relationship 
between test scores and school types versus a simple OLS analysis. 
 The variance inflation factor (VIF) was also calculated for all variables and regressions 
and showed that there was no multicollinearity among the variables used in the models. This was 
true for both individual variables and mean VIF because all values of VIF were less than 2 (a 
VIF value of 10 is taken as the cut-off point for confirming or rejecting the multicollinearity 
issue). Regression test results show that propensity score matching estimates in this chapter can 
be useful is examining the relationship between test scores and different school types.  
Overall, findings showed that FAS program schools are more strongly related to test 
scores than private schools and the coefficients are higher for 5
th







Subject-wise, Islamic Studies often shows the least and Science shows the highest dependence 
on school type. The strong positive coefficients of FAS program schools can possibly point 
towards unobservable characteristics they can possess because of being PPP schools. These 
characteristics can include how finance and management is organized; the PPP contract; and the 
accountability mechanism. The quantitative results and PPP unobservable characteristics are 
examined first in the discussion section of this chapter below. 
 
4.3 - Discussion 
From a policy standpoint, it is useful to see which school type – public, private, or PPP – 
adds to more understanding about increasing educational quality in Pakistan‘s context. The 
objective of this chapter was to quantitatively answer the first research question – how are 
public, private, and PPPs related to student achievement? This discussion section first describes 
the findings and weaknesses of the quantitative analysis, and then moves on to some specific 
PPP characteristics - considered unobservables in the quantitative analysis – that can be the 
reason for PPP schools performing better than public and other private schools. 
 
Quantitative Findings and Weaknesses 
Briefly, findings from the empirical analysis showed that FAS program schools exhibited 
a relatively stronger relationship than private schools with test scores although both school types 





 grade. Subject-wise, Math and Islamic Studies had the weakest and total and Science 





schools. Although FAS program schools did not necessarily explain a large portion of the 
variance in test scores, their estimates were large compared to estimates for private schools.  
As far as other school covariates are concerned, some unexpected findings came forth in 
terms of school inputs. Although school inputs including infrastructure are expected to positively 
influence test scores (Hanushek, 1986) some variables used in this dissertation, such as the 
availability of drinking water, appeared to have a negative relationship with test scores. This 
could possibly be due to measurement error as explained earlier, and also because of 
construction‘s disturbing factor that reduced the attention students could pay in class. Moreover, 
by policy, all public schools are required have these facilities even if all private schools do not 
have them and in turn, public schools scored less than private schools on PEC exams. Another 
reason for the negative coefficients on several school infrastructure facilities is their theoretical 
versus practical availability. For instance, even if monitoring reports of PMIU and PEF show that 
a school has drinking water and electricity when in reality there are electricity and water outages, 
the relationship between these facilities and test scores will not be large or significant. This is 
apparent through the small and often insignificant coefficients for school infrastructure variables. 
 One of the issues to be discussed in this section deals with methodology. This is one of 
the most important issues because the empirical method in this dissertation is used as an 
exploratory technique on which future research and policy can be based. However, the main 
method chosen in this dissertation – propensity score matching - has theoretical as well as 
practical assumptions that are not always realistic or easy to meet. On one hand, propensity score 
matching is useful because it can reduce selection bias. This is because control and treatment 





the kind of school – is supposed to differ between the two groups. On the other hand, propensity 
score matching is problematic because it often means reducing the sample size if all observations 
cannot be matched or the overlap between treatment and control groups is not large enough. 
Propensity score matching also assumes that the similarities (or differences) between the two 
control and treatment groups exist only for observable characteristics, which is clearly not a 
realistic assumption given that intangible characteristics of individuals and families, such as 
motivations and ability, cannot be measured and matched on quantitatively. The propensity score 
matching method in this dissertation is able to match on only a few school covariates out of the 
vast array of other covariates that have been used in the literature, such as teacher qualification 
and expenditure. Although some more covariates were available in one dataset or another (such 
as teacher education level), it was not possible to use them since they were not common across 
datasets (especially for public and private schools) or because they were not coded accurately. 
Therefore, for propensity score matching, not only were unobservables missing, but observable 
characteristics were also not fully specified. Moreover, this dissertation does not include separate 
analysis for tehsils so that schools in one tehsil might have been matched with other tehsils‘ 
schools, which can be problematic if there are unobservables, such as the local tehsil government 
management, that can influence how schools provide education. 
 A more general drawback of the quantitative analysis is its internal and external validity. 
Internal validity can be reduced because there can be spillover effects on other schools‘ policies 
who function in the same market as the FAS partner schools (Barrera-Osorio & Raju, 2011). 
Moreover, if schools anticipate being FAS program schools in the future, they can change their 





External validity is also compromised since the FAS program schools so far comprise a small 
proportion of total private schools in Punjab, which means that it is not clear what results more 
FAS program schools will bring forward. Additionally, separate analyses for smaller political 
units, such as villages and union councils, might show different results than analysis at a tehsil 
level. Further, if a program similar to the FAS program is implemented in other provinces of 
Pakistan, its influence (or lack of it) might be different depending on the governance structure, 
culture, and data availability in other provinces. These considerations are examples of why 
external validity of this research can be reduced. 
Another issue that should be discussed in more depth here is the high coefficients for 
FAS program schools (compared to private schools) shown by the empirical analysis. These high 
coefficients can have several explanations. For instance, they could be due to selection bias 
(which the propensity score matching method attempted to mitigate). Another explanation could 
be that FAS program schools perform better than other public or private schools on PEC exams 
because they are better prepared since FAS program schools also have to prepare for Qualitative 
Assessment Tests (QATs) to gauge their student performance (personal communication, PEF 
Academic Development Unit, October 19
th, 
2011). Like PEC examinations, QATs are based on 
the state curriculum (Punjab Textbook Board) but are considered by many to be more rigorous 
than the PEC exams. Preparing for both standardized exams can arguably provide students with 
more revision of the curriculum, which can improve FAS program schools‘ performance. 
However, despite similar durations of 1 hour each, PEC and QAT exams are designed by 
different teams that might stress different aspects of learning (such as logic versus multitasking 





subject representing teachers and university faculty members while QATs are designed by PEF‘s 
own Academic Development Unit. Therefore, it is not necessary that preparing for QATs allows 
students to perform well on PEC exams as well.  
A third explanation for higher coefficients of FAS program schools can be related to their 
PPP structure that leads to certain unobservable characteristics of FAS program schools, such as 
their PPP contract that outlines the terms of the agreement about management, finance, and 
continuation of partnership. This explanation indicates that the PPP structure of FAS program 
schools should be analyzed in more detail.  
 
 PPPs and their Structure 
According to the definition of institutions in Chapter one that included both governance 
and culture, PPPs are close to governance according to Stoker‘s (1998) propositions about 
governance. The institutions involved in the FAS program go beyond the government to include 
private schools. The PPP contract deals with power dependence, authorities, and responsibilities 
vested in each stakeholder‘s sphere individually through schools as well as through the Punjab 
Education Foundation. Governance is also incorporated into PPPs because both for-profit and 
non-profit private schools have to conform to certain requirements set by PEF but which have to 
be met independently of PEF‘s help. Therefore, governance in PPPs is related to finance as well 
as management of its structure (Galetovic et al., 2009; Patrinos et al., 2009).
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 Although there are various definitions of PPPs (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Canadian Council for PPPs, 2009 cited 
in Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2009), I adopt the one used by Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2009) because they 
apply the definition to low and middle income countries, which is relevant to my study. According to them, the 
institutional and economic policy components of PPPs include ―(i) bundling [combining] of construction and 





Earlier in the dissertation, it was mentioned that for the FAS program, finance was 
controlled by the first party (PEF) while the management of education provision was controlled 
by the second party (private partner school). In other words, private schools had temporary 
ownership of providing education services according to the public sector‘s requirement while it 
still owned its assets. This can be referred to as bundling (Galetovic et al., 2009). However, the 
terms of partnership show that PEF‘s Board of Directors (BOD) can affect not only finance, but 
it can also affect management of schools whether or not the BOD chooses to exercise this effect.  
Managing partner schools is especially apparent through the training PEF provides to school 
teachers and staff about delivering high quality education. Moreover, partner schools are not just 
required to provide high quality education; they are also required to increase their educational 
quality at least partly through schooling inputs (furniture, quality infrastructure, hygienic 
conditions, teacher and staff training etc.). Therefore, in an unsaid way, PEF also uses finance to 
manage its partner schools. 
Bundling is related to another important aspect of PPPs - its contract and in turn, 
accountability. The contract of the PPP is important to discuss because through its institutional 
nature, it can influence student test scores. In other words, if the FAS program does affect test 
scores, one of the unobservables that allows it to do so could be its partnership contract. 
According to Kelman‘s (2002) description of the main contract components, the FAS program 
contract seems to contain these components – education provision is possible to outsource; PEF 
is the sole source of the partnership; the FAS program is a completion (performance) contract; it 
requires multiple provision of various aspects of education provision; there is space for 
                                                                                                                                                             
(p. ii, abstract). As mentioned in earlier chapters, in this discussion, I focus on the first two aspects – bundling and 





incentives (e.g. for teachers in the form of monetary rewards), resolving conflict, and change in 
policy dependent on BOD of PEF; there is a criteria of selecting schools (see Appendix C); and 
PEF holds considerable authority over terms of contracts and supervision. In addition, the PEF 
contract of partnership also meets some of Kelman‘s (2002) criteria on when contracting is 
superior to in-house provision. This is because the final output of education delivery is precisely 
specified – QAT results, school facilities, enrollment levels, and quality of teaching. Another 
reason is that performance according to the contract is assumed to be easily measurable through 
PEC exam results and QATs (although neither can account for the overall education that students 
actually receive). Moreover, demand for being FAS program partners is also increasing (personal 
communication, PEF, November 17
th
, 2011), which will make it easy to contract versus conduct 
individual school supervision of an increased number of partner schools. PPPs are also more 
important because private schools are in a more feasible position to select qualified teachers and 
assess students rather than the government using its already meager resources to perform the 
same task less efficiently. Therefore, at least on a short-term basis, a PPP contract in the form of 
the FAS program is superior to in-house provision. 
From an institutional and governance perspective in contract bundling/accountability and 
with respect to finance, PEF holds the ultimate authority to withdraw its funds at any time if the 
partner school is violating its terms of agreement (clause 3 in the terms of partnership; see 
Appendix C). This clause can potentially lead partner schools to be cautious all the time in terms 
of facilities, management, and student achievement. Moreover, the system of fund disbursement 
is not through cash but through an online transfer of funds to the partner school‘s bank account. 





and utilizing their funds. Conversely, PEF as the first party is also induced to be efficient and 
punctual when disbursing funds and evaluating whether or not schools are meeting the terms of 
agreement (and performing well academically).  
 Overall, the accountability, authorities, and constraints for both PEF and funded private 
schools can be possible reasons why FAS program schools are more efficient and achieve higher 
test scores than public or other private schools. This corresponds to the literature review about 
institutions where Rodrik et al. (2004) claim that institutions are the most important factor for a 
society‘s growth. In econometric terms, the contract and its clauses can be the omitted variables 
that can bias the estimation results from the propensity score matching method. More research 
will be required to incorporate these omitted variables into informing policy. 
 A third issue that should be discussed here in terms of both PPPs and educational 
outcomes is the type of schools that the FAS program partners with.  
 
FAS Program Partner Schools 
When entering into a partnership, the FAS program has few requirements besides those 
of a school having basic facilities and passing the preliminary QATs. It does not deal with the 
internal mechanisms of a school so that it is interesting to see the pattern that comes forward 
when looking at the FAS program partner schools overall. This pattern shows that several of 
these partner schools seem to have a social orientation. One reason for the social orientation 
could be that these particular partner schools have a clear social mission, which is often apparent 
through incorporation of religious and ethical elements into their curriculum. Another reason 





students who might have aims of social cohesion/religious values/civic ethics etc., hence again 
leading partner schools to have a religion-oriented curriculum. In either case – school social 
mission or capturing the market – it remains that schools partnering with the FAS program are 
often those with religious or civic values components. This was apparent through names of the 
FAS program partner schools (e.g. Al-Iqbal, Al-Iqra, Al-Muhammadan Institute etc.
109
, which 
are all Islam or Pakistani identity related); school descriptions; and most importantly, through 
phone interviews with some principals of schools picked at random from among the FAS 
program schools. If the schools were small (i.e. low enrollment), school owners themselves were 
often the principals and were therefore in a position to elaborate on the aims they hoped to 
achieve through the school(s) they had established. Principals of slightly larger private schools 
were usually well-informed about the school‘s curriculum, its teaching quality, and overall 
educational objective. Most principals mentioned that they hoped to create citizens who were 
well-informed about contemporary education as well as about ethics, which they wanted to 
achieve through expanding on the religious component in their teachings and dealings with 
students and parents. This can be further examined in the next chapter dealing with parental 
educational decision making through qualitative analysis. 
These past two chapters focused on the first research question of how public, private, and 
PPP schools relate to student achievement. The chapters used the FAS program in Pakistan as an 
example of education PPPs and hence incorporated a top-down perspective. However, in order to 
inform policy that can increase private and social utility, it is also important to look at the 
bottom-top perspective, which is represented by the second research question – how does Islam 
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matter for educational decision making? Answering the second research question involves 

























Chapter 5 – Issues and Background in Educational Decision Making 
 
The previous chapters have mostly discussed the first research question dealing with the 
top-to-bottom level of analysis that compared average student achievement of three school types 
with the ultimate aim of informing government policy about which school type to support. In 
contrast, the second research question addresses the bottom-to-top level of analysis and decision 
making where parents choose school(s) for their child(ren). The purpose of this chapter is to 
begin to answer the second research question – what role can Islam play in parental educational 
decision making
110
? A cultural stance is adopted so that decisions made at the top (represented 
by governance institutions i.e. school type) can be complemented by thought processes at the 
grass-root level (represented by cultural institutions i.e. religion). Doing so will allow two levels 
of interactions to be combined – one between the government and schools (described in previous 
chapters); and the second between schools and parents that will be described in this chapter. At 
the second level of interaction, parental decision making can be examined through a cultural 
institutions lens represented by religion
111
. This means that religion can possibly influence 
parents‘ desired education outcome(s) including education quality, school choice, social 
cohesion/identity formation, and/or anything else.  
This chapter first discusses some research and policy literature regarding parental decision 
making, and religion in/and education to further expand on the concept of culture as 
institutions in educational decision making/school choice. The second part of the chapter 
discusses the background of religion in education, especially in Pakistan. The last part of the 
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chapter discusses the specific data and methodology used to analyze religion in educational 
decision making in this dissertation, thus providing the background for qualitative analysis in 
the following chapter. 
 
5.1 - Religion and Educational Decision Making 
 
This section has two main aims – it attempts to briefly discuss parental and household 
decision making in terms of school choice, and then it discusses religion in education in more 
detail. This implies that student achievement is not the only educational outcome that parents and 
students aim for, and hence this implication can influence education policy.  
 
Parental Educational Decision Making  
One of the arguments for increasing school choice in parental educational decision 
making is that given a certain amount of resources, increased specialization through school 
choice will increase efficiency in terms of producing higher achieving students. Supporting this 
argument, a study by Sawada and Lokshin (2001) on 25 villages in rural Pakistan uses both 
qualitative and quantitative techniques to analyze a household‘s schooling decisions. The authors 
find that conditional on school enrollment, there is a high retention rate and that at higher levels 
of education, progression rates of boys and girls converge. They also conclude that the reasons 
behind these findings are a household‘s assets affecting school choice, a student‘s academic 
performance, and supply restrictions for girls‘ education. In addition to high retention rates 





enrolled in schools that have their preferred learning styles or curriculum (Goldhaber, Showalter, 
& Eide, 2002).  
However, it can be counter-argued that the more choice, more efficiency argument is 
more true for a country like the United States where school assignment is generally residence-
based. In Pakistan, child enrollment does not depend on geographical location (except for 
parental preferences of driving distance etc.) so that specialization already occurs. Conversely, if 
children are too young to act upon or even realize their educational preferences, their academic 
achievement will not necessarily increase if they go to, for instance, a secular versus more 
religious school.  
It has also been argued that parents choose schools based on social rather than 
educational needs so that specialized needs for achievement and talent are less significant than 
receiving a traditional education (Gordon, 1994; Lauder et al., 1994; OECD, 1994 etc.). Yet 
parental choice is still not considered the main driving force behind initiatives such as PPPs; 
instead, these initiatives are more supply side and government based (Gordon & Whitty, 
1997).
112
 This makes this dissertation‘s second research question even more relevant because it 
can help to determine how exactly to incorporate parental choice in education policy. If parental 
choice is incorporated, it can possibly lead to a more diverse schooling system in terms of 
pedagogy, curriculum, and student body.
113
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 For instance, in New Zealand, the government pays 50 percent of teachers‘ salaries in private schools, arguing 
that private schools are more efficient and diverse (Gordon & Whitty, 1997). Moreover, in England, the government 
provides funding more to individuals than to institutions.   
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 However, some studies, such as in England and Australia, have also found that choice leads to more 






Therefore, it seems that parents rationally derive satisfaction or utility when their children 
perform well in school in terms of academics, school completion, college admissions, and even 
religious training (McEwan & Carnoy, 2000). The higher the tuition and the larger the trade-off 
of education with other goods and services, the higher will be the opportunity cost of their 
children‘s schooling. Overall private utility can be maximized by obtaining the right trade-off 
between different educational outcomes and their opportunity cost. Given sufficient information 
about how well a school provides education through its resources and effort, it seems intuitive 
that parents will make rational decisions about enrolling their children in higher quality schools 
to increase their private utility. This can in turn lead the government to establish high quality 
PPP schools to increase social utility
114
.  
However, according to Hirschman (1970), there can be lapses in rational behavior where 
consumers (parents in this case) seem loyal to a school with deteriorating education quality. 
These lapses in rational behavior can possibly be explained by economics if parents desire a 
different educational outcome. Where Levin‘s (1999) framework for goals of PPPs includes 
productive efficiency as shown by education quality measured through test scores, it is not 
necessarily true that parents choosing one school over another also aim for higher test scores. 
This implies that there could be a difference in goals between the government, schools, and 
parents (for instance, productive efficiency versus citizenship identity/social cohesion). This can 
also imply that there could be a difference in social versus private utility of education where 
parents are more likely to focus on their private utility, which in turn can be derived from non-
quality aspects of education. 
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The mechanism behind parents choosing schools not based on education quality can be 
derived from institutions at an individual level. Chapter one defined culture as one aspect of 
these institutions. Culture further consists of social capital and norms. Manski (2000) argues that 
in order to more clearly describe social capital and norms, the concept of social interactions from 
an economic perspective can be used
115
. According to him, the economics of social interaction is 
unique because it brings together various decision makers (agents) with different preferences, 
expectations, and constraints. Instead of assuming utility maximization, decision making can be 
thought of as the result of social interaction through not only observing another agent‘s actions, 
but also through observing and gathering information about his/her preferences. In the context of 
this dissertation, social interaction can be related to how parents interact with each other to 
gather information about each other‘s decisions and expectations from schools and then choosing 
schools for their child(ren). This is especially true since members of one group tend to have 
similar opinions and behavior (Manski, 2000). For instance, if the context of choosing schools is 
a Muslim majority society, another context is different socio-economic classes within the 
Muslim majority society in Punjab, Pakistan. Arguably, these socio-economic classes will have 
similar preferences within each class. Manski (2000) also argues that instead of making perhaps 
inaccurate inferences about observed preferences and expectations of agents, ―subjective‖ data 
can be collected from these agents themselves. Again, this is related to the idea - which is not 
common in traditional economics - that decision makers can make rational decisions and express 
them truthfully. As part of an exercise to collect this ―subjective‖ data, my second research 
question adopts a qualitative approach. 
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The specific cultural context in which I attempt to situate the institutional processes of 
educational decision making spreads across Punjab – religion. This is possible if parents aim 
towards raising children who have a strong religious identity and/or have an opportunity to 
receive moral and ethical education. In this sense, they can even be willing to compromise 
quality of education by enrolling their children in schools that focus more on religion than on 
student achievement.
116
 Moreover, according to Manski‘s (2000) idea of social interaction 
leading to similar preferences and decision making, parents‘ focus on improving their children‘s 
ethics and religious identity through education can even be extended to PPP‘s goal of social 
cohesion. Whether or not, and to what extent religion as a cultural institution is a factor in 
allowing parents to choose schools is the second level of interaction this dissertation focuses on.  
From the above discussion, it seems that at a more grass root level of interaction, religion 
is a form of cultural institution that is theoretically used to produce an educational outcome 
depending on parental preferences (perhaps ethics, religious identity, and social cohesion) and 
parents‘ interaction among themselves and with schools. The next section discusses religion in 
education from both a PPP choice and policy standpoint in order to lay the background for 
relating educational decision making with religion in the context of Punjab, Pakistan. 
 
Religion in Education 
As mentioned in chapter 1, religion can be included in the definition of culture. Religion 
in education (and in other social services) has always been common, even in societies that aim 
for secular public education and attempt to not support any one religious group (Minow, 2003). 
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For instance, in the early twentieth century in the United States, even seemingly secular reforms 
had a religious background. These reforms have historically often been disguised as insurance or 
vouchers to conform to social norms; however, now the U.S. government is beginning to fund 
religious organizations (not just religious schools) as well as places of worship (Minow, 2003). 
The argument is that this policy incorporates small denominations that would otherwise be 
neglected. Religious schools are aided because of the government‘s desire for subcontracting or 
providing subsidies (such as through PPPs). In other words, borders between the public and 
private, and religious and secular, are blurred by the government so that they are ―never sharp‖ 
(Minow, 2003, p. 1254). However, unlike the U.S., this is not true for Pakistan yet where religion 
in mainstream public and private education is not officially supported or even considered by the 
government although religion is often otherwise used by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to 
approve or disapprove policies (Rahman & Bukhari, 2004). 
Religion in education has been examined through both quantitative and qualitative 
research. As a measure of culture, religion can be seemingly irrational. However, Berman and 
Stepanyan (2004) argue that this seemingly irrational behavior by a religious sect can be 
considered rational behavior in an economic sect. Berman‘s (2000) extension of Iannaccone‘s 
(1992) proposed rational choice behavior of religious groups can help to explain low returns to 
religious schooling.
117
 This argument is described in more detail below. 
In the rational choice framework of religious sects, the basic economic context assumes a 
competitive market. Secular behavior is assumed to be more prevalent than religious behavior 
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although a policy maker can subsidize religious behavior to increase it.
118
  Within this proposed 
economic setting, externalities arise from Muslim as well as Jewish sects who play a ―role of 
charity in providing medical insurance‖ (Berman & Stepanyan, 2004, p. 6). However, religious 
sects can also impose restrictions on consumption of certain secular goods, which can act as 
taxes on these secular goods. This induces religious sect members to replace secular good 
consumption with religious activities, which they assume leads to positive externalities. Another 
way of describing this optimal tax rate is the opportunity cost of potential wages in the secular 
market, which can rise if the wage rate increases. This opportunity cost can vary from family to 
family and individual to individual partly depending on education so that schooling decisions are 
important to analyze. 
The optimal tax rate will also separate those who will undermine the quality of religious 
practice from those who will maintain or improve it. In the case of religious schooling, 
attendance is practiced by those who have low wages (Berman & Stepanyan, 2004) so that there 
is a low level of sacrifice that is required. In effect, religious schools separate low wage 
individuals from high wage ones. This can be tested by comparing the low returns to religious 
schooling versus secular schooling in terms of future earnings. 
Therefore, a rational choice framework for religious sects shows that it is possible to 
place religious behavior in an economic setting in addition to the more conventional setting of 
spirituality (for instance, Peshkin, 1988). However, this behavior deals only with religious 
schools. What is the case if there are public schools or PPP schools that somehow incorporate 
religion in their teaching or structure? Dronkers and Robert (2008) attempt to provide an answer 
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to this question by conducting a cross-sectional study (Dronkers, 2004) on comparing student 
achievement in U.S. religious state-funded schools (an example of a PPP school) and public 
schools. On one hand, Dronkers (2004) finds that students in private, state-funded schools 
perform better on scholastic tests than students in public schools. On the other hand, Lubienski 
and Lubienski (2006) find lower student performance in religious, private schools than in public 
schools. However, Dronkers and Robert (2008) argue that it is important to further study religion 
in education because it is yet unclear if higher achieving students in private state-funded schools 
also perform better in terms of moral and religious attitudes. Besides relevant well-defined 
quantitative data, this also requires a qualitative analysis, which I am conducting through this 
dissertation. 
Similar to Berman and Stepanyan (2004), Mocan and Tekin (2002) situate their 
framework in a rational economic behavior model (such as behavioral economics; O‘Donoghue 
& Rabin, 2001 as quoted in Mocan & Tekin, 2004). Examining religion, ethics, and good 
behavior instead of student test scores, Mocan and Tekin (2002) use Catholic schools in their 
analysis and measure the associations between schooling and good/bad behavior using indicators 
such as drug use, sexual behavior, property crimes, gang membership, suicidal attempts, and 
running away from home. They find that Catholic school attendance increases the probability of 
using and selling drugs by male students but reduces the probability of drug use and sexual 
activities for female students. They argue that like adults, teenagers also make rational decisions 
about good or bad behavior even if their decisions can differ from those of adults because of 
contrasting preferences and time discount rates. Another example of non-academic behavior is 





and civic skills, tolerance, political knowledge, and community participation. Figlio and Ludwig 
(1999) offer some reasons why this positive association exists – religious education can change 
student preferences; Catholic (and other religious) schools can have more strict discipline; and in 
turn, this can lead to a ―better‖ peer group (Mocan and Tekin, 2002, p. 6).119  
The paper by Mocan and Tekin (2002) is especially significant because it touches on 
another aspect of PPPs - the school choice debate since vouchers are a type of PPP aimed at 
providing choice among schools to students and parents. However, these vouchers are mostly 
used for enrollment in religious schools leading to controversy within communities and policy 
circles in terms of using public finance to support institutions with a particular belief system. In 
the United States, this debate has occurred at all government levels including the Supreme Court. 
Part of the issue was that through using vouchers, religious schools might force students to 
behave in certain religious ways that they would not have done otherwise (Minow, 2003).  
In Pakistan, which is a much less religiously diverse state than England or Australia (96 
percent of Pakistan‘s population is Muslim; CIA World Factbook, 2010), such a controversy 
might not arise unless the objective of the social and policy network is to maintain a strictly 
secular society. In this sense, PPPs that cater towards the social capital of a society, will ideally 
take into account whether or not religion in education is acceptable and/encouraged by society. 
Moreover, various religious sects (such as Shiia and Sunni) can have differing opinions and 
attitudes that might be important to take into account before forming and implementing any 
policy regarding PPPs
120
. However, Minow (2003) argues that even if finance and/or 
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management go into private hands through the establishment of PPPs or privatization in general, 
consumers are considered passive and not active, thoughtful citizens. This can counter the effect 
of allowing or supporting schools to include religion in education because if they have passive 
parents and students as consumers, schools will not necessarily make independent decisions 
regarding, for instance, its curricula (especially if they cater towards different religious sects). 
This can also counter the choice mechanism that assumes schools to vie for more consumers. 
The way religion plays a role in Pakistan‘s schools is discussed below. 
Islam is in the limelight in contemporary times largely because of its political role on 
many fronts including security and religious education institutes (REIs) (Stern, 2000, as quoted 
in Rahman & Bukhari, 2004). Many believe that the rise in anti-West and anti-American 
sentiments is because of the doctrinal teachings in REIs in Muslim majority countries including 
Pakistan (Singer, 2001). Singer (2001) mentions a ―role reversal between the public sphere and 
private radical groups‖ (Singer, 2001, p. 4) where both insufficient public education121 and 
expensive private education leads low income families to enroll their children in free or low cost 
madrassas, some of which even provide food and shelter.  
As far as the quality of madrassas is concerned, Beegle and Newhouse (2005) find that in 
Indonesia, students attending public madrassas do not perform worse than those attending public 
secular schools and students attending private madrassas do not perform worse than those 
attending private secular schools. A study in rural Bangladesh (Asadullah, Chaudhury, & Dar, 
2009) examines student achievement in secondary schools, many of which are both PPPs (public 
financing of private schools) and religious schools. Further still, it can be argued that madrassa 
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 In 2000-01, Pakistan spent about 2% of its gross domestic product on primary and secondary education that often 
resulted in lack of functioning public primary and secondary schools (World Bank, 2010; Singer, 2001). Although 





reform (by including, for instance, other subjects besides Qur‘an and hadith) brings madrassas 
closer to secular schools (public and private) that incorporate religion in their curricula.
122
  
Moreover, REIs can possibly have some reservations and concerns regarding reform of 
their curriculum, structure, and their relationship with the government (for instance, the 
Madrassa Reform Commission) and other public and private schools (Rahman & Bukhari, 
2004).
123
 One reform suggestion is to simply close the madrassa(s) if it (they) does not follow 
state-approved curriculum, textbooks, and teacher certification (Burki, 2001). According to an 
NBER Report on madrassas in Pakistan (Ahmad, 2009), the government established three model 
madrassas in Rawalpindi, Karachi, and Sukkur, which were privately owned although the 
government encouraged them to align themselves with the Madrassa Education Board as well as 
the Establishment and Affiliation of Model Dini Madaris Board
124
. However, the federation of 
madrassas from various sects jointly opposed the government-proposed reforms in madrassa 
education (IPS, 2009). Amidst these conflicting and oscillating sentiments towards Islam, 
education, and various stakeholders and reforms at both domestic and international levels, the 
question of religion in mainstream, non-madrassa education becomes even more significant.  
Since religion in education is a policy matter, it implies a connection to law as well 
because policies are subject to law and ―constitutional stability requires formal citizenship 
education‖ (van Geel, 1995, p. 1).  While this implies that the state has authority in implementing 
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 However, again, these analyses take religious education into account by examining madrassas, not ―secular‖ 
schools that also emphasize religious and ethical teachings in their curricula. 
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 Suggestions for public sector reform include standardization of student entry and exit procedure; curriculum 
revision; institutional development for specialization and research; establishing libraries in REIs; and getting 
involved in religious journalism (Rahman & Bukhari, 2004). However, again, the suggested reforms include only 
madrassas and do not address the role of religion in mainstream education. 
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a particular type of citizenship education (or religious education if religion is considered an 
important part of citizenship), it also implies that this authority is limited (van Geel, 1995). The 
extent of state authority is significant because in Pakistan‘s case, it can determine to what extent 
it incorporates parental attitudes in its education policy.  This does not mean that the government 
and non-government actors are uniform stakeholders. For instance, within the American public, 
there is a deliberative democracy movement that believes in state coercion to instill certain 
values in students; however, this movement is not uniformly accepted by all non-government 
actors (van Geel, 1995). To demonstrate government versus non-government differences, in 
Prince vs. Massachussets, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), Mrs. Prince rested her case on freedom of 
religious mentorship by parents, whereas the state claimed that the state has the right to regulate 
even family life and religious practices (Shuman, 2011). Therefore, before taking parental views 
into account, the policy arena in Pakistan might refer to the fundamental religious rights in the 
Constitution. However, unlike the United States, policy making in Pakistan might be less fraught 
with debate since there is a clear religious majority despite the various Muslim sects. 
What is the form of religion in education and religion in education PPPs? In the United 
States, this often means tax exemption, which can act as a subsidy to create incentives for the 
private provider (in this case, a religious organization) to perform functions that the government 
cannot (Minow, 2003).
125
 This is one example of approaches that can include religion in PPPs 
where choice is created among private providers so that all religions can be catered towards. 
Another approach would be to ensure that each private provider supplies the same public norms 
to its students (Minow, 2003). Yet public-private partnerships that relate to religion in some 
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way(s) are difficult to analyze (and implement) because incorporating religion formally at the 
government level is complicated. There are various reasons for this, some of which exist already 
in the shape of current religious schools. For instance, there has been conflict over the 
registration laws and bans on madrassas (Rahman & Bukhari, 2004). Another reason is religious 
education related departments may not be performing their assigned tasks. The waqf department 
in Pakistan is an example because although it is supposed to keep a record of local mosques, it 
does not always do so. 
It is important to keep in mind that before implementing a policy that incorporates all or 
most faith-based organizations that have formed schools, the performance of public schools, 
private schools, and faith-based organizations can differ. Research has shown that students in 
faith-based schools perform better on test scores than students in public schools, for instance, in 
Sierra-Leone (Wodon & Ying, 2009) while the opposite is true for the U.S. (Lubienski & 
Lubienski, 2006). This finding is even more surprising because faith-based schools tend to serve 
a lower income population than public schools, which would imply that public school students 
should perform better because they belong to a higher socio-economic class. However, Wodon 
and Ying (2009) show that after taking potential school choice endogeneity into account, 
students in faith-based schools perform slightly better on tests. Yet it is not clear from the Sierra-
Leone study whether for-profit private schools perform better or worse than faith-based schools.  
Asadullah, Chaudhury, and Dar (2009) attempt to clarify this question by comparing 
Islamic and secular secondary schools in rural Bangladesh. They conclude that students in public 
Islamic schools do not perform worse than students in public secular schools, and the same is 





faith-based schools, and other private schools that emphasize religion. Within this distinction, 
―traditional‖ Islamic schools can be distinguished from ―modern‖ Islamic schools where the 
former focus mostly, if not only, on Islamic teachings. There can also be differences between the 
traditional and modern Islamic schools in terms of their structure and accountability mechanisms 
leading to differing performances of students (Asadullah, Chaudhury & Dar, 2009). 
 On a more qualitative and controversial note, what is the role of Islam in today‘s 
Pakistan according to decision makers in the education system, such as parents and policy 
makers? To build on the idea mentioned before of religion being related to certain behaviors, 
such as honesty, religion in Islam takes on a moral and even normative tone if parents choose 
schools Islamic schools. For instance, according to Ahmed (2002), in addition to the scientific 
rationality in Ibn Khaldun‘s works (which, some Muslims believe he takes too far), there ―is a 
moral imperative in his interpretation of „asabiyya as the organizing principle of society. 
Muslims see human beings as having been created to implement the vision of God on earth 
through their behavior and organization of society‖ (Ahmed, 2002, p 25). This is similar to 
Peshkin‘s 1988 description of a fundamentalist Christian school in the U.S. In other words, the 
social order must have a moral order in organized societies. It is important to understand the 
concept of asabiyya in order to understand current Muslim societies. Asabiyya is Ibn Khaldun‘s 
most well known theory of social organization. It brings together different groups who want to 
approach an ideal and through asabiyya, values are imparted from one generation to the next. 
Asabiyya generally belongs in ―traditional‖ societies but it breaks down in more ―urbanized‖ 





areas as well, it will be significant and interesting to see if social order breaks down in urban 
areas (and if attitudes towards religion and education are different in urban versus rural areas).   
It is important to keep in mind that the timeline for social order to be built and then break 
down is uncertain because according to Ibn Khaldun, ―certain civilized societies based in cities 
with developed social organization, arts and crafts, may take a long time to break down‖ 
(Ahmed, 2002, p. 30). After the advent and decline of colonialism, urban areas do not respond to 
asabiyya, which the rural and traditional areas cannot provide in any case, and yet ―Muslims 
everywhere will voice their alarm at the breakdown of society. They know that something is 
going fundamentally wrong but are not sure why‖ (Ahmed, 2002, p. 31). Ahmed (2002) 
attributes the breakdown of society or of asabiyya to several factors including institutional 
problems, such as corruption, a growing income disparity, and new ideas from the West that can 
challenge traditional norms and assumptions.  
Conversely, Pakistan at least has also shown a revival of traditional norms through an 
increasing emphasis on religion in education. Although asabiyya is a controversial concept, it 
can be argued that there is an attempt to restore an older social order in Pakistani society. This 
implies that there is also a possible shift in primary identities in society from blood and place – 
or ethnicity and nationalism - to religion (which are the three main sources of identity according 
to Kottak (2000) and Lewis (1998)). 
In this sense, it can be argued that conducting a qualitative analysis that examines 
religion and educational decision making is important because it can help to extend the analysis 
to countries with a similar religious majority as Pakistan, such as almost all Middle Eastern 





component of culture, it can be counter-argued that Pakistan might have more similarities with 
other countries than Muslim majority ones. For instance, Gupta, Hanges, and Dorfman (2002) 
discuss how scholars have organized international cultural clusters according to three main 
criteria – i) geographic proximity (Furnham, Kirkcaldy, & Lynn, 1994); ii) mass migration and 
ethnic social capital (Portes & Zhou, 1994); and iii) religious and linguistic commonality (Cattel, 
1950). In this sense, besides religion joining Pakistan with the Middle East, geographic 
proximity, mass migration, and ethnic social capital make Pakistan very similar to other South 
Asian countries, such as India and Bangladesh
126
. Using several other sources, variables, and 
factor analysis, Gupta, Hanges, and Dorfman (2002) suggest the existence of ten major cultural 
clusters where South Asia is one of them. However, the earliest attempts to cluster cultures 
depended largely on religion. For instance, Toynbee (1947) identified five existing clusters, three 
of which were based exclusively on religion – Orthodox Christian, Islamic, and Hindu (Far 
Eastern and Western were the other two). Later, Sirota and Greenwood (1971), and Ronen and 
Kraut (1977) used work goals (albeit in a relative small country sample) to conclude that cultural 
clusters had strong religion-language basis.  
Since almost all past and recent attempts to cluster cultures conclude that religion is a 
significant factor in this clustering, this dissertation focuses on this factor, especially because 
other authors have claimed that religion also affects attitudes towards work and the economy (La 
Porta et al., 1998). Religion can also be considered a part of a community‘s social capital, which, 
as shown before, is also important for determining the formation and success of PPPs. Therefore, 
this inter-connectedness of economics, education, and religion makes it imperative to 
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qualitatively answer the second research - how Islam relates to educational decision making - in 
Pakistan‘s PPP context. 
It is important to keep in mind that the qualitative component of this dissertation is not an 
official case study in itself. Instead, it aims to complement the quantitative analysis by raising 
policy relevant issues. However, in line with qualitative research methods, I still follow a 
triangulated approach – observation, individual interviews, and focus groups – although I focus 
on interviews because respondents seemed more comfortable in sharing their views on an 
individual basis. The next sections on qualitative data and methodology are organized as follows: 
Religion in education in Pakistan is first put into context by discussing types of religious 
educational institutions so that they can be kept in mind when using the second research question 
to inform education policy. Then data and qualitative methods are described with an emphasis on 
locations that currently have a low density of FAS program schools because these locations will 
have a higher chance of receiving PEF‘s funding in the future and hence are more relevant for 
policy making (PEF, personal communication, November 14
th
, 2011). Chapter 6 uses these data 
and methods to answer the second research question.  
 
 5.2 - Background of Religion in Pakistan’s Education System 
 
For Pakistan as a case study, I create a typology of institutions that deal with Islamic or 
religious education in general so that the structure and curriculum of existing schools can be 
compared to future educational institutions that the government could potentially fund. The 





education in mainstream Pakistani education is not readily available. Instead, madrassa education 
is described in more detail in the current research and policy literature (Shafiq, 2010). The table 
focuses on Muslim majority communities (Middle East, Pakistan, Southeast Asia) and specific 
examples are given from Pakistan where applicable. 
 
Table 3 – Typology of Institutions Teaching Islamic Education127 
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 Ownership, funding, and management are included in creating a typology because they are significant aspects of 
PPPs and their contracts (Galetovic et al., 2009). Although it can be argued that one aspect is more important than 
the other in determining the intensity of religion in an institution (such as curriculum versus management), I give all 
aspects equal weight because of the policy implications they can have. 
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 Traditionally from Central to Southeast Asia, there were learning groups at royal mosques or courts (Hefner, 
2009, p. 14). 
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 Adapted from Anzar (2003). 
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 ―Modern‖ in this context refers to recent and contemporary characteristics i.e. a time based definition is used as 




















































As shown above, there are subtle differences between Koranic schools, traditional, and 
secular madrassas possibly because of recent government reform efforts (especially because of 
international pressure on Pakistan).
132
 The curriculum includes various intensities of Islamic 
education whereas hybrid schools are similar to modern madrassas in terms of including secular 
subjects in their curriculum. These madrassas are often managed by teachers themselves 
although there can be headmasters or administrators. Moreover, funding sources most often 
include donations and government funds while only secular or hybrid schools work as businesses 
(even if they are subsidized by the state).  
The chart below maps the intensity of religious education in various types of schools and 
educational institutions. This chart will help in categorizing the findings of the qualitative 
analysis in terms of the desired religious intensity parents prefer in their children‘s schools. 
Details on how the intensity is calculated and a key to types of educational institutions are 
provided below the chart. 
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 Koranic schools are different from mosque schools, which are considered public primary schools operating under 





Figure 7 – Intensity of Religious Education 
 
 
Score for ownership, funding, management, curriculum, emphasis (Mostly supply side factors): 
- Ownership  1 if it is publicly owned or comes under the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs/Religion (although this is not a perfect division) 
- Funding  1 if it runs on donations or government 
- Management  1 if it is managed by religious teachers or heads or Ministry of Religious 
Affairs/Religion 
- Curriculum  3 if all major Islamic subjects; 2 if only Qur‘an; 1 if includes secular 
subjects 
-     Emphasis  3 if on religious subjects; 2 if only on Qur‘an; 1 if on both religious and                  
secular subjects.  






Therefore, given that score are assigned in the order above, the x-axis numbers correspond to: 
1  Unconventional Religious Masters: 0 + 1 + 1 + 3 + 3 = 8 
2  Traditional Madrassas: 0.5 + 1 + 1 + 2.5 + 2.5 = 7.5 
3  Waqf/medieval madrassas/maktab: 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 (average) + 2 (average) + 2.5 (average) = 
9.5 
4  Koranic Schools: 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 = 7 
5  Modern Madrassas: 0.5 + 1 + 1 + 2 (average) + 1 = 5.5 
6  Religious Schools: 0 + 0.5 (average) + 0 + 2.5 + 2.5 = 5.5 
7  Secular Schools: 0 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 0 = 1 
8  Hybrid Schools: 0 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 1 = 2 
 
In other words, in descending order, the intensity of religious education by educational 
institutions is: waqf/medieval madrassa; unconventional religious masters; traditional madrassas; 
Koranic schools; religious schools and modern madrassas; hybrid schools; and secular schools. 
The discussion after the qualitative analysis in chapter 6 will attempt to place the desired 
educational outcome by parents into one of these educational institutions. 
Since the qualitative analysis of this dissertation is conducted from the perspective of 
if/how future policy can or should include religion in Pakistan‘s mainstream education, it is 
important to look at the current situation of how religion is included in education. The latter is 
mostly through schools that are specifically religious and focus less on secular education (MOE, 
personal communitation, October 19
th





religious and secular schools in Pakistan in 2007-08.
133
  Mosque schools operate under the 
Ministry of Education. 
 
Table 4 – Secular and Religious Schools in Pakistan, 2007-08 
Province




Punjab 97,499        4,967      5,438        18,424,231      304,230          698,998         
Sindh 59,908        42          1,862        6,745,061        - 316,664         
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 30,740        2,802      2,633        5,302,605        166,267          355,207         
Balochistan 12,469        462        683          1,140,269        17,178            68,597           
Total 200,616    8,273     10,616    31,612,166    487,675        1,439,466    
Note: Each type of school includes public and private, and male and female unless specified otherwise
Source: Academy for Educational Planning and Management, Ministry of Education, 2007-08
Number of schools Enrollment
 
Note: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was previously NWFP (North West Frontier Province). 
Table is based on author‘s calculations. 
 
According to the table above, madrassas are more common than mosque schools 
although both have less quantity and enrollment in Sindh and Balochistan than in Punjab and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Since mosque schools are considered part of primary education, it can be 
assumed that either they teach only the Qur‘an at an early age or in addition to the Qur‘an, they 
also teach the regular Punjab government curriculum but are built in a mosque. The table shows 
that less than 5 percent of all educational institutions are madrassas and they enroll an even lesser 
percentage of all enrolled students. Perhaps simply because of its high population, Punjab has 
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both the highest number of madrassas, secular, and mosque schools. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has 
the highest proportion of madrassas versus secular schools followed by Punjab, Balochistan, and 
Sindh. This dissertation restricts itself to schools that in this table would be considered secular or 
mainstream for reasons mentioned earlier (e.g. most of the research focus so far has been on 
madrassas, and the government policy can influence non-religious schools more closely 
madrassas). 
Moving onto how the face of future religious and mainstream education can be shaped 
depending on parental preferences, the next section describes qualitative methods used to answer 
the second research question, which aims to investigate the relationship between Islam and 
educational decision making.  
 
5.3 – Qualitative Methods 
This dissertation uses Punjab, Pakistan, as the data source to conduct its qualitative 
analysis. I used the triangulation approach to collect and analyze data, which included 
observations, interviews, and focus groups. Like interviews, observations were mostly on an 
individual basis unless the interview was interrupted by a parent‘s child(ren) so that I could see 
how parents and children interacted with each other. Otherwise, observations were mostly based 
on the tones, gestures, and body language of the respondents. Interviews were conducted on an 
individual basis without outside interruption. They included both objective and open-ended 
questions, and were conducted in English, Urdu, and Punjabi (depending on which language the 
respondent felt most comfortable with). Since I am fluent in all three languages, I did not need a 





section. Sometimes, individual interviews turned into group interviews, especially in Kolo where 
village women were used to congregating at one spot. Focus groups were also conducted and 
sometimes included only parents and at other times, they included both teachers and parents. 
However, there was a higher chance of providing socially desirable answers in a focus group 
setting because the research topic asked about personal viewpoints and motivations. This means 
that data collected from this method has to be accordingly qualified.  
The next section provides some rationale for interview questions asking parents about 
their background and educational decision making.  
 
5.3.1 - Rationale for Interview questions 
In answering the second research question, the chapter inexplicably becomes exploratory 
through a bottom-to-top approach as opposed to the top-to-bottom approach in the quantitative 
section. This is because while the quantitative section looked at the association between school 
types and student achievement to inform education policy made at a provincial, district, or even 
school level, the qualitative section will look at how attitudes and decisions at the individual 
level can be related to educational decision making and government policy. The second research 
question is sequential – interviewees will first be asked about their background and perceptions 
about Islam, and then they will be asked, implicitly or explicitly, to relate their background and 
perceptions with decisions about school choice for their child(ren).  
When designing the questionnaire, especially in terms of its open-ended questions, I took 
into account methods and results from a pilot study I conducted on a similar topic before 





multiple choice questions as well as the open-ended questions for the dissertation such that they 
are accessible to the respondents, reduce researcher bias, and are targeted carefully towards 
obtaining answers that are relevant to the second research question. 
The interview questions themselves cover a range of topics from background information 
about parents to information about their social and religious attitudes. It is important to collect 
background information about parents‘ education and employment because these variables have 
also been used extensively in quantitative studies to determine their relationship to, for instance, 
health and schooling decisions for their children. For instance, Holmes (2003) shows that 
mothers‘ education is significantly and positively related to their children‘s education, and more 
so with daughters‘ than with sons‘ education134. Although several earlier quantitative studies 
have concluded that there is little positive relationship between parental education (especially 
mothers) and their children‘s education (for instance, King & Lillard (1983); Alderman et al., 
1995, 1996; and Behrman et al., 1997), more recent studies have shown that the opposite is true 
(e.g. Rothstein, 2004; Carnoy, 2006). This discrepancy could be due to the different datasets 
being used for the various studies. Since the quantitative data used in this dissertation does not 
include individual or household level information, I hope to somewhat reduce this gap in 
analysis through grass-root level interaction with individuals. 
In the interviews, questions about parents‘ childhood are also important because they can 
offer a clue about whether or not some or all of their children live with their parents, and hence 
provide an additional qualitative variable for schooling demand (Holmes, 2003). Used 
quantitatively (although not in this dissertation because of lack of such detailed data), if the 
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decision to leave home and low motivation of individuals to study are correlated, the 
unobservable characteristic (motivation) can lead to sample selection bias (Holmes, 2003).  
However, attempting to reduce selection bias by, for instance, dropping individuals above 15 
years old from the sample (Birdsall, 1982), can increase censoring bias because it increases the 
proportion of individuals still in school versus those who have completed school. I hope to 
uncover some of these unobservable characteristics through qualitative research in this 
dissertation, which can provide ground for further research on educational decision making. 
The interview questionnaire also contains questions about parents‘ education levels. This 
is not only because education is related to pecuniary returns to education
135
 that can determine a 
student‘s socio-economic status, but also because parents‘ education is related to non-pecuniary 
returns to education (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009). An example of a non-pecuniary return to 
education is good health (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009) although it can still be argued that good 
health enables a student and/or employee to be more productive and hence gain higher pecuniary 
benefits. Other non-pecuniary benefits can include more stable marriages (for instance, because 
of critical thinking skills) and parenting skills (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009).  
Parenting skills are important because they not only shape their children‘s academic and 
social skills at home, but they also allow parents to choose utility maximizing schools for their 
children. In turn, the effect of parental decision making on children‘s cognitive and non-
cognitive achievement is significant even after controlling for income and socio-economic 
factors. Partly depending on the type of schooling, attending school can influence students‘ 
preferences in terms of, for instance, current versus future consumption. In line with the 
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discussion of culture used in this dissertation, schooling can also affect trust levels, which in 
turn, can affect social capital. Higher social capital is often used as an argument for public 
subsidies, such as PPPs (Hanushek, 2002)
136
.  
 Before describing the sample and collected data, it is important to mention some 
weaknesses of the study and the role of the researcher. The latter is important because the 
researcher becomes part of the research context in which the interviewee participates. 
 
 
 5.3.2 – Triangulation, Confidentiality, Anonymity, and Researcher Bias 
 
Although I have used triangulation and hence three methods of qualitative research to 
answer my second research question – observation, interviews, and focus groups – my analysis 
focuses more on interviews. There are two main reasons for this – one, since the research deals 
with intimate issues, such as religion, it appeared that participants were more open and 
comfortable sharing their views on a one-to-one basis with the researcher. This also led to less 
reliance on observational data because in individual interviews, it was not possible to observe 
participant interactions with either other participants or their children etc. Two, in focus groups, 
participants might have been influenced each other‘s voiced opinions and provided what he/she 
thought were socially desirable answers. Therefore, although even individual interviews 
sometimes turned into quasi-focus groups because multiple individuals congregated at the 
research location (e.g. out of curiosity especially in the village Kolo), interview data still 
dominated the triangulation approach. This can be considered a strength because interview data 
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ensured more open and accurate answers. However, it can also be considered a weakness 
because it assumes full reliance on what the interviewee says. This can be problematic because 
despite assurance of confidentiality by the researcher, interviewees might share limited 
information or they might provide answers that they think are preferred by the researcher (this is 
related to researcher bias described later). 
In order to maintain confidentiality, the original questionnaires are kept in a locked 
drawer after the answers for each questionnaire are entered into a dataset under numerical ID 
numbers and not names of participants. Only the principal investigator has access to the original 
questionnaire. The identifiers are destroyed after data entry. The data will be used only for 
analytical purposes or to follow up with interviewees in case of missing data.  These 
questionnaires are also destroyed after the data is coded. The option to consent or not consent to 
being audiotaped was in the participant consent letter and I also explained it verbally so that 
subjects had a clear choice. If subjects consented to being recorded, the audiotapes were 
destroyed after transcription so that they do not even accidentally become accessible to anyone 
besides the principal investigator. The transcribed interviews are listed under numerical IDs and 
not names of participants. If some subjects did not consent to being recorded, again, they were 
not listed under personal identifiers but rather under numerical IDs so that their confidentiality 
was protected. 
The risks associated with this study are minimal, such as potential self-consciousness if 
an individual is unused to disclosing personal views. However, the interview is conducted in a 
safe space with mostly only the principal investigator and interviewee so that this risk is 





their religious views, especially in a focus group. In this case, the participants are reassured of 
anonymity and confidentiality (after identifiers are destroyed) to avoid any social harm. In other 
words, both the magnitude and probability of risk are minimal, such as might be encountered by 
having any discussion. Yet I still focus more on interviews than focus groups so that participants 
are more comfortable in sharing their true opinions. 
One of the main sources of research bias in qualitative research is the researcher 
him/herself. The gender, income group, occupation, and even personality of the researcher 
(including the principal investigator) can influence how research participants respond to 
questions (especially open-ended ones). Avoiding researcher bias is important because often 
interviewees will consciously or unconsciously tailor their answers to what they think the 
researcher would like to hear or to avoid peer pressure especially in a focus group.  
For this dissertation, researcher bias could have arisen because I am female, educated in 
the U.S., from a relatively upper middle income group, and Muslim. Being female allowed me to 
interact more frankly with female interviewees who might have been less open with a male 
researcher. Being Muslim was also in my research advantage because parent interviewees 
assumed I was familiar with what they were discussing and hence answered in more detail. 
Being educated in the U.S. was also helpful because it grounded the study more seriously in 
participants‘ views so that they attempted to articulate their answers more comprehensively. To 
further reduce researcher bias, I reiterate in the beginning of each interview that the participant 
should think of me as an objective third party whose opinion does not and should not matter for 





dissertation‘s interview questions was helpful in informing me how to word the questions so that 
research bias is mitigated to a negligible level.  
Starting the interview, I first ask them what, in their opinion, is the purpose of education. 
If someone mentioned social capital or socialization, I build on that. Otherwise, I describe to 
them myself what one of the purposes of education is believed to be (i.e. socialization, building 
social capital, identity). Then I briefly describe the quantitative component of my research in 
non-technical terms before moving onto explaining why interviews at the grass root level are 
important. 
The words or examples I use in the interview depend on the setting. For instance, if the 
subject belongs to an elite and educated family in Lahore, the level of explanation and language 
(English) I use is different from that I use for a low income and less educated family in the 
village. So I try to ensure that the research description corresponds to the subject‘s comfort level. 
The next sections describe qualitative data sources and a brief sample description. 
 
5.4 – Qualitative Data 
 
 
Besides the individual level sample that is described later in this chapter, this section 
talks in more detail about the geographical localities of the interviews. Since my quantitative 
data sample involves all of Punjab, I use three types of localities that are present within that data. 
One is a large city, Lahore, which represents large urban centers. Another is a small city or town, 
Sargodha, which represents medium to small sized cities. Lastly, Kolo is a village used in the 





district Lahore, Sargodha is in district Sargodha, and Kolo is in district Hafizabad. Punjab is 
almost all Muslim except for a small Christian population. There are five main ethnic groups in 
Punjab – Jatt, Gujjar, Awan, Arain, and Rajput. Punjabi is the mother tongue of about 90 percent 
of Punjab‘s population while Urdu and English are used officially (Pakistan Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, 2011). 
It is important to note that all three localities are in northern or central Punjab. This was a 
deliberate selection since currently, PPPs in terms of private schools funded by the government 
are not common in northern or central Punjab and hence these districts have a higher probability 
of forming future PPPs than districts that already have PPPs. This is true for the largest PPP 
program in Punjab, the FAS program, which is so far concentrated in southern Punjab (although 
PEF is expanding its district coverage) and which was also described in the quantitative section. 
Table 5 below shows the relative number of FAS program schools in Lahore, Sargodha, and 
Hafizabad versus some of the most concentrated FAS program districts - Bahawalnagar, 
Bahawalnagar, Jhang, and Multan. 
 
 






Share of District 
Program Schools 
   Bahawalnagar 186 0.10 
Bahawalpur 258 0.15 
Jhang 126 0.07 







Lahore 43 0.02 
Sargodha 24 0.01 
Hafizabad 0 0.00 
      
Note: Official total number of program schools is 1779 
Source: PEF(2010) 
   
Since the aim of this dissertation is to ultimately aid policy and decision making, there is 
more potential for the government to have flexibility in terms of the types of schools it funds or 
otherwise support in districts that so far have little government presence in the private sector. 
These districts are mostly in northern and central Punjab so that Lahore, Sargodha, and 
Hafizabad are chosen for the qualitative sample. 
Within these districts, the specific cities and village are chosen based on statistics as well 
as accessibility. Lahore is the largest city in the province so it made sense to choose it for the 
large city sample. Choosing Sargodha was slightly more tricky because there are several other 
cities in Punjab about the same size as Sargodha, such as Multan, Sahiwal, Faisalabad etc. The 
deciding factor for Sargodha was ease of accessibility and contacts so that the sample could be 
collected through a snowballing effect. Sargodha district consists of six tehsils – Bhalwal, 
Kotmomin, Sahiwal, Sargodha, Shahpur, and Sillanwali – and 845 villages. Its population is 
about 3 million and there is a 66 percent literacy rate (Government of the Punjab, 2011). For 
Kolo, Hafizabad was the district chosen because I wanted to exploit as many geographical areas 
as possible so that ideally, all three sample localities were in different districts. Other than that, 
accessibility was easier because it is close to both Lahore and Sargodha so traveling is feasible 
yet not so close that it is the exact same population. Differences among the three localities lie in 





opportunities available; and migration to and from the district (Lahore has the most and Kolo the 
least ―to‖ migration; Sargodha has about the same to and fro migration from the city).  
The choice of specific individuals within the three localities was based on multiple 
factors: income level; gender; age; education level; and school type (for teacher parents). For 
Lahore and Sargodha, income was divided into three levels – upper/upper-middle, middle, and 
low income groups. Classification into these three groups was by the individuals‘ self-
perception. However, upon further validation (depending on government classification) given 
income levels and occupations, self-classification and validation overlapped almost 100 percent. 
For Kolo, low income was the only applicable income group. I also attempted to mostly 
interview one parent per household in order to get as much variation and representativeness in 
the sample as possible. Choice of interviewing mother versus father of the student or prospective 
student was done randomly.  In terms of age, the sample was 80 percent restricted to parents who 
had children in primary and secondary schools; 10 percent to those whose children had yet to 
join school; and 10 percent to those whose children were at higher levels of education. The 
education level of parents was almost always tied to income levels so that educational 
background did not significantly affect the sample. School type was also often associated with 
income level; however, I ascertained that both high and low cost/quality private schools that 
students attended were varied although the range of schools was more limited in Sargodha than 
in Lahore. Kolo was a simpler place to sample schools because there were mostly public schools 
except one non-profit private school.  
Given all these factors, the total sample amounted to 100 individuals – 30 from Lahore, 





(about 70 percent versus 30 percent urban population, Population Census, 1998) so that a larger 
sample could possibly more closely attempt to approximate the rural population. However, the 
sample in this analysis is by no means necessarily representative of Punjab, of the districts used, 
or even of the populations in the sample locality. Instead, the aim of this analysis is to point out 
one possible direction for the government to investigate and attain its objective more accurately. 
The individual sample is described below. 
 
  5.4.1 – Sample Description  
 
The data sample includes adults (who were competent to give research participation 
consent) – 25-50 year olds including parents, teachers who are also parents, and vice-principals 
of two schools. Parents define the demand side of the educational process while school personnel 
define the supply side. Having both sides makes the analysis more rich and nuanced. Both men 
and women are included in the interviews, almost all of whom are Muslim and ethnically 
Punjabi. All income levels are targeted. Some adults could possibly be migrants from other 
provinces or Pakistanis who had lived abroad for a few years before returning. Some adults, 
especially in villages, include individuals who cannot read or write. However, the principal 
investigator is a native speaker of Urdu and Punjabi so that translation is not an issue and the 
interviewees‘ informed consent can be obtained through a thumb print or recorded orally. 
 For interviews conducted on school premises and involving school personnel, interviews 
are conducted outside regular classrooms, for instance, in an empty classroom or unoccupied 
office space. This made it more convenient for parents since they could be interviewed when 





conducted on school premises (this is true for most interviews), the locations varied according to 
participant preferences although their own homes probably provided the most comfortable and 
private space for them. However, I left the choice to each individual participant. 
 In Kolo, individual interviews often turned into focus groups especially because 
interviews were conducted in an open space. Moreover, women knew each other and out of 
curiosity and/or moral support, sat down together and participated as a group to share thoughts 
and joke about each other. However, their opinions were almost never affected by each other 
because due to their knowing each other, they did not feel self-conscious. This not only helped in 
giving me accurate information but also allowed me to see their group interaction. On average, 
each household had 4 children and at least among the sample I had, there were about the same 
number of boys and girls among all children combined from all households. 
 With the background of religion in education, and qualitative methods and data in mind, 














Chapter 6 – Relating Islam and Educational Decision Making –  
A Qualitative Analysis 
 
 
This chapter qualitatively answers the second research question: How does Islam matter 
for educational decision making? Indirectly, this question also asks how the government can 
form policies for establishing certain types of public-private schools depending on parental 
preferences. Policy-related issues are discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
As described in chapter one, Islam is used as an example of religion, which in turn is the 
cultural component of institutions and their relationship with education. The first research 
question compares school types according to how the government makes certain policies (the 
FAS program in this case) regarding student achievement that focus on education quality. 
However, the second research question counter-questions the government‘s focus on only 
student achievement in order to verify that the beneficiaries – parents and students – are 
increasing their utility from the education that the government supports. This is especially 
significant given the types and aims of schools that the FAS program actually incorporates (e.g. 
many of them have ethical and moral aims).  
In this chapter, I first outline the hypotheses, and main trends and themes that came forth 
from qualitative data sources. These trends and themes are divided into two sections – influences 
on parents‘ attitudes and aims (parental processes); and how these attitudes and aims influence 
the school(s) they choose for their children (outcomes about schooling choices). Then I discuss 
each trend and theme in detail before specifying how qualitative findings coincide with the 





section. The final discussion section raises some relevant issues associated with the qualitative 




6.1 - Hypotheses 
 
The figure below shows a chart depicting hypotheses about qualitative analysis findings 
that might be validated or rejected by the actual data collected. Since the qualitative analysis is 
based on the smallest unit of analysis, which is the individual, the first two boxes in the chart 
show the factors that can shape the priorities and experiences of each parent. Following 



































External factors can include issues that are beyond the control of an individual (unless 
collective action takes place). An example of these external factors is the political climate of a 
community where the community can range from a relatively smaller unit, such as a city, to a 
larger unit, such as Pakistan‘s foreign relations. This is also related to the geographical location 





will possibly be more aware of Pakistani politics. They will consequently form more informed 
opinions about external influences and be more conscious of what they would like their children 
to learn. Economic and social external factors also refer to macro aspects of what can affect 
parents‘ priorities and hence what they would like their children to learn in school (La Porta et 
al., 1998; Ogbu, 1992).  
It can be argued that individuals can choose which external factor affects them by 
choosing their location. However, for low income groups, relocation is often not an option. 
Moreover, external factors themselves can be a hindrance to relocation, such as war, so that 
leaving Pakistan or restive areas within Pakistan (such as South Waziristan) might not be 
possible. In addition, before relocation, external factors have probably already shaped parents‘ 
thought processes and priorities. 
Internal factors are issues that can directly influence an individual. They are mentioned in 
the figure above and are self-explanatory – family, work experiences, unusual circumstances 
(such as death or illness in family), and income levels etc. A mixture of external and internal 
factors can influence parental thought processes in terms of what they would like to achieve for 
their children, if and how they teach in schools, and if/how they differentiate between girls and 
boys. All of these will in turn affect the type of school parents choose for their children – public 
or private, which class of private (elite or not), school cost, teaching quality, student 
achievement, non-achievement outcomes, student body etc.  
The next section discusses findings through qualitative data analysis and considers 







6.2 – Findings – Parental Processes 
 
Findings are summarized in the table below. The column labeled ―Interviews‖ is 
highlighted because findings are based mostly on interview data. This is because among the three 
qualitative data sources used, participants felt most comfortable with individual expression of 
their thoughts rather than through focus groups so that interviews would be a more accurate 
representation of participants‘ responses. In addition to the external and internal factors 
mentioned in the hypotheses chart, there were other factors and processes that emerged through 
data collection and analysis. They included power relationships within a family (mother versus 
father influencing school choice) as an added internal factor. More parent processes emerged too 
including parenthood related to self-worth; aims in life; lack of gender bias; and taking children‘s 
feedback and preferences into account before choosing schools. These are all explained in more 
detail in the table below and the discussion that follows. 
 
 
Table 6 – Main findings of the qualitative analysis 
 
Findings Observations Interviews Focus Groups 
Parenthood related 
to self-worth and 
self-awareness 
Hand gestures and facial 
expressions. 
More significant for mothers. Mothers discerned self-worth 
more keenly than fathers did. 
Family background 
makes a difference 
in the kind of 
education that 
parents want for 
their children 
Personality Role of religion while growing 
up affects the kinds of schools 
that parents want for their 
children. 
Participants gave personal 
examples about different 




Mothers talked more; 
they talked with more 
force and conviction; and 
Although fathers mostly have 
opinions, a mother‘s 
preferences are the final 
Mothers feel that they have a 
bigger right over their 





fathers they had counter-
arguments in case their 
husbands disagreed.  
deciding factor because it is 
assumed that a mother will be 
more involved in a child‘s 
overall education. 
they have more responsibility, 
but also because Islam has 
given mothers a higher status 
than fathers. 





through parents who 
taught character building 
in school. Observation 
done during regular class 
timings. 
Examples of aims include 
attaining a high financial status; 
fulfilling life‘s purpose to 
become closer to God or 
religion; achieve popularity 
among peers.  
Participants from different 
income groups often had 
different aims. 
No gender bias Talking in equal detail 
about sons and daughters 
Focused more on the 
problems/issues faced by sons 
and daughters; teachers 
discussed problems faced in 
dealing with both kinds of 
students. 
Parents agreed or disagreed 
with each other regarding 
their personal experiences 
with their children and 





Explained parents‘ own 
opinion(s) with regard 
to/compared to what 
their child(ren) thought. 
Discussed conflicts between 
parents and children 
Discussed among each other 
about the similarities and 
differences among their 




Observations were more relevant for parents who were also teachers for whom some of 
the observations were conducted during regular class hours. They were also possible sometimes 
when during an interview, a parent‘s child(ren) happened to interrupt so that I could see the 
interaction and hear the conversation (for example, a mother asking her son what he learnt in his 
English class that day). 
 The analysis below is organized by finding where the finding or conclusion is discussed 
with support from interview or focus group recordings. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that findings can often overlap. For instance, a parent feeling that his/her purpose is to raise their 
children well can be categorized as both a self-worth finding and a life aim finding. Therefore, 





Finding 1: Parenthood related to self-worth and self-awareness 
One possible theory that can be applied to this particular finding of how parenthood is 
related to self-worth is the paradox of subjectivity where despite subordination, according to the 
findings, the subject ―becomes self-aware‖ (Butler, 1997). In Pakistan‘s educational context, this 
can possibly refer to the low quality public education that the government ―subjects‖ the 
country‘s population to. It can also refer to the high cost private schools that parents have to 
confront if they want to improve their child(ren)‘s education. Another example is the possible 
lack of ―Islamic‖ education which, according to the interviews, several parents crave for their 
children. Subjugation can also refer to making circumstance-related school choice decisions that 
might not follow parental priorities. If parents are subjected to these deficiencies in the education 
system, it could lead them to become more self-aware of what exactly they seek in quality 
education and hence potentially affect the schools that the government funds and manages. 
It can be counter-argued that a process where parents hope to influence the government is 
unrealistic. It is probably true (personal communication, PEF, October 4
th
, 2011) especially if 
parents are seen as passive citizens and not as active agents (Minow, 2003). Yet it is possible if 
the only alternative to including Islamic education in mainstream schools is madrassa education, 
which the government is attempting to curtail (personal communication, PEF, October 6
th
, 2011). 
What follows is a discussion of interviews finding wise for all three localities - Lahore, 
Sargodha, and Kolo.  
At a parenting level, self-worth was especially relevant for mothers for whom the most 
important role they play is being a ―good‖ and responsible parent. On an educational teaching 





related to the flexibility in teaching that faculty members could enjoy so that they could realize 
their own potential as well as impart the quality of education they deemed important. A teacher 
in an elite private school described that discussions about religion among colleagues were ―very 
rare‖ and even deliberately avoided. However, about her time in class with her students, the same 
teacher mentioned: 
 
…when it comes to classroom, that was something that would invariably creep in and I 
would encourage that. Because being a language teacher one needs to be talking about on 
so many different dimensions and I would say that language class is the safest way you 
can talk about religion. Because in such a way that you were not as such preaching the 
religion, it was under the garb of language development and one‘s opinion.  People did 
not feel that their religion was being threatened or whatever they would say they would 
be judged on that. In a language class, it‘s most that we are having a discussion. What 
would you say so they were more like how they were putting their words rather than what 
they were saying. So it was easier. 
  
 Therefore, on one hand, faculty members in most types of schools did feel that it was 
important to have religion as a significant component of the curriculum for both boys and girls. 
On the other hand, both teachers and students in elite private schools were subjected to a 
dilemma about their identity and about being open about it, versus achieving high grades in their 
examinations. Although I did not interview students (under the assumption that at a young age, 
parents and not students choose schools), faculty members described their students, especially 
14-16 year olds who had to take international standardized tests, such as University of 
Cambridge‘s Ordinary-level (O-level) exams: 
(1) In O-levels when they were to attempt their essays and their compositions, it‘s 
very interesting what they would talk about…some of them would write about 
religion, and their beliefs and how they felt and that one had to sort of be very, 





they are and how they were. But I would also get apprehensive because I know 
that this also might affect their grade, it might.  So the challenge was to teach 
them, to voice their opinion but to put it in a more socially appropriate way and 
they shouldn‘t come across putting it very strongly.  
 
(2) I really liked the environment, in the sense that it seemed tough at that time but 
the thing I really liked about Convent
137
. The other thing I really liked about 
Convent was that we were allowed to be who we were. In the sense most people 
thought that because we were studying in a missionary school we invariably 
would have either very liberal or we give up on our religion totally. But I think I 
am a better Muslim by far I think in my own opinion. I remember milad from my 
old convent days. We used to have a milad
138
, yes we used to have Christmas 
carols and all but I remember the other opportunities we got for reciting Ghalib 
and Iqbal
139
 and all that, So I really liked the effort that the nuns put in and I 




The above quotes show that teachers and administrators, especially those who had 
experienced a different educational experience and who were often also parents of children in the 
same school were, in a way, ―subjected‖ to certain social norms and constraints that prevented 
them and their children/students from giving full rein to their thoughts and identity. Teachers in 
similar schools both in Lahore and Sargodha described that slightly older students, especially 
girls, were aware of this mutual exclusiveness and struggled to find the ―right‖ balance between 
their thoughts and academic actions. Often, students became confused and swung from one 
extreme to the other – from being very confident about their religion and culture, to being 
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 Gathering for religious songs. 
 
139





acutely aware of the international academic requirements that did not reward students who were 
open about their identity. 
 This dilemma not only subjected teachers and students, but also parents who were torn 
about which part of their identity to cater towards the most – providing their children with the 
best possible education in terms of building their characters, ethics, and personality versus an 
education that would make their children ―successful in worldly things.140‖ This dilemma also 
led to school-hopping until parents decided what they preferred the most. Through interviews 
and focus groups, it was apparent that neither set of parents were completely satisfied - one set 
felt that their children were not receiving high quality ―secular‖ education whereas the other set 
felt their children were not receiving high quality, or even satisfactory, ―life and character 
building education.‖ It is important to note that life and character building education does not 
necessarily correspond to religious education although as will be seen later, interviewees often 
assumed that teaching religion would lead to life, ethics, and character building education. 
 As a solution to this dilemma, some parents chose secular schools but in order to do 
justice to their role as parents and preserve their ―self-worth,‖ they encouraged discussions about 
religion at home: ―…the kind of person I am and what we are as a family, we believe in that if 
somebody is saying it, it does not impact us and what we feel about we are very clear on it.‖ 
Another solution to this dilemma was parents catering towards both secular and ethical/religious 
education by using one for boys and the other for girls so the household overall had a balance
141
. 
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 Therefore, parents – and even teachers who are parents – found it difficult to find the 
right balance between what they think should be the priority(ies) and the decisions they take that 
might not follow these priorities. The dichotomy is related to being subjected to circumstances, 
such as international testing, that make parenting decisions difficult. However, making the right 
decisions about being good parents and being good teachers that encourage thinking skills can 
lead to self-awareness and self-worth because according to some interviewees, parenthood then 
becomes a responsibility that is performed well because it is not subjected to other influences. 
 The next section combines the second and third findings because they are inter-dependent 
since family background can influence a parent‘s personality, and in turn, this personality can 
influence how parents interact with or think about their children‘s education and religion. 
 
Findings 2 and 3: Family background and personality 
 
 
As far as family background and personality are concerned in influencing attitudes 
towards Islam in education, I draw on an example of an upper-middle class, female vice 
principal in Lahore. Ghausia Ahmed (name changed for privacy) can provide a useful 
representation of how teachers/administrators in an Islamic school make educational decisions 
for their children, at least in one large urban city in Punjab. Related to Newcomb (2008), it is 
true that the ability to use patriarchal norms to one‘s advantage in some situations depends on 
social position. Ahmed had a high social position not only because of her high education, but 
also because she was the first wife of an established architect and hence more respected in 
society (personal communication, September 20
th





her father who had let and made her study in the best institutions and hence shaped her 
personality. Ahmed says: 
 
I used to be his [father‘s] favorite child…I was his type, very particular about things. I used 
to understand things if he only said them once, he didn‘t have to repeat anything. Then I got 
very good grades so he used to really admire me and look up to me…used to tell people ‗look 
at my daughter‘…I remember his love…Basically my father always wanted us to be at the 
best of institutions…so my father when he got the survey done about which were the best 
schools in Lahore, there was also Convent, Sacred Heart was there too…he didn‘t want to 
admit us there[Convent is originally a missionary school although it does not teach 




Significantly, besides her social position as a member of the upper middle class, religion 
was an important source of Ahmed being able to maintain a large degree of control over her life. 





I used to like it [listening to religious stories
143], that‘s why I‘m here today… 
when I talk to children the next day at the assembly, I know I‘m telling them, I‘m a 
model, I‘m a model to them but if I‘m not doing it myself, whatever I say will 
automatically have a hesitation…so if I‘m practicing and I‘m saying something, whatever 
I say has a force. 
 
 
In other words, religion provided Ahmed with internal and social tools to navigate her 
personal and social space at home and at the school she worked in. In terms of navigating space 
and whether or not territories ―when described as an eternal and unchanging ‗culture‘ or 
‗religion‘‖ (Newcomb, 2008, pg. 100) are difficult to overcome, it seems that in Ahmed‘s case, it 
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is important to differentiate between the conceptual territories (religion itself) and practical 
territories (as religion is practiced in Lahore and maybe Pakistan in general). For religion itself, 
there does not seem to be a desire to change it but for its practice, Ahmed certainly thinks change 
is desirable and through the school she works in, it is possible as well. This relates to the concept 
of paternalism because Ahmed has willingly adopted the paternalistic role through education.  
Again within the school, Ahmed has complete authority over teacher recruitment, curricula, 
administration, and the entire learning process of the school‘s students (equally for boys and 
girls). This can be described in further detail below where Ahmed discusses her children‘s 
education. 
For parents who were not teachers or did not hold any administrative positions in schools, 
answers to the interview questions had both similarities and differences. The similarities 
depended on social class and position whereas differences depended on gender and geographical 
location (large city, town, and village).  
In family background among the upper middle class in both Lahore and Sargodha, 
mothers who did not work often saw themselves as ―home maker[s]‖ (Interview 1, September 
5
th
, 2011) such that the most important role they played was as a parent versus a wife, a daughter, 
a sister etc. About 80 percent of this sample group (upper middle class females) were born in or 
married into families where their parents and grandparents had practiced religion in terms of its 
rituals (for instance, the five pillars of Islam – belief in one God, prayer, fasting, alms-giving, 
and pilgrimage) rather than engaging in discussions about any aspect of religion. For instance, 






Their [the children‘s] grandparents are absolutely practical about Islam, they are like five 
times regular prayer, they will offer prayer, they will recite Qur‘an everyday, my father in 
law like he gets up every morning and everyday he offers two nafils of shukrana 
[gratitude] for God that whatever He has given him so they don‘t have to say it vocally 
that much…I am too vocal about it, my number two my second daughter and my third 
one who is quarter to six they both are really, you know, they would say it loud…[about 
her husband] He is a practical one he does not verbally no, I told you my in laws they are 
not the verbal type but they are the practical type. 
 
However, even if religion was not verbally present in her house, she was keen on 
ensuring Islam played a significant role in her children‘s lives. About discussions of religion at 
home (ethics, politics, rituals), she mentioned: 
 
That [discussion about Islamic ethics] is constant because it‘s my kid‘s age, you 
know they are in that age where I need to teach them about first of all to be a good human 
being, like Hazoor (SAW)
144
 said a person who is not a good human being cannot 
become a good Muslim…I start a talk, I tell them about Islam, whatever they are doing in 
life, I describe that situation from a relative angle, this is what I do, fulfill everything, and 
they do sometimes like my second one she got a creative writing from school, it is a 
political thing you were saying this thing just came up, she, her teacher gave her a letter 
that it is a bit of the creative writing that write like if you want to ask a question ever in 
the world, who will that be and what will that question be she answered surprisingly, 
being a kid in class 4, she wrote a letter to Raymond Davis, and she asked him that why 
did you kill those Pakistanis and what would have it felt if a Pakistani had killed an 
American, she had done a number of questions and I was surprised. 
…[asking her children what is] taught in school I do…like when they are watching 
television, I sit with them and watch the programs, then I tell them the American aspect 
and the religious aspects that what are these channels and what are these programs doing 
to your brain. You watch them but do not acquire or obtain or whatever they are trying, 
the culture they are trying to impose upon you, don‘t grab that just take the good things. 
 
From observation, interviews, and focus groups in both cities (Lahore and Sargodha), it 
was interesting to note that such attitudes towards instilling Islam into their children‘s lives 
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existed in two strands of upper and upper-middle class parents – one strand that already belonged 
to a religious household, and the other strand that originally did not belong to a religious 
household but through their life experiences, they had decided to come closer to Islam. The latter 
was more true for mothers than for fathers because, in the Pakistani context, mothers often took a 
more active interest in their children‘s schooling than their husbands145. Among several parents 
that I interviewed, it was apparent that sometimes mothers mostly took a greater initiative than 
fathers in building their children‘s identity and personality through religion. Upon probing, the 
reasons for mothers taking this greater initiative ranged from the family dynamics mothers had 
experienced in their own lives as children, to fathers assuming that their greater responsibility 
and parental role was reserved for ―out of the house work.‖ This is significant because if mothers 
took more interest in their children‘s schooling than fathers, it could also mean that this was the 
role husbands had assigned to their wives (i.e. fathers had assigned to mothers) rather than 
mothers themselves being the active agent in adopting the role. On the contrary, if mothers did 
take up the initiative on their own, it could also imply them bringing home a certain type of ―out 
of the house work‖ – in this case, their children‘s education.  
 An example of a family experience that led one parent to place more importance on 
religion is the following: ―…my life really changed when my mother passed away and it really 
made me I really saw, when I really saw her dying and it really pinched me and I got very close 
to Allah.‖146 
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However, there are exceptions to this trend, such as interviewed mothers who were more 
influenced by their fathers than their mothers. For instance, one mother described that her father 
was strict in terms of religion although her mother wasn‘t because her mother‘s family was ―very 
educated.‖ In a way, the interviewee was linking the extent of religiosity – however she defined 
it – to an individual‘s educational background so that more education meant less religious. 
Among low income groups, there did not seem to be a significant difference in attitudes 
between religious or non-religious households and parents because no household was starkly 
religious or non-religious. For instance, almost everyone in Kolo mentioned that religion is 
important but they also mentioned that they themselves are not very practicing although they 
would like their children to be (this is a possible socially desirable answer). Yet, it was difficult 
for their children to attend mosque school or have an individual Qur‘an teacher because they had 
to help their parents financially and did not have much extra time. This was true for both girls 
who helped in household chores and boys who helped their fathers in agricultural fields. 
Another group of interviewees included parents who considered themselves belonging to 
an upper-middle class and had worked as teachers or administrators in schools earlier in their 
lives but recently were only housewives or unemployed. Most of these interviewees described 
themselves as ―self-made‖ in terms of bringing themselves up from a previously middle class 
status. Therefore, these parents lie at the cross-section of middle and upper-middle classes and 
can share a more nuanced perspective. Some of these parents were deeply affected by the 
financial and emotional instability of their middle class lives so that they wanted their children to 
have more stability and access to opportunities. Besides secular education, they introduced 





In fact, there should be comparative religions. First I didn‘t put on Star Plus [an Indian 
TV channel with mostly soap operas and music shows] but now I do and show them to 
my kids and ask them. Not at a small age... but after 14 years, they‘re pretty sure and 
mature enough to make out what‘s right and what‘s wrong… I ask them things that you 
aren‘t doing things for me, you aren‘t doing them for Allah so whatever you do, you have 
to decide right and wrong in everything. Sometimes I used to have them list advantages 
and disadvantages of some things. I tell them that if you‘re doing something good, it‘s 
not for me. If you are, it‘s for your own good. If you believe that Someone [at the Day of 
Judgment] will ask you about them, then it‘ll make a difference on what you do and don‘t 
do. 
 
Interestingly, the difference between middle income class interviewees and upper-middle 
class interviewees was that in both Lahore and Sargodha, upper middle class parents had thought 
out their actions in more detail and were more conscious of the consequences of education on 
their children. Middle income class parents had mixed opinions – some were slightly more 
concerned with providing their children with an education that would bring them lucrative job 
opportunities rather than the quality of or the role of religion in their children‘s education. Others 
– and this comprised the majority of middle class fathers and mothers – felt Islam was ―lacking‖ 
in Pakistan‘s society and needed to have a stronger presence. Significantly, the government was 
mostly blamed for rampant ―corruption‖ so that parents felt it was important to instill correct 
values in children at an early age when they were still in school. When I asked how these values 
could be best inculcated, they mentioned two main methods – one, that teachers had to be role 
models, especially because boys were more difficult to discipline otherwise; and two, Islam was 
the ―only solution‖ in teaching these values. However, if there was lack of trust that parents had 
in the government
147
, consequences of a PPP policy where religious schools are funded can be 
mixed. 
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An example of how teachers should be role models (since modesty is an important value 
in Pakistan for both religious and cultural reasons) is conveyed by the following quote from a 
father: 
I was studying in a co education and I mean the type of clothes she [teacher] used 
to wear I don‘t know I should mention this or not but the boys in my class used to make 
fun of her in a very dirty way and she used to come and talk about religion you know 
somehow, everybody used to make fun of her that she is portraying something else and 
she is not really what she is. 
  
Another finding was that often interviewees – no matter which income group they 
belonged to – seemed to desire the same things (i.e. values and ethics) in their children‘s 
schooling that other interviewees explained in the context of Islam. For instance, one mother 
who claimed she was not religious and that religion was not frequently discussed in her house 
talked about instilling the same ethics in her children that other parents discussed because they 
believed that is what Islam teaches. This mother based her attitude towards the education she 
desired for her children on her own experience and family background: 
 
Although I was going to the best school in Pakistan but I still feel the education system in 
Pakistan is not up to the standard, it is more of a ratta [rote learning] system. I would like 
Amal [her daughter] to have an education more on a research base and things have 
changed in Pakistan especially in Lahore in my city where people were not brand 
conscious at all. And now when I go to Amal‘s school and pick up people talk to you 
after looking at your bag or the kind of car you have got it has become a pain as to the 
kind of environment it is now we never grew up, we made friends by looking at the 
families and their background and values system and now people make friends by 
looking at their car their brands the kind of clothes they wear
148, it‘s pretty weird and I 
make sure Amal doesn‘t grow up like that. At times she sees so she says I want 
something like that ―mummy I want to have a big car and I want a bag like that,‖ so I tell 
her it‘s not important who you are the kind of person you are that is more important 
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Such parents – both fathers and mothers - also seemed to have similar discussions at 
home (after marriage).
149
 According to them, although Islam per se did not come up because 
―only grandparents offered prayers regularly,‖ the parents instilled values in their children‘s 
lives, such as keeping ―good‖ company, being polite towards ―helpers‖ and not wasting food 
because otherwise it can be given to a poor person (concepts of politeness and charity in many 
religions). When asked about religion in their children‘s schools, the response was often similar 
to the following: 
 
In school they focus on manners and generally they fit your kids to international 
standards … they don‘t prepare your kids to basically islamiyat [Islamic Studies as a 
subject] is not important anymore in Pakistan. 
  
 In almost all upper, upper-middle, and middle class interviews, there was a consensus 
about which way the society is going – ―it is going both ways, ziada kharab ho raha hai [it is 
getting worse] but side by side people are also trying to know [about Islam]‖ and interestingly, 
these trends neither vary by class
150
, nor by location. Again, as described before, the solution in 
most people‘s opinions seems to be Islamic values: 
See religion is not only Quran [Muslims‘ Holy Book] and namaz [prayer], it really is, it 
makes you groomed, that is really important, Islam ki jo basic values hain [Islam‘s basic 
values] they are wonderful, if you read Quran and you understand generally if everyone 
stops lying to society bohat behtar ho jae gi [will become much better] if everyone stops 
fooling I mean just that one little difference can change the whole society.  
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 Before marriage, parents‘ involvement in religion dependent on family dynamics. For instance, if one child went 
to a missionary school while his/her sibling went to a Shia school despite being Sunni, discussions at home about 
teachings would have been probably long and rich (Shia and Sunni refer to two Muslim sects). 
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 The reason why there is similarity between upper-middle and middle classes is partly 
because of their common educational experiences, which in turn are part of their similar family 
and incomes (also suggested by Rothstein, 2004; Manski, 2000). Similar educational experiences 
either encourage parents to desire a similar educational experience for their children if they 
found it satisfactory (socially and academically) and a different one otherwise. For instance: 
 
…what I liked most about Convent was that we were all from the same background, all 
the girls were, we had the same kind of families, even I have I still am very good friends 
with the girls of my school, we were the same kind of people, the same kind of social 
background that we come from and there were no pressures as such and the only pressure 
was that of studying in exams and later on also and bit of fashion, consciousness crept in 
but not that much.  
 
 
Besides middle and high income groups, low income groups in cities and in the village 
seemed to have a similar thought process about the kind of educational experience they would 
like for their children. Ideally, their children would not face any social pressure while receiving a 
high quality education: 
 
TV these days is spoiling our children. Girls care about fashion too much and watch 
movies and boys care about roaming around with friends and sometime don‘t even go to 
school. Even if we aren‘t educated, we didn‘t do that, we listened to our parents more. 
We keep telling them to not listen to their awara [being unproductive and sometimes 
indulging in immoral (according to Islam) acts, such as drugs and drinking] friends and to 
go to school. But some parents also don‘t care. They have too many children to feed and 
take care of to think about education.  
 
 
 In other words, even low income parents – both fathers and mothers - base their attitudes 





be more productive and care about education because they ―listened to our parents more.‖ In 
turn, they emphasized this for their children. 
 The next section digs deeper into how parents‘ backgrounds and personality might be 
related to their aims in life. 
 
Finding 4 – Personal Aims 
Personal aims in life of parents are not necessarily the same as their aims for their 
children. This is where the findings differed very finely from the hypotheses, which stated only 
aims for children. Often personal aims and aims for children overlapped. However, many parents 
were consciously aware of their overall purpose in life and could point out how raising their 
children would allow them to fulfill their own purpose. For instance, an upper-middle class 
parent mentioned how his aim would be to encourage spirituality and socializing of society (first 
of their children) through Islam: 
 
I would look at religion as a more social orientation and you cannot take it away because 
then all that is left for the parent would be preaching because then what context would the 
child put good behavior into? It is said as religion and spirituality, we are human beings 
and we‘re to be nice to other people and it‘s not good to be mean and not nice, snatching 
things and all that. 
 
For parents belonging to low income groups in cities or those living in cities, 60 percent 
of the sample said that their aim was to give their children what they did not have – a high 
quality education. When I probed what they meant by a good education, parents replied that they 
were referring to an education through which their children could become ―baray and acchay 





respected members of society, not only because of the clout they had depending on job or social 
status, but also because of the kind of character and personality they had. For instance: 
 
As I have said religious spiritual moral ethical education, ab [now] if there‘s no 
shadow or hint of that then the parents‘ work become difficult because religion where are 
they going to practice their religion not just at home, see, so that religion or those values 
are balanced at school as well, they meet that balance at school because that‘s the social 
skill. 
 
This is very similar to what some middle and upper-middle class parents want for their 
children‘s education so that it can be argued that rather than income group, parents‘ personalities 
or personal aims (perhaps shaped by experiences or surroundings) matter for the kind of 
education their children ideally receive. The above passage also shows the nuance between 
personal aims and aims for children because according to more detail in the interviews, it is the 
―parents‘ work‖ to ensure that they themselves led wholesome lives. In order to have such a life, 
it was important that they provide their children with the kind of education that would allow 
parents to tell God that they tried to fulfill their mission and raise ―good‖ people. 
In contrast, 30 percent of interviewees among all income groups said that their aim in life 
was to give their children a happy, comfortable life and ensure that they had financial and marital 
stability when the children grew up. For them, education was not a necessary component of the 
stable life they wanted their children to lead because ―a good education without a job‖ was not 
useful. The remaining 10 percent said that they were not sure what their aim in life was.  
While describing their life aims and how they consider religion to be an important part of 
how their children are groomed, middle and upper-middle income parents also went on to 






All comes into the context of religion, you might name it differently but the 
context is religion or spirituality or moral values so it should be taught in Pakistan. In all 
sorts of schools, that is the problem in Pakistan, see, ab [now] how and who teaches it 
that remains a problem but because that is the problem we cannot say no to it, you see, 
we have to say yes to it knowing the who and how problem, so it has to be across 
board… Well, I hope you realize that I am talking in a very utopian context here, very 
utopian because given the problems like language issue [teacher skills], this is another 
issue to which there is no solution to, at least not now, till we have got all context right 
till we have got all things working, who should it [religious studies in schools] be taught 
by as I said by normal, average human beings. 
 
A more detailed description of how religion can be included in schools to provide a 
comprehensive education and help parents achieve their aims can be provided through some 
specific school examples in both Lahore and Sargodha that currently follow this model. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss these schools, it can be an area for 
potential future research so that the government can explore options to partner with private 
schools whose education models (combining religion and secular education) provide an 




Findings 5 and 6 – No gender bias, and incorporating children‟s feedback 
. 
Although I expected to see a gender bias in terms of both the quantity and content of 
education that parents wanted for their daughters versus sons or what future they envisioned for 
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 Many parents from all income groups in Lahore and even Sargodha mentioned that they had heard of, knew 
someone who studied in, or their own children studied in such schools that promised to combine religious and 





girls versus boys, I was not able to discern a noticeable difference in the parents‘ attitudes 
towards different genders. For instance, one low income parent from Kolo said: 
 
Boy or girl, Allah has told everyone to study. So I want to send all my children to school. 
My girls even go more happily, the boys are more irresponsible. I just want them all to 
study for now. It is good for the future and it also keeps them out of trouble. 
  
This attitude was consistent throughout the sample, all income levels and all localities. I 
expected a difference partly because of other studies and statistics (enrollment, repetition etc.), 
even by Pakistan‘s Ministry of Education, and partly because of my findings in the quantitative 
section of this dissertation where boys often achieved higher scores than girls. However, the lack 
of difference between what parents want for sons and daughters augurs well for the government 
so far because they might not have to form varying policies towards girls and boys except for 
equity reasons. Of course, this cannot be a definite conclusion without further research. 
The next finding is interesting because it incorporates the other unit of interest besides the 
parent – the child him/herself. I had not mentioned the student in the hypothesis because through 
most quantitative studies, it appears that at younger levels of education, parents are the decision 
makers for their children. However, through the interviews and focus groups, I realized that 
children themselves are often considered active agents because they can not only shape what and 
how they learn but also where they learn. This is especially apparent through parental decision 
making based on how ―well‖ their child is performing in a given school (―well‖ can be looked at 
both academically and socially) or how ―well‖ a certain school‘s environment brings out the 
strengths of the child. This section later discusses this in more detail when describing how 





would like to give an example of how at the school-entry level, children‘s questions and 
inquisitiveness can possibly influence the parental decision making process. In response to an 
interview question about children‘s learning processes and if religion can play a role at a very 
early age, a parent who had also worked at a primary level private school responded: 
 
[Understanding and exploring] is as natural as it is learning to walk, learning to 
see, differentiate between mauve and lilac, so how can it be anything, how can you delay 
it, my question is not when to start it, it is how can you delay it, children by nature are 
inquisitive beings, they would ask you questions, we don‘t know how to interpret them, 
we don‘t even know where they are coming from but they are really coming from within 
them, they‘d ask k Allah mian nazar kiu nahi aata? [why can‘t we see God?]… these kind 
of processes are already stirring within the child, so how can one say ke ‗let‘s put it on 
hold, and we‘ll decide when the child is ready.‘ The child is ever ready for it, so don‘t put 
it on hold…take it along as it comes and when the child starts schooling it should slip in. 
 
 
The child here is considered as an active agent in the learning process because he or she 
is continuously being affected by teachers and giving feedback about what is being taught. 
Parents who think it is important to treat children as part of the decision making process will take 
the child(ren)‘s opinion or personality into account. Interestingly, parents in all income groups 
and in all locations seemed to give slightly more weightage to their teenage daughters‘ than to 
their teenage sons‘ opinions perhaps because they felt girls matured early. 
Parents of children who are older and in college also provided an interesting perspective 
to this finding. The interview questions asked about discussions about religion at home. As we 
would expect and as interviews showed, at a younger age, parents are usually the ones who bring 
up religion in terms of praying, fasting, or ethics although several parents mentioned that 





However, one family in my sample had college-going children who were raised in the Middle 
East. According to their father, his children (both son and daughter) brought up religion at home 
on their own, even when they were little, because Arabic and Qur‘an were woven into the school 
curriculum (exceptions were international school systems like Chouiefat in Lahore). This led the 
parents to seek answers so that overall it was a dynamic process, which the father appreciated 
and wished was available in Pakistani schools as well. Coming from outside Pakistan, he felt he 
could tell what the education system lacked, which was morals and ethics. According to him, the 
best way to teach morals and ethics along with academics was to incorporate Qur‘an and Arabic 
into the regular mainstream schools at a very early age because those beginning school years are 
the most impressionable for children. He also suggested that starting from 6
th
 grade, children can 
learn the Qur‘an with explanation because that is essential for the children‘s ―foundation and 
moral development.‖ 
Parents often emphasize the five pillars while children often focus on ethics and morals. 
This is especially true for middle class parents whose children are enrolled in medium or low 
cost private schools. Most middle class parents mentioned how their children, especially 
daughters, who are in 5
th
 grade and above come home and discuss what their Islamic Studies 
teacher talked about. However, it is mostly parents who begin religious discussions at home and 
that too in the context of asking their children to pray and fast regularly. This could be partly 
because middle class parents had to help their own parents when they were young because hiring 
helpers was expensive. So either they studied up to a certain point and then dropped out or there 
was a limited choice of subjects and schools they could attend (mostly the ones closer to their 





think are important leads the middle class parents to want their children to attend the best schools 
and receive a comprehensive education so that children sometimes influenced their parents‘ 
school choice but not always. During interviews and focus groups, this was mostly true for both 
Lahore and Sargodha‘s middle income classes. 
For Kolo, almost everyone belonged to a low income group so that even though children 
aspired to be active agents and attend school, their parents simply had to say that their family 
could not afford it before children stopped attending school. Girls were expected to help in 
household chores as well as taking care of cattle while boys were expected to help in the fields. 
There was still no gender bias in the sense that parents did not mention educating boys was more 
important than educating girls or vice versa except that sometimes the reason differed by gender. 
For instance, boys should study because otherwise they would fall into bad habits, and girls 
should study because as future mothers, they would have the greatest influence over her 
children‘s lives. However, some parents did mention that their children had watched television 
and become more aware of schooling so that these children had chosen to attend morning or 
evening shifts, depending on when their household workload was less heavy. Some children 
happened to enter the room (which happened often enough in Kolo but less so in Lahore and 
Sargodha) during the interview and their parent explained to them what we were talking about. If 
the child was not intimidated, usually because he or she was slightly older, he or she sat down 
next to the parent and listened closely. Both I and the parent felt slightly self-conscious at first in 
front of the child but in a few minutes, the conversation was back on track.  
In terms of how chlidren‘s feedback can be incorporated into the school they attend or the 





who had recently begun college. She offered quite illuminating answers on some issues, such as 
her brothers‘ education and how their adjustment to a certain school mattered a great deal. One 
of the brothers had changed three schools before settling into one where religion was stressed 
while the youngest one was adjusting to a different school that belonged to a family friend. The 
daughter herself studied in a boarding school and mentioned that although she thought religion 
was very significant, she reached the conclusion herself after seeing her parents praying and 
fasting. Therefore, she was the active agent herself. She mentioned that to get high grades, ―50% 
praying matters and 40% hard work but hardwork 100%  [without praying], it will matter [only] 
40%.‖ Yet she did not like enforcement so any family pressure made her resist being religious. 
Overall though, religion was again actively chosen to be a private realm than a schooling one 
except for one of the sons, and self-motivation and independent decision making played a large 
role in this family. 
After discussing findings about processes that influence how parents think, the next 
section describes the actual school choices made and hence more closely answers this 




6.3 – Outcome – How Parental Preferences influence Educational Decision-Making 
 
 
The previous section described parents‘ experiences and background whereas this section 
will discuss given their opinions, how parents make educational decisions about their children, 





had experiences in Pakistan although several upper-middle and middle class parents mentioned 
that international experiences (e.g. in Saudi Arabia where children who knew Arabic were more 
knowledgeable about Islam than Pakistani adults) also influenced how they perceived their 
children‘s future and current potential. This is because experiences in Pakistan might make the 




As mentioned in the earlier section, at the general school level, choice of schools by 
parents in Lahore and Sargodha who are also teachers seems to have a somewhat paternalistic 
relationship. The concept of paternalism as it relates to social classes or circles seems more 
applicable to parents who also work in schools as administrators, such as Ghausia Ahmed, 
because there is a top-down relationship – Ahmed describes the school‘s responsibility and 
hence her responsibility - to help, change, and prevent children from ethical downfall. This is 
why her children are enrolled in and she works at a school that instills Islamic values in them so 
that she has both a personal and an idealistic stake in the school. She says: 
 
So I feel that today, the way we spend life today, that unless you bring in religion, 
religious knowledge and you implement, the degradation in this world will keep 
worsening. There‘s no other solution besides this. That we catch onto our religious values 
through education. Put a religious aspect in education. And it‘s completely possible. 
Children will never be inspired unless older people set an example. 
 
 









I thought a co-teacher would listen to me so I told her some guidelines and rules, when 
you talk to kids in the morning, just tell them to say Salam [Peace] and it‘ll be sadaqa-e-
jariya [concept of  reward even after death]  because if one child, only one child, at any 
point in his or her life start says Salam and whoever he says it to, whenever he says it, 
you‘ll get rewarded even if you‘re in your grave and then he‘ll teach his kids, his kids 
will teach their kids…even if you aren‘t there you‘ll get rewarded. Allah doesn‘t let 
reward go to waste, ‗I‘ll write it down and I‘ll make sure it‘s delivered.‘ And the teacher 
became stunned and I was like you have such a good opportunity, even if you bring one 
child closer to Allah, bring him, you‘ll be rewarded and you know she was listening to 
me like this [makes an expression]. And then later I went and she was telling me how I 
told her something really nice and now I tell my own children the same thing. So I just 
opened that window in her mind…and I inspired her there. She said it to me again and I 
said you can do that in everything, it‘s not difficult. 
 
 
Overall, Newcomb‘s (2008) idea of the significance of social position playing a key role 
in helping women ―navigate‖ their social space(s) seems to apply to Ahmed whose social spaces 
have been her father‘s house (high income group and provided with high-end education); her 
husband‘s house (status as first wife); and the school that she heads. Owing partly to her social 
and education background, and religious attitude, she has managed to create a position of formal 
authority for herself at school and of informal authority at home. She has taken on the leadership, 
paternalistic role in educating children and has imbued the rest of the school staff and faculty 
with the same attitude. Conversely, the teachers that join this school are somewhat self-selected – 
they feel a responsibility not only towards themselves (to achieve a high spiritual level by being 
around similarly religiously minded people), but also towards raising the next generation to be 
ethical, productive, and socially cohesive citizens. 
A similar sense of paternalism was apparent in the village Kolo in terms of the non-profit 
school taking on the responsibility for enrolling out-of-school children and imparting quality 





Similarly for mosque schools, the teacher was mostly a qari (person who teaches the Qur‘an) so 
that although he was on a government payroll, he might also feel a sense of responsibility to 
provide children with education for the sake of Islam. Hence according to interviews, low 
income parents are often satisfied with sending their children to any type of school in the hope 
that their children will learn ―something at least.‖ 
 
Dilemma - Upper middle class families dissatisfied with both secular and religious education  
 
Again for parents who did not work or teach, several upper middle class mothers took 
active interest in their daughters‘ education no matter what school they studied in. For instance, 
Lahore Grammar School (LGS) is considered a top-notch, elite, and secular school for girls and 
boys (separate campuses for both genders). One family‘s eldest 13 year old daughter studies 
there about which her mother said: 
 
I‘m not that satisfied with Grammar. Grammar is getting better like after class 7. It‘s 
gotten much better. It has another worldly knowledge, you would say a sense of thinking, 
on another level you would say… air of Grammar freedom and a little sense of thinking 
for their own …[but] for Grammar I would like them to study a little more, much much 
more because the burden is just on the mother you have to teach to read you have to teach 
them to write. 
 
It is obvious that an elite school that is supposed to have at least a satisfactory secular 
education is unable to provide it not only for this mother‘s daughters, but also for many other 
upper middle class parents that I interviewed most of whose daughters and sons study in LGS. 
For the same mother who is quoted above, her feelings about the role of religion in her 






…my daughter is in Grammar na, she is the eldest and she is 13 and is class 8, and she 
has a book called by Martin Ling, a Christian by the name Mohammad. And the school 
has started Islamiyat [Islamic Studies] in class 6, before that they did not have any 
Islamiyat curriculum. Nothing. And Martin Ling has totally quoted bible and other books, 
so they have no information about prophet (saw) from their own religion‘s point of view 
and the first image that is put into their brains is by a Christian, there‘s no comparison. 
 
A family with children studying in different schools have the opportunity to compare 
these schools not only from their children‘s experiences but also from the parents‘ own 
experiences in dealing with schools. For instance, one parent comparing LGS with another 
school, Learning Alliance, which is not as elite, mentioned: 
 
Learning Alliance is I would say that they really do a very good job like the basic 
education… the faculty is amazing, they will also listen to you, though they say the 
principal and the people who are running basically people who own the school are 
dominant, from a different sect but the Islam and all I am completely satisfied with the 
religious syllabus…yes, if I don‘t like anything I go there and I am very comfortably 
telling them that I don‘t like this, like Sarah [one of her daughters at Learning Alliance] 
last year had a male dancing teacher, they just introduced him in the school and the first 
day I gave the application to her and when she presented the application to the teacher. 
The next day the whole class got an application, and they just cut the classes out. 
 
  
Moreover, movement between schools seems to be fluid and shaped by parents when 
they experience one school after the other. However, generally these parents are not completely 
satisfied with the education imparted by any specific school type. Some parents who wanted 







 would be taught in a religious school so that they were unsure of the type of school 
they would be satisfied with. Another household experimented with the youngest child, shifting 
him back and forth between Islamic and secular schools where parents finally settled on an 
Islamic school because they aspired to have him become a balanced and competitive religious 
scholar. 
  
Changing classes and localities - Rising from middle class to upper-middle class 
 
The sample of interviewees who described themselves as having risen from a middle 
class to an upper-middle class status in both Sargodha and Lahore had a slightly different 
experience in choosing schools for their children. Whereas a few years ago, one of the main 
considerations in choosing their children‘s schools might have been the expense (middle class 
parents), the consideration now had mostly changed to convenience or the quality of education 
(middle class parents had become upper middle parents). For instance, one parent described his 
experience: 
 
Salamat [an Islamic school in Lahore] was a nightmare, teachers were very bad and 
academics weren‘t good at all and were more inclined towards kids taking tuition and 
then shifted to Mrs. Ali‘s branch [of LGS] because the kids get a lot of importance and 
then there were moral values in the sense that they weren‘t allowed to leave the school 
before 12 so there were some restrictions. Although when Saba [his daughter] went to 
Mrs. Neelam‘s branch [of LGS] but I was not happy because I feel that there, teachers 
didn‘t want to take responsibility. So comparing the two although when they‘re the same 
owners, they‘re very different. Mrs. Ali‘s was much more organized and in Mrs. 
Neelam‘s, it‘s much more inclined towards fashion and teachers don‘t want to take 
responsibility. 
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 There are four main  Sunni Islamic schools of thought – Shafai, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali. Hanafi is the most 






Another parent in the same sample described his reason for his son‘s choice of school: ― 
The only reason he‘s in that school is because it‘s near and because it‘s a reputable name and up 
to some extent, you can call it a status symbol, the building is nice, otherwise nothing.‖ 
 The first parent quoted actively looked for the right school and teachers for his child(ren) 
while the second parent quoted showed how besides education, status symbol was important in 
choosing schools for families who were becoming more wealthy. The different in attitudes 
between the two parents - and other similar ones – could be due to their own family background 
and personality as described before and does not differ according to their child(ren)‘s gender. 
This is related to how parents‘ priorities changed based on their experiences. 
 
Changing priorities 
When I asked parents about how they made a decision about which school to enroll their 
child in or change schools, the most common answer was either their own good or bad 
experience of having studied in the same school (if they were young enough) or word of mouth 
especially if they had moved into a new city recently. Often these two reasons clashed. For 
instance, if a mother or a father had studied in a particular school and had had a wonderful 
experience, they might not enroll their child(ren) in the same school because ―it was not the same 
anymore.‖ This could be true because the school was actually not of its previous standard, or 
because the parents‘ circumstances or opinions had changed. This could be especially true if the 
parents had initially wanted their child(ren) to attend an elite private school but over the years, 
their priorities might have changed to wanting a school where the child(ren) would be 





earth life… I said it won‘t be the same social class [at a certain private school] and…I don‘t 
think I‘ll be able to handle it and snooty ban jayengay [they‘ll become snooty] and so I decided 
against it.‖ 
The above quote also shows that the concept of humility and modesty that Islam 
emphasizes was brought up by a parent who preferred the same values but not in a religious 
light. 
Although many parents mentioned that their own parents were a strong influence on their 
religious attitudes, a few were cognizant of how their childhood as well as adult experiences had 
led them to decide what kind of school they wanted for their children. For instance, one mother 
who described herself at the intersection of middle and upper-middle income group, mentioned 
how she had ―partied‖ as a young girl and had been driven away from religion by her young 
brother‘s death. Her father had also been driven away from religion – ―gone off track‖ - after her 
mother‘s death. However, as life went on and she went for pilgrimage153 to Mecca (in Saudi 
Arabia), there was a ―drastic change‖ and she recognized that her upbringing had lacked morals 
and ethics. She felt she was old enough to recognize that for her own children, she would want a 
different experience. According to her, she wanted to ensure that her children did not waste the 
earlier part of their lives by having the ―wrong‖ priorities; for instance, she wanted them to feel 
closer to God from the very beginning. Therefore, she had enrolled her sons and daughters in an 
Islamic school even though it did not offer the best secular education in the city because she is 
―100 percent‖ sure her children will receive good grooming from the Islamic school.  
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Another factor in educational decision making that was brought forth was how mothers 
are more influential in choosing schools than fathers. This is true of the mother described above 
and discussed in the next section. 
 
Mothers are stronger decision makers 
A common response regarding who was dominant in making school educational 
decisions was that between parents, mothers were the more forceful influence. Several parents 
mentioned how the father and mother had had long and heated debates about which school(s) to 
choose for their child(ren). Mostly, the reason for arguments was different priorities; if one 
wanted to follow a certain elitist culture, the other focused more on convenience and distance to 
schools. If one wanted to follow a family legacy of every boy in the family attending one 
particular school, his or her spouse wanted to experiment with a more innovative model of 
learning. Of course, these arguments only occurred in certain income groups that could afford 
more than one type of school. For instance, even if fathers in my interview sample were very 
keen on an Islamic school, unless mothers agreed, it was difficult for fathers to make an 
independent choice. For one couple, seeing her daughter dancing to a Bollywood (Indian film 
industry) song in her current secular school convinced the mother to send her daughter to an 
Islamic school (although still after ―checking out the new school for a year‖ to ensure there was a 
balanced education).  
In low income groups in cities and in Kolo, the norm was mothers making education 
related decisions for their children because fathers had a greater financial responsibility to 





married couple‘s family functioned as if a single mother was the head of household. The most 
common reason was fathers being away from the locality, either in another city or in another 
country, so that for all practical purposes, mothers were the only decision makers for their 
children. However, in Kolo, the choice was mostly between sending the child to school or not, 
rather than which school to send the child to because there was limited choice – the available 
schools include one public and one private non-profit school. 
 
Choosing schools based on teachers 
Parents can also choose schools based on the kind of Islamic Studies teacher in a secular 
school versus teachers in an overall self-defined Islamic school. Most middle and upper-middle 
class parents feel that an Islamic Studies teacher should be a role model in terms of ethics but not 
necessarily in terms of appearance (e.g. beard for men and hijab for women). Most middle class 
parents felt that appearance also mattered and that first, praying and fasting need to be ―on track‖ 
before character building and ethics are focused on. Village parents do not have a choice since 
there are only two schools but they are quick to voice their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a 
teacher and outline their concept of an ideal teacher – one that makes the children interested in 
studying, who does not hit children, and who arrives in class on time every day. This shows that 
religiosity of teacher(s) was not a deciding factor for village and even other low income parents. 
Some parents from all income groups in all three localities felt that the teachers‘ role in 
developing a child, especially an Islamic or Social Studies teacher, was not restricted to 
discussing rituals, such as praying, fasting, and pilgrimage. The role extended to being a role 





For instance, gratitude and humility were concepts that a teacher should discuss with children of 
any age so that learning rituals and character-building happen simultaneously. Therefore, 
parents, especially teacher parents, usually wanted to look at the teaching philosophy of a school 
before enrolling their children into that particular school. In contrast, some upper-middle class 
parents in my interview sample thought that religion in a public and school setting was not the 
ideal situation because they did not ―trust‖ the teachers or the schools to impart the ―right 
concepts‖ about Islam to their children so that they would prefer secular schools. 
 
Religion is important but children study in secular schools 
 
On a related note, parents who had stressed the importance of religion in children‘s lives 
described that they had still enrolled their children in secular schools because of the school‘s 
status symbol and also because there was no competitive alternative that ensured a ―good‖ future 
for their children financially and socially. This was mainly due to the other ―crowd‖ that attended 
these high quality private schools where children came from ―really good families.‖ Among low 
or middle income families, this consisted of sending their children to any private school because 
private schools in general were assumed to be more expensive and provide better quality 
education than public schools. In these cases, attending any private school was a status symbol 
rather than a specific one.  
Among some interviewees, when asked how parents had compared one school to the 
other, parents mentioned that there was no need to compare schools and they already knew 





children to a particular school so that interviewed parents either felt peer pressure, or did not 
want their children to grow up dissatisfied with their secular education. For these reasons, 
sometimes parents still enrolled their children in secular schools although they felt there was too 
much ―freedom‖ in some private schools where ―children were smoking during school hours.‖ 
According to some parents, even public schools were better in this regard because they were 
strict about what happened on their grounds and smoking was not allowed. This implied that 
although some parents, if their priority was character building, would have preferred sending 
their children to an Islamic school or even a strict public school rather than a secular private 
school, which allowed too much freedom to children who were too small to differentiate between 
―right‖ and ―wrong.‖ 
Madrassas automatically came up in some interviews when I asked parents about religion 
in education. Some parents mentioned that madrassas were the lesser evil as long as the teacher 
was educated and ―balanced enough.‖ Others – and these were the majority – whose children 
studied in secular schools felt that instead of madrassas, regular secular schools should 
incorporate Islamic values. This will help children feel that religion is easy and can be practiced 
on a daily basis instead of religion being relegated to a completely different institution that is 
only attended by a small minority of the population. 
Moreover, there were parents who wanted their children to have a high quality secular 
education and if religious education was not provided in schools, they wanted their children to at 
least not be driven away from religion. For this, some medium and high cost private schools have 





they will not interfere with a child‘s personal beliefs and will be only concerned with his or her 
overall development. For instance, according to a teacher parent: 
 
…when they bring a child to school, they are trusting us with the child‘s 
upbringing…and it is in no way be going to take their child‘s religious understandings… 
not values because values are universal, religious understanding hai na it is best left to the 
parents. At school, we tell them and I am very particular about this that they should know 
that the child will get an environment where the child will develop understanding, 
whatever understanding is, be it the understanding of the world or an understanding of 
themselves or an understanding their religion or God. 
 
Such school attitudes at least reassure parents that what they teach children at home will 
not be countered by the school so that both secular and religious educations can go along 
simultaneously. 
In Kolo, while some parents seemed unsure of what they wanted for their children in 
terms of education, others were clear enough in their opinions to know that children can learn 
about religion, especially studying Qur‘an with its explanation, even after completing their 
secular education. However, learning Qur‘anic recitation (as opposed to explanation) was still 
more important at a very early age and could be learnt alongside secular education. 
Sometimes, if parents felt that religion was important but their children studied in secular 
schools, the reason could be that they considered religion to be a personal choice and 
phenomenon as described below. 
 
Religion should be in a private realm 
Some parents – no matter which income group they belonged to – did feel that religion 





motivation(s) behind which school they enrolled their children could be several but did not 
include religion. For instance, some of these motivations behind school choice could be driven 
by a school‘s status symbol; accessibility (especially a consistent school system that was 
available in most cities, such as Beaconhouse or City School, or the only available school in a 
village); convenience (other children from the same family studying in the same school; brothers 
accompanying sisters to school in the village); and knowing someone who taught in the child‘s 
school. Moreover, the number of choices mattered as well. For instance, Lahore has many more 
options than Sargodha does simply because it is a larger city while Kolo hardly has a choice of 
one or two schools. However, given the scale of choices in Lahore and Sargodha, the motivation 
for choosing schools for low, middle, and upper-middle classes were similar.  
Underlying – or in addition to - all these reasons for restricting religion to the private 
realm could be a very simple motivation – parents‘ personalities. Parents who are more focused 
on the family as a unit might be satisfied or even prefer discussion religion in a private setting. 
For instance,  
I would find it very interesting and at times disturbing also, when I would see that 
parents would come and talking about that we are shias and aap nay class may ye kaha or 
aap nay wo kaha [you said this and that in the class] but I as a parent, I never brought it 
up. I did not, there was no need for me to bring it up because I understood that what is 
being taught there in the classroom was a syllabus and what the parameters and even my 
children know that, whatever religion they are carrying with them as such is what we 
have given them from home. 
 
If religion is significant to how parents raise their children, including it in a private realm 







 Exception – Christian missionary schools 
An outlier or exception to the general rule of parents choosing secular versus religious 
schools was that of St. Anthony‘s and Convent of Jesus and Mary in both Lahore and Sargodha. 
Given that Convents are missionary schools, it could be assumed that Muslim parents would not 
prefer to send their children to such schools. However, both boys and girls missionary schools no 
longer preach Christianity. Rather, they are still considered a status symbol by most interviewees 
who knew about it. For instance, in Lahore‘s Convent, there is always a long registration list 
with mostly Muslims applicants and Christian nuns making admission and all other school 
management decisions. One parent who had studied in the Convent described it: 
 
I have never given that much thought but now that you ask I think they are operating in a 
very conventional Islamized kind of an environment. They wouldn‘t want to threaten or 
in any way be considered a threat and then not be able to do what they are doing with 
regard to giving good education. I think they have to operate on those lines otherwise 
they would not have been able to survive in this very very religion conscious society. 
 
One of the key phrases here is ―good education,‖ which in the rest of the interview with 
this participant seemed to be defined as building values, ethics, character, and polish within the 
Convent‘s female student body. As with Islam and Islamic schools, a Christian missionary 
school is also assumed to provide ―good‖ education. Conversely, again unlike most religious 
schools that focus on Islam as a religion, the Convent cannot be openly Christian because, 
according to one of its alumni: 
…they [nuns] knew what it would bring about and they understood it very well and they 
very subtly kept it out, not a taboo as such that we couldn‘t talk about religion as such but 






However, unlike many Islamic schools, the Convent of Jesus and Mary has built a 
reputation as being one of the best secular education-providers to girls in Lahore and 
Sargodha
154
. Their education is considered secular because they do not teach or preach 
Christianity as a religion although they still try to impart ethics to their students. 
Another interviewee was a low income Christian mother whose children went to a 
predominantly Christian school. When I questioned her about her children‘s experiences and 
how she chose that school, she mentioned three main things – first, the school was close to her 
house; second, the ―parhai‖ or studies were up to par because of good teachers; and third, 
religion was taught in an open-minded way. After probing, she mentioned that by open-minded, 
she meant that Muslims could study Islam and Christians could study Christianity in her 
children‘s school. Moreover, she personally did not feel threatened even if only Islam was taught 
because no matter what religion it was, it was the ―same God.‖ This was an interesting 
perspective because someone belonging to a religious minority group lived and studied among 
the majority Muslim population and instead of being uncomfortable with mixed religion schools, 
she felt they were helpful because they promoted unity. In other words, she appreciated different 
religions being taught in the same school and wanted her children to study in such an 
environment. In terms of earlier discussions in the literature review, this form of trust can be 
related to social capital and cohesion, which can be considered one of the aims of PPPs. Another 
form of trust or distrust in a society is the feeling of safety and security, and lack of it 
respectively. 
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Significantly, one additional factor that I had not initially expected but which did 
influence many parents‘ school choice was ―security‖ by which they meant safety. Parents 
wanted their children to feel a similar sense of security that‖ they had felt when they went to 
school decades ago.‖ For this reason, several parents opted for schools in locations that were 
considered safer, such as the Cantonment area in Lahore. Furthermore, lack of security was also 
the reason why some parents did not want their children to attend Islamic schools; in other 
words, they felt that Islamic schools might be the ―target‖ of one religious sect or the other. 
However, security was mostly a consideration in a large urban city like Lahore. It did not seem 
to be a significant consideration in Sargodha and Kolo where the parents denied thinking about 
security even after I specifically asked a question about their children‘s safety. 
  
Choosing schools based on children‟s personalities 
Only two interviewees mentioned choosing their children‘s schools based on the 
children‘s different personalities. For one, although both her sons went to elite schools in Lahore, 
there was enough choice available to the mother (her husband had passed away) that she could 
choose a more competitive school for her more outgoing son, and a slightly smaller school for 
her younger son. According to her, the younger son was quieter and needed more individual 
attention to bring out his debating skills. For the other parent, it was clear to him that his son 
could not take too much academic pressure because according to the father, he had observed his 
son over the years and felt that his son was in need of overall grooming rather than just 





provide his son with an ―open environment and broadmindedness.‖ The first parent belonged to 
an upper-middle class family in Lahore and the second one belonged to a middle class family in 
Sargodha. Both of them had considered other schools but had reached a realization about their 
particular priorities. Related to personality was student performance so that if children did not do 
well in school, such as memorizing the Qur‘an, because they were not interested in it or felt 
unable to live up to the challenge, parents felt forced to change their children‘s school. This was 
the case especially in some low and middle class families in Sargodha. In Kolo, some parents 
mentioned that they wanted their children‘s personalities and habits to change so that they 
enjoyed education and attending school although the parents recognized that one or two schools 
were not varied enough to cater towards each child‘s preferences. The reason why even two 
schools were available was because a non-government organization (NGO) aiming to expand 
educational access had set up a school in Kolo. 
  
Schools taking up responsibility for low income parents 
Although most of my sample was restricted to for-profit private schools, there were some 
parents in Kolo who mentioned having to pay a subsidized fee for their children to attend a non-
profit or NGO school while the majority of village children attended Kolo‘s public school. 
Parents mentioned how the only alternative to what they considered was a low quality public 
education was the non-profit NGO school because they felt that private schools treated their 
children better and took on a larger responsibility on their behalf. For low income groups where 





teachers and staff took up some of the role that parents played in cities or higher income groups. 
This role often included teaching children cleanliness, ethics, and building their character.  
 In line with Gutmann (1987), it was clear through interviews that although parents in the 
village might not be well educated or even literate, they were aware enough to know that they 
wanted the opposite for their children. For parents who could not even afford the non-profit 
school in Kolo, there were always mosque schools, which taught the Qur‘an but also added a few 
secular subjects. How well the teacher taught at the mosque school compared to other schools 
was not clear. However, interviews also showed that even when there was a viable alternative, 
parents were willing to send their children – both girls and boys – to a mosque school, at least 
until the primary education level, because they felt that learning how to read the Qur‘an was 
important so that children could differentiate between right and wrong. This was true for the 
majority of parents in Kolo.  
 
Children taking on their own responsibility 
 In a few instances in the village, it was interesting to see that instead of, or besides, 
parents, children were the ones taking the initiative to study in school. Inspired by either their 
mosque school or friends, the children had enrolled themselves in not just primary and middle 
schools, but also in secondary schools and were responsibly getting good grades. A mother of 
two such children mentioned that she completely trusted her children in terms of how, what, and 





even gone to meet the school teacher to ask how her children were doing
155
. Such understanding 
between parents and children was rare. Upon probing, this understanding of children feeling 
responsible for themselves existed usually in households where mothers were mostly single 
because of the husband‘s death or parents‘ divorce. In this particular case, the widowed mother‘s 
trust and hard work had inspired her children to reach their potential and aspire to get out of their 
current circumstances by acquiring jobs in a city. 
 In the village, some parents mentioned how their children, especially daughters, were 
extremely keen on learning about Islam and spreading the knowledge further. There were often 
differences among siblings too. While some were not interested in studying anything, others 
wanted to study the Qur‘an, yet others wanted to study both secular and Qur‘anic education. 
 Overall, while there might have been some researcher bias, almost all parents, especially 
mothers, were keen on gaining both secular and Islamic education. Some believed one education 
type was more important than the other if they had to choose. Otherwise in the ideal situation, 
parents would prefer their children studied one type of education alongside the other type. 
  
Learning the Qur‟an outside school 
Similar to the concept of mosque schools in the village, 80 percent of parents in Lahore 
and Sargodha (all income classes) had employed a Qur‘an teacher (called Qari) who came to 
their houses in afternoons or evenings to teach Qur‘an to their children alongside their other 
secular schooling. Some parents were happy with their qaris while others mentioned that it 
would be much easier for the children if Qur‘an was taught at school, especially because boys 
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seemed to have a difficult time getting back into the ―study mode‖ again in the evenings. 
However, parents felt that the presence of a Qur‘an teacher at home or in school was definitely 
necessary even if the child had completed the Qur‘an once because then the child needed to ―stay 
in touch with it.‖ This was the norm until about 6th grade for most children (especially girls who 
were reaching puberty), after which the qaris left although many parents said they would like to 
have their children understand the Qur‘an but there was little time and opportunity. 
In Kolo, several parents mentioned that before the mosque school was set up, they sent 
their children to family friends whose children were older and knew the Qur‘an so that their 
younger children could learn Qur‘anic recitation from them. This was true for both boys and 
girls. However, after learning the Qur‘an, boys often went to school and girls either studied the 
Qur‘an in more detail or went to school as well. The latter usually depended on the children‘s 
own preferences.  
Significantly, Kolo also mentioned how there was an Islamic course in the village that 
taught young boys and girls Qur‘an, songs about Islam, and prayers. They also had a program for 
older girls (but not for older boys because of unavailability of male teachers) so there were two 
types of parents who sent their daughters to this program. One type considered Islamic education 
more important than secular education; and the other type (a larger proportion) wanted their 
daughters to learn both types of education simultaneously but they were hindered by the lack of 
secular secondary education in the same village (in either the public school or the non-profit 
school). The Islamic course had a weekly one hour lesson for mothers as well that they enjoyed 
and told me about because according to the mothers, it taught them ―how to speak, how to walk, 





considerably improved by this course especially because it focused more on ethics besides 
Qur‘anic recitation. Even more importantly, the children themselves were satisfied with the 
education provided. This was apparent through what some children said when they happened to 
come into the room when their parents were being interviewed and also apparent from what their 
parents mentioned about their children‘s interest in their education. 
In terms of external validity, this extra Islamic course makes it difficult to generalize 
Kolo to other villages as well. However, parents did mention that girls from some neighboring 
villages also joined the course and then went back to teach children in their villages of origin. 
They predicted and informed me that in a few years, these other villages will probably be similar 
to Kolo in terms of the type of education that both parents and children want. 
The next section summarizes parental processes and output in terms of school choice. 
 
6.4 - Summary 
So far, this chapter has discussed hypotheses and findings related to the second research 
question in this dissertation – how does Islam matter for parents‘ educational decision making? 
This question in turn implies: how can the answer to the second research question be related to 
the government‘s education policy regarding school types (including PPPs)? Qualitative methods 
have been used to answer the second research question. Although a triangulation approach was 
adopted – observations, interviews, and focus groups – findings were mostly based on interview 
data because participants talked more openly on a one-to-one basis since religion was a very 
personal issue for most participants. Findings show that ethics and value building, and being 





linked to PPP goals of social cohesion. This is the result of the second research question that was 
more investigative and dealt with finding the result of the interaction between schools and 
parents. 
According to my hypotheses, both internal and external factors go through a certain 
process of parental preferences and result in a particular school choice (which is ultimately 
related to parents‘ desired educational outcome(s)). These were mostly confirmed by the 
findings, which were on two levels – one level identified the factors that could influence how 
parents thought and their priorities; and the second level identified how these thoughts and 
priorities took shape in the actual school choice. For instance, family background and personality 
could potentially influence how parents felt about religion being a private or public space. In 
turn, this could influence whether or not the parent chose a secular or religious school, 
respectively. Another example is how mothers were stronger decision makers when it came to 
their children‘s education, which could lead them to either impose a certain school on their 
children based on security, or choose schools based on her children‘s different personalities (e.g. 
outgoing versus introverted).  
When it comes to the main question of religion in education, especially in the mainstream 
education system, the vast majority of parents felt that schools should include both secular and 
religious components in their curricula. This can be for ideological reasons where parents‘ 
desired educational outcome was a more united, ethical, and identity-cognizant personality for 
their children. Although some parents wanted this outcome but were unsure of how to achieve it, 
others were certain that the only process that could achieve this outcome was teaching Islam in 





would be easier than having Qur‘an teachers (or qaris) come to the house each day after school 
ended.  
In this sense, according to the typology of schools that the qualitative methods outlined in 
chapter 5, the second educational outcome that parents desired for their children – ethics and 
identity – was possible through the ―hybrid‖ school category. This is because hybrid schools 
included both secular and Islamic components in their curricula and even management (e.g. how 
staff dealt with each other and the students). In the religious typology graph, these hybrid schools 
would be closest to school type 8 in terms of funding, management, curricula, and ownership.  
This categorization seems representative of the sample selected (although not Punjab‘s 
population) because upon asking, teachers and parents from all classes and all localities provided 
a unanimous answer - there should be a combination of religious and secular education in one 
educational institution in both urban and rural areas. Further probing showed that living in rural 
versus urban areas did not make a difference in parents feeling that they themselves do not know 
enough about Islam. Yet they are all still aware enough to know what they would like for their 
children - the ideal education they want for their children includes secular and Islamic 
components in mainstream schools because they feel it is important for Islam to be an ―added 
thing.‖ According to both parents and teachers, it is not just the parents‘ responsibility to provide 
an environment conducive to learning ethics and religion. Instead, the school, teachers, and 
government have to help the parents because otherwise the dichotomy between home and school 
life will ―confuse‖ their children.  
Therefore, the public feels that the government has the responsibility and authority to 





as the Punjab Education Foundation, which supports public-private partnerships. The missing 
component is knowing the kind of change that should be brought about, potentially through 
public-private partnerships. One of these changes is shown by the Punjab Education 
Foundation‘s aim of increasing educational quality as measured by test scores, which indirectly 
means that private schools have to become more efficient in producing education. The other kind 
of change was possibly shown through qualitative analysis – parents wanting more religious, 
ethical, and identity-forming components in schools in order to produce a socially cohesive 
society with ―good‖ Muslims and citizens. The next section discusses further policy implications 




5.5 - Discussion 
 
 The discussion at the end of the quantitative analysis in chapter 4 focused on examining 
PPPs as a method to increase test scores and evaluating the existing contract between the 
government and private schools. It focused on the ―how‖ of different school types after parents 
had already made their educational decisions. In contrast, the qualitative analysis in chapter 5 
focuses on the ―why‖ of parental decision making.  
 The qualitative analysis attempted to answer the second research question – how do 
subjective factors, especially those related to Islam, relate to parental educational decision 
making about school choice? This question is significant given the recent attention placed on 
Islam especially after 9/11 as well as the lack of attention on religion in mainstream education 
rather than in madrassas (Shafiq, 2010). Briefly, findings brought forth an overwhelming trend of 





consumers of schooling, they attempted to maximize their and their children‘s short and long-
term utility. Parents‘ utility would increase if their ideal education was provided to their children. 
According to parents as well as teachers who were parents, their ideal education did not exist, 
which would have consisted of the right combination of contemporary and religious/ethical 
education where neither was considered mutually exclusive.  
 From an institutional perspective, while PPPs can be considered to represent governance, 
results from the qualitative section can be considered to represent culture, which is more nuanced 
in terms of how individuals and groups interact with each other. The aspect of culture most 
relevant to this dissertation is religion since Pakistan is a predominantly Muslim country and I 
am looking at Punjab, which has more or less a similar culture throughout the province. While 
there have been quantitative studies on how religious schools have performed on standardized 
tests (e.g. Sander, 1996; Neal, 1997), I adopt a bottom-up approach in this chapter. The 
methodology I have adopted is not a perfect case study; however, it serves the purpose of this 
dissertation, which is to show how individuals from different income groups and different 
geographical areas perceive their children‘s education. Since part of the sample was collected 
through a snowballing effect, it is possible to have some bias in terms of the class or motivations 
of individuals who were similar or knew each other. However, I made a concerted effort to keep 
the sample diverse yet focused enough to answer the research question.  
 One important finding that this chapter brought forth is that parents have no gender bias 
in terms of which child – son or daughter – they prefer to enroll in school whether or not this was 
actually the case or if there was researcher bias at work here. However, boys often perform better 





focuses almost equally on both girls and boys‘ schools. This can imply that depending on the 
goal, either the government can focus on boys‘ education to increase overall achievement or also 
focus on girls‘ education in order to achieve gender equity. This is also discussed in the next 
chapter that focuses on future research and policy implications. 
 This discussion is a useful point to combine a few concepts brought up in literature the 
religion and educational decision making. One concept is related to Ibn Khaldun‘s asabiyya 
(Ahmad, 2002), which shows that a society ultimately leads itself to self-correction. In contrast, 
Minow (2003) describes communities to usually have passive citizens who are not active agents. 
Interviews in this qualitative analysis showed that parents did not seem passive in terms of their 
educational preferences for their children. Moreover, although this dissertation did not focus on 
hybrid schools, there are citizens forming such schools that combine secular and religious 
education in order to provide an alternative source of education to currently dissatisfied parents 
who wanted their children to learn ethics and religion besides achieving high scores (personal 
communication, November 13
th
, 2011).  
Additionally, as part of self-correction whether a society is active or passive, the 
government‘s aid of religious schools has often been discussed. Besides quantitative studies on 
Catholic schools, Minow (2003) mentions that the U.S. government ends up providing aid to 
religious schools because the borders between religiosity and secular nature of a school are often 
blurred. Moreover, if, based on the results of this dissertation, the government decides to fund 
schools that encourage Islamic values, it indirectly means that the government is subsidizing 
religious behavior and ethics. This is because the opportunity cost for secular behavior (i.e. 





opportunity cost, the government also reduces the cost of schooling that encourages both secular 
and religious behavior. However, since the opportunity cost will vary from individual to 
individual and family to family (Backiny-Yetna & Wodon, 2009b), it is important to analyze 
schooling decisions made by parents and students, such as through the interviews discussed in 
this chapter. 
 One link between the qualitative analysis and PPPs, such as the FAS program, has to do 
with how partner schools can ensure their students perform well. It seems after this chapter that 
if partner schools incorporate more parental opinion into their education – or perhaps they 
already do – their teamwork can ensure that students‘ education at school is reinforced at home 
and vice versa. The Punjab Education Foundation can also include a related clause in its terms of 
partnership or perhaps include a parental questionnaire in its school monitoring (provided it has a 
reasonable cost). Although parents and other stakeholders can have conflicting viewpoints, 
including all stakeholders in making decisions regarding students‘ education can increase 
chances of a higher quality and comprehensive education, as well as foster trust and social 
capital as a result of teamwork.  
The next chapter further elaborates on possible future research and policy implications 















Chapter 7 – PPPs, Policy, and Research Implications 
  
 
This dissertation can have both significant future research and policy implications based 
on the importance of its topic, research until now, and findings from its quantitative and 
qualitative analyses. The dissertation began with two research questions: 1) how do public, 
private, and public private partnership schools relate to student achievement? and 2) how does 
Islam matter for parental educational decision-making? These questions represent two levels of 
interaction respectively – top-to-bottom interaction between government policy and schools; and 
bottom-to-top between individuals and schools. An example of the first level of interaction is 
how a decision is made by the private school to apply for funding and a decision is made by the 
government to disburse the funding to that specific private school.
156
 In other words, a decision 
is made by both the government and the private school to enter into a public-private 
partnership.
157
 An example of the second level of interaction is how a decision is made by 
parents to choose a certain school and school type (in this case, school types are public, private, 
and PPP schools) and a decision is made by the school for which students to enroll. Combining 
the two levels of interaction is significant in policy-making as will be discussed later. 
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 Since the definition of institutions used in this dissertation included governance, it is important to know that 
before implementing any education related policy (or other socially related policies), the governance perspective on 
institutions and public/private sector dynamics does not necessarily depict the entire reality (Stoker, 1998). Like 
other theories, the governance perspective on theory and policy provides a conceptual framework in analyzing 
processes and outputs such as economic growth and student achievement (Rodrik et al., 2004). However, the 
applicability and credibility of this perspective depends on the time and location. For instance, whereas the 
dependent variable in education and economic studies a few years ago was education enrollment, it has more 
recently shifted to student achievement (e.g. through international standardized testing through TIMSS and PISA). 
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 This decision is arguably driven by market forces where proft-maximizing schools understand what parents want 





Findings from the dissertation indicate that public-private partnerships (PPPs) are 
significantly related to an increase in test scores and more so for 5
th
 rather than 8
th
 grades. The 
same is true for private schools although the increase for PPP schools is greater than the increase 
for private schools. Moreover, parental preferences indicate that the current education system in 
Punjab, Pakistan, does not provide enough school choice for parents to be satisfied with their 
child(ren)‘s schooling. Instead, rather than just student achievement, a large consideration in the 
ideal education for their children includes the children learning ethics and forming civic identity, 
which most of them believe will come through teaching Islam in the mainstream education 
system. Again, the two levels of interaction – between the government and schools, and between 
parents and schools – can be combined to inform the government‘s future educational policy 
(through parental preferences) regarding its potential goals of efficiency, equity, school choice, 
and social cohesion.  
This chapter is organized as follows: since the difference between PPP and public schools 
seems so marked, I will first describe PPP dynamics, strengths, and weaknesses in more detail 
(chapter 4 also discusses them) as well as discuss FAS policy related issues. Next, some other 
policy implications of this dissertation‘s research are described while the third section of this 
chapter outlines some areas of possible future research. The fourth and last section concludes the 
dissertation. 
 
7.1 – PPP Dynamics  
According to the framework set out by Levin (1999) and Patrinos et al., (2009), 





goals are described in more detail in chapter two; however, the most significant lesson learnt by 
discussing these goals is that there is a trade-off among these goals. Private goals (for example, 
higher earnings) can deviate from social/public goals (for example, gender equity in education) 
so that individual utility is not necessarily attained by maximizing social/public utility. The 
government attempts to strike the best combination of these goals to maximize utility (social, 
public, or private as preferred by the government) (Levin, 1999; 2002). Inadvertently this leads 
to some goals taking precedence over others. For instance, by attempting to reach the highest 
productive efficiency by enrolling more boys (assuming that boys have higher test scores), 
gender equity can be compromised because fewer girls are now enrolled since school enrollment 
capacity is limited. Since Punjab Education Foundation (PEF) attempts to increase education 
quality through PPPs (supply-side), how do PPPs relate to productive efficiency (to increase 
education quality) in the FAS program as well as the general context of education in Pakistan?
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 Patrinos et al. (2009) argue that differentiating between finance and management in 
education is a useful way of categorizing PPPs in education
159
. For instance, there can be public-
private partnerships between private schools and the government (such as voucher programs for 
faith based schools and the FAS program in Punjab, Pakistan) as management and finance 
respectively to improve education outcomes – expansion (e.g. enrollment) and quality (e.g. 
student achievement). There can also be partnerships between public schools and private 
businesses (such as education management organizations) as finance and management 
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 PPPs related specifically to the FAS program are also discussed in the discussion section at the end of chapter 4. 
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 When examining the economics of education PPPs in more detail, it is first important to realize that most existing 
literature is either by policy advocates or is concerned with construction contracts (except some studies on vouchers) 







respectively to improve an education process - school operations. In other words, PPPs consist of 
several key factors that can be further analyzed – contract/partnership between the government 
and private service provider in terms of which partner finances and which partner manages; 
specific quantity and quality of a particular service (in this case, education); and a mutually 
agreed upon price and duration (Taylor, 2003). This dissertation focuses on the partnership 
between the government and private service provider (i.e. private schools) which, through the 
contract, provide finance and management respectively.  
 
 PPP Contracts 
As far as contracts representing PPPs are concerned, De Bettignies and Ross (2004) 
imply that PPP contracts can include the public and private breakdowns of four tasks: defining 
and designing the project; financing the capital costs of the project; building the physical assets; 
and operating and maintaining the assets to deliver services. The FAS program seems to deal 
mostly with the fourth task where private schools operate and maintain schools in order to 
provide higher quality education. In this case, the government does not finance the capital costs; 
instead, it is involved in providing subsidies per student, which can be interpreted as the 
government financing the school‘s operating costs per student. However, if the school‘s 
expenditure per student decreases, it also means that the school possibly has extra resources to 
invest in capital or physical facilities. Thus the contracting out of providing educational services 
is the basis of PPPs in the FAS program where the government temporarily provides ownership 
of services to the private partner schools
160
. Bundling also exists in the FAS program because 
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 Patrinos et al. (2009) have described seven types of PPPs in education according to how contracts are structured. 





although it seems that private schools are only concerned with the management of education 
provision, saved operating costs and PEF facilities requirements indirectly lead the partner 
schools to also build physical assets. If there was another education PPP aimed at expanding 
education instead of only improving quality (i.e. increasing enrollment), government subsidies 
could perhaps be used to build more capital (e.g. buildings) and not only provide services. 
Therefore, the PPP contract as a process has the advantage of encouraging its private school 
partners to invest more in physical inputs of education provision and expansion. The contract 
between PEF and a FAS program school is shown in Appendix C.  
However, generally, in terms of evaluating PPP structure to gauge their success, PPP 
contracts often have the disadvantage of suffering from ―contractual incompleteness‖ (Valila, 
2005, p. 102; Galetovic et al., 2009)
161
. This means that the public sector (the government 
agency contracting out to the private sector) rarely specifies expectations and output clearly 
and concretely enough for the private sector to deliver that output in its desired quality under 
all circumstances. PPPs generally have long contractual periods (up to 30 years) and provide 
public services that can respectively increase uncertainty and difficulty in monitoring output. 
Due to contractual incompleteness, efficiency can decrease if the private service provider does 
not have to maintain quality of the public service. For instance, instead of immediately 
                                                                                                                                                             
the support services category. This is because the government represented by PEF is using private schools‘ services 
to provide quality education, which is a public service.  Moreover, another related PPP type is facility provision, 
which is also the result of the FAS program because it requires a minimum standard of facilities in its partner 
schools. Although private schools retain ownership of these facilities and assets, it can be argued that through 




 Contract incompleteness is related to the amount of information available to the public and private parties 
(Schmidt, 1996). For instance, a government can withhold information if it wants more ownership over the good or 
service or if it wants more efficiency in education production so that the private parties (e.g. FAS partner schools) 





withdrawing funding and then ultimately canceling the partnership contract, schools in reality 
are given two warning notices if they are violating the contract (PEF, 2011). Relating this to 
the ownership aspect of PPPs described earlier, clear negotiation of contracts is significant in 
order to ensure efficient and high quality service provision. In terms of the FAS program, this 
can imply that the government has to clearly specify to the private school partners that its 
objective is to increase educational quality due to which it subsidizes education and monitors 
academic performance through QATs. Further, if private school partners are clear about the 
government‘s objectives in the contract, it will know that educational quality has to increase 
(e.g. through teacher training, parental involvement etc.) and not just its indicators (such as test 
scores). 
 A possible weakness in the PPP contract is that PEF allows itself to believe students and 
teachers if they file a complaint against the school management or facilities. Although this can 
serve to double-check that partner schools meet PEF requirements, it can also mean that students 
and teachers can file unjustified or false accusations that can cause a valid school to lose its 
funding and partnership status. Another possible weakness of the contract can be the high 
supervisory costs it leads to for both the first and second parties (Valila, 2005; Kelman, 2002). 
For instance, the first party has to perform monthly checks of randomly selected schools whereas 
the second party has to provide monthly reports, especially of the enrollment levels in each grade 
and by gender
162
. Additionally, although schools are not allowed to charge students any fee, 
students have to pay out-of-pocket for standardized tests, such as the PEC exams, that PEF 
mandates its partner schools to participate in. This does not make private education completely 
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free for students even through the FAS program although it is still probably cheaper than what 
other private schools charge.  
Another weakness of the PPP contract is that due to the BOD having ultimate authority 
over the finance and management of the FAS program, some school owners or principals might 
directly contact BOD instead of the designated chain of command, according to which partner 
schools have to contact FAS program personnel and director first. The partnership agreement 
could also work in the opposite direction where the school personnel could convince PEF‘s 
designated local evaluator to give the school more chances (for instance, to pass the physical 
inspection, get accurate documentation, un-crowd classrooms) than allowed by the PEF 
agreement. The official PPP bundling can be compromised in this way, at least for some time. 
In terms of the time-frame, the contract is renewed yearly so that it is not considered a 
long-term commitment by either party. There is also always a risk of the FAS program contract 
ending before a year is complete based on either contract terms or a decision by PEF‘s Board of 
Directors. While this has the advantage of allowing the first party to ensure that private schools 
do not become complacent in the quality of their education provision, it also has the 
disadvantage of creating uncertainty for second parties. Another disadvantage of short-term 
contracts is that although PEF‘s and the partnering school‘s desire to increase educational quality 
is based on increasing productive efficiency, a short-term contract does not necessarily serve the 
purpose (De Bettignies & Ross, 2004). Instead, they are more likely to raise coordination and 
regulation costs on behalf of PEF. According to Crocker and Masten (1996), vertical integration 
is another form of short-term contracts because they are present in an uncertain ―exchange‖ 





provision is the public sector‘s responsibility although it has been shifted temporarily to the 
private sector through a short-term PPP. So far in Pakistan‘s case, PPPs in education are still a 
relatively recent phenomenon so that it makes sense that vertical integration and not long-term 
contracts will be prevalent in the earlier stages. 
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In addition, a general weakness of PPP contracts is that realistically it is very difficult to 
contract for every contingency or to predict for uncontrollable circumstances (such as natural 
disasters). In this case, one solution can be to regularly revise contracts so that they can respond 
to current circumstances and limitations. This would mean regularly changing the kind of 
institutional inputs and processes.
164
 Another solution could be to design contracts on a case-by-
case basis in order to retain efficiency (Seabright, 1996). In PEF‘s case, this would mean 
contracts targeted towards each specific school where needed. This can have the advantage of 
each school having its own mix of inputs and processes in order to produce high quality 
education although the disadvantage is that forming the contract between each school and PEF 
can be expensive and time-consuming. 




Accountability is important because despite establishing a PPP through a contract 
between PEF and the private partner school, supply-side intervention or public provision of 
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 Valila (2005) also mentions that such PPPs will ultimately increase costs for the government because education 
provision through PPPs is essentially the private provision of a public good. 
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 Another scenario is where too much contract incompleteness leads to ―vertical integration‖ by the government so 





education might still be preferable depending on how the partner school behaves, which in turn 
depends on the values placed on it by the public versus private sector. For instance, assuming 
that the private party is interested in only profit-maximization at the expense of providing quality 
education, both PEF and the private party gain from the contract ending. This is because the 
private school in question can increase the student fees it charges (which it could not under the 
PEF contract) whereas PEF can transfer its subsidies to another school that does provide higher 
quality education with reduced costs. Therefore, in equilibrium, accountability will lead to the 
optimal utility of the PPP being achieved if the maximum benefit of the contract ending is 
transferred to the party that cares the most about high quality education (Besley & Ghatak, 
2001). In the case of the FAS program, it appears that the government cares the most so that if 
the partner school does not meet the PPP contract conditions, the government can either provide 
higher quality education itself through public schools
165
 or transfer the contract to another private 
school that values higher quality education. 
This is related to the argument by Hart, Schleifer, and Vishny (1997) that even if the 
private sector provides education at a lower cost, it does not necessarily increase the quality of 
education provided. One way the FAS program counters this weakness in school ownership and 
education provision is by conducting Quality Assessment Tests so that it can monitor the quality 
of education schools provide even if their costs are lowered. However, the quality versus cost 
argument is based on two main assumptions – a positive relationship between cost and quality 
(lower costs lead to lower quality); and incomplete contracts. Yet although the FAS program cuts 
costs of private schools by providing student subsidies, it can be argued that it indirectly expects 
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 This implies that the productive efficiency argument for PPPs might not hold for the provision of public goods 






the remaining school resources to be used on education quality-improving measures so that 
school costs are not actually lowered. Whether or not this is mentioned clearly in its contract is 
less certain, so that accountability can potentially be an issue in the FAS program. 
According to Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), conventional treatment parameters, such as 
propensity score matching used in this dissertation, are theoretical rather than policy relevant 
exercises. In contrast to theoretical exercises, policy relevant exercises include cost studies, 
which are often conducted and their scale ranges from classrooms to entire education systems 
(Coombs & Hallak, 1987; Levin, 1983). Issues related to cost studies of PPPs are discussed 
below. 
 
PPP Cost Studies 
Although the quantitative section showed that FAS program schools perform better on 
PEC exams than public or other private schools, it is important to look at more widespread and 
long-term implications of programs like the FAS program before implementing them on a larger 
scale. For instance, according to past studies, it is not necessary that PPPs are beneficial in the 
long run because they can cost the government even more if schools default. Moreover, the 
saved costs due to shifting the education provision burden to the private sector can be overridden 
by the government investing quite heavily in supervisory costs (Valila, 2005; Boardman et al., 
2011)
166
. For the FAS program, cost-studies are especially significant because tuition-free 
education for students does not mean that the private cost burden disappears; there are non-
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 This was also apparent through a preliminary cost-benefit analysis where in the long run, the government does 
not benefit due to saved costs if the FAS program focuses on students that will already have attended another school 






tuition costs as well that can influence demand for education (Tsang, 1997). Therefore, the 
government might have to complement the FAS program with free textbooks and nutrition, as 
well as encourage communities‘ financial help (although this can lead to favoritism and 
inequities).  
Another important example of cost studies is relative educational cost-effectiveness, 
which is often neglected and underestimated (Tsang, 1997). If private costs are not taken into 
account, the efficiency of private schools in providing higher quality of education can be 
overestimated. Methodologically, cost-effectiveness studies of school types can inform policy in 
terms of how to most increase student achievement while lowering costs. However, cost-
effectiveness studies are most useful as comparisons between policies (e.g. encouraging PPPs) 
and programs (e.g. the FAS program). Since budgetary and expenditure data is not available for 
other PEF programs, comparisons among its multiple programs is not possible for the purposes 
of this dissertation. An alternative tool to inform policy is cost-benefit analysis, which is more 
controversial than cost-effectiveness analysis because it is difficult to identify and quantify all 
types of private and social benefits.  
It is also important to consider if the policy is continuous (as for the FAS program) or a 
one time ―treatment.‖ If these policies interfere with or enhance an existing program, the 
combination should together maximize their net social benefits. This would be easier to make 
conclusions about if other programs run by PEF were also analyzed. In addition, better measures 
of factors, such as future earnings, are needed. For instance, income can include not only 





appliances, heat, furniture etc. Overall, research findings as well as social benefits/costs are 
significant in determining the utility of a PPP, such as the FAS program. 
However, assuming that the FAS program does have positive net social benefits 
considering all factors, there is still the question of how to implement it. The kinds of partner 
schools that FAS chooses depend to some extent on government goals. This means that if the 
government aims to increase productive efficiency, which is influenced by school resources and 
leads to higher utility, schools that perform the highest on test scores should be funded. For 
instance, if boys are performing better, it could imply that in order to achieve highest overall 
scores and education quality, the FAS program should focus on incorporating boys‘ only or co-
ed schools into its program. Moreover, 5
th
 grade scores seem to be more strongly related to the 
FAS program than 8
th
 grade scores so that looking at the marginal increase in test scores, primary 
schools up till 5
th
 grade should be focused on.  
Yet in reality, the aim of public-private partnerships through the FAS program is not just 
higher education quality, but also higher education equity (PEF, 2010). This could be one reason 
why the FAS program is concentrated in low income areas, which increases program costs (PEF, 
2011). This could also be the reason why over the course of its establishment, the FAS program 
is incorporating more girls‘ schools as partners rather than just more boys‘ schools, which is 
unlike the general proportion of boys‘ to girls‘ schools in Punjab. The higher education equity 
goal could also lead to the FAS program partnering with an increasing number of both primary 
and middle schools so that students who finish 5
th
 grade have a high quality middle school 
alternative rather than just any public or private school. Additionally, the FAS program slightly 





will probably provide lower quality private education than private schools in urban areas (e.g. 
facility wise). Teacher incentives in the FAS program to situate themselves in any geographical 
area are a significant portion of how the FAS program attempts to increase rural educational 
quality. This is despite teacher incentives further increasing program costs while benefits in 
terms of teacher motivation are unclear.
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As mentioned earlier, another aim of PPPs that the FAS program inadvertently fulfills is 
related to school choice and social cohesion. This is because, as described in the discussion 
section of chapter four, the kinds of schools that the FAS program ultimately ends up partnering 
with are those which have a certain social or religious objective in mind. These private schools 
are looking for means to stay in business and deliver their message and being funded by the FAS 
program is one way achieving of this aim. Keeping these various schools in business has the 
advantage of providing school choice to parents and students from the demand side and 
competition among schools from the supply side.
168
 It also has the advantage of targeting another 
educational outcome brought forth through this dissertation‘s analysis - ethics and civic identity 
among students – that can in turn lead to the PPP goal of social cohesion. Yet this outcome is 
difficult to quantify so that a straightforward PPP policy might miss its target. 
Therefore, overall we can assume that PPP schools have been established because they 
are used as both institutional factors and processes (e.g. through school management, contracts) 
to increase productive efficiency with quality education as the desired outcome by both PEF and 
the partner school (due to parental and student demand). However, student attendance in these 
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 FAS program schools are strict about teacher attendance and test scores of each teacher‘s students. 
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 Several studies have found this to be the case although private schools competing with public schools is still 






PPP schools depends on various factors, one of which is parental choice. If and how parents 
choose one school over another depends on their preferred educational outcome. If parents prefer 
their children to learn ethics through a religious education, it can guide the government to 
channel its funds in the same direction. For instance, the kinds of FAS program schools that 
applied and are currently funded by PEF often relate themselves to a social or religious objective. 
This can lead us to assume that the FAS program policy can be continued and expanded by PEF 
through partnering with schools that advocate a social, ethical or moral objective. Cost-
effectiveness is also significant when determining whether to maintain, expand, or decrease the 
FAS program‘s coverage in Punjab. 
The next section elaborates on some other policy implications of this dissertation‘s 
research. 
 
7.2 – Policy Implications 
 
Although this dissertation deals with student achievement, as the first chapter mentioned, 
student achievement is closely linked to other educational issues, such as dropouts
169
, so that it is 
important to examine multiple educational issues and policies simultaneously. For students who 
would otherwise be unenrolled (including never enrolled and dropouts), dropout rates can be 
influenced by both individual and institutional factors, including school type (Rumberger, 2001). 
Lowering the dropout rate is significant because it can imply improving education quality, 
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 For instance, higher student test scores would be significant for reducing repetition rates and hence reducing 
dropout rates (Rumberger, 2001). This is because retention can lower student self esteem and motivation and 






academic achievement, and the rate of return in the form of earnings. Therefore, policies and 




Many dropout prevention programs deal with demand-side program strategies (unlike the 
supply-side FAS program) that aim to provide extra resources to individuals and families to help 
students stay in school (for instance, vouchers, which are a type of PPP) or with providing 
alternative school programs that reduce dropout risk (Rumberger, 2011). However, these 
program strategies should deal with both academic and social engagement of individuals because 
there are various reasons why students drop out so that all the various factors can be addressed. 
Moreover, the timing of dropout intervention policies is significant because the earlier the 
intervention, the more effective it is supposed to be. This is especially true because students who 
are more likely to drop out later on usually have unresolved problems from a younger age, which 
cannot necessarily be addressed by a straightforward program (Rumberger, 2011). Instead, the 
government has to find out the grass-root level situation about student and parental preferences 
(e.g. about school type) in order to better target its policy audience and timing (such as through 
this dissertation‘s second research question). Yet, so far, the evaluation of intervention strategies 
has not yielded concrete results about the effectiveness of various strategies partly because there 
is a lack of rigorous evaluation strategies and partly because existing evaluations do not 
necessarily show program effectiveness (e.g. Dynarski & Gleason, 1998). Moreover, educational 
outcomes are not necessarily only student achievement or school completion so that other 
educational outcomes, such as ethics and civic identity, also have to be evaluated. 
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Sohail Ahmed (YEAR not known) suggests supply-side policies that can be relevant in 
judging why there is a dropout problem in Pakistan and then mitigating the problem. These 
policies can include fewer number of school hours per day; different academic calendar in rural 
areas depending on agricultural crops; use slate instead of exercise books; evening versus 
morning classes; need-based curriculum e.g. elementary agriculture; and no retention in first or 
second grades. Although programs targeting individuals (such as PEF‘s voucher plan) can be 
influential in countries like Pakistan, large scale changes might be more effective in rendering 
widespread change (possibly like the FAS program). These large scale changes can be brought 
about by policies that deal with ―the commitments and competencies of the people (teachers, 
administrators, and staff) and the organizational structure (size, staffing ratio, curriculum design, 
services, etc.)‖ (Rumberger, 2001, p. 30). In other words, these policies refer to institutional 
characteristics that are also adopted by PPPs. However, there are several problems with 
designing and implementing large scale change so its effectiveness is uncertain. One such 
problem is the government‘s political will to increase education quality (which can increase 
student achievement and reduce dropout rates) and allocate sufficient resources towards 
achieving this goal. 
Besides educational quality, this dissertation also deals with another educational outcome 
– ethics, religion, and civic identity formation among students. This outcome shows the 
relationship between education and cultural institutions, such as religion. One glaring policy 
implication of this relationship is that before incorporating this outcome into policy, the 
qualitative research conducted in Pakistan not only has to be expanded and deepened, but should 





include Muslim majority countries as well as countries or societies with a significant Muslim 
population. For instance, Britain has a large Muslim population and establishing Islamic schools 
is a popular policy issue especially because it has been shown that students from faith-based 
perform better in standardized testing (Ameli, Azam, & Merali, 2005). In addition, Islamic 
schools often see themselves as a ―moral compass‖ for the rest of society (Ameli, Azam, & 
Merali, 2005). This does not mean that they necessarily consider themselves to be superior to the 
rest of society; rather, they attempt to serve a purpose that the school directors think is necessary 
in order to achieve the social objectives that education aims for (personal communication, 
December 11
th
, 2011). In other words, the second educational outcomes in this dissertation can 
be ethics (including character building) and civic identity, which is possibly related to social 
cohesion (one of the four goals of PPPs). This is because ethics and character building can make 
social co-existence easier and also strengthen the religious identity of students. Interviews in the 
qualitative analysis support this hypothesis. Many parents were dissatisfied with the type of 
education their children were receiving because they felt the opportunity cost of educational 
quality (shown by their children‘s academic performance) was too high in terms of the foregone 
ethical education (in secular schools) their children could have learnt through their religion. 
According to qualitative data, the ideal combination in education provision – efficiency for 
quality and religion for social cohesion – is lacking. This can have policy implications in terms 
of the kinds of schools that the FAS program funds by not only having facilities and achievement 
as criteria, but also school aims as a basis for deciding whether or not to enter into a partnership 





 The analysis in this dissertation has used a comparative and exploratory approach 
towards comparing school types, which means that it has examined relationships rather than 
impacts. However, in order to affect policy change or even maintain the policy status quo for 
greater educational quality, it will be more useful to estimate ―effects‖ rather than ―associations‖ 
of public, private, and PPP schools, such as the FAS program, on education outcomes including 
student achievement and ethics/civic identity. This implies using causal inference strategies for 
further research and data collection. Moreover, additional research also needs to be conducted to 
gather grass-root opinions that are representative of the population and hence can allow the 
government to cater towards their opinions. Future research is discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
 
7.3 - Future Research 
As far as future research is concerned, randomized controlled experiments (RCTs) of 
programs, such as the FAS program, are a possibility since RCTs are considered to be the gold 
standard in evaluation methods (Duflo & Kremer, 2003). This evaluation of government 
education programs often occurs towards the middle or end of an intervention to gauge its 
influence on development (which can have various indicators, such as student test scores), and to 
determine if the status quo should be maintained or changed. Deaton (2009), and Duflo and 
Kremer (2003) evaluate evaluation methods themselves. For instance, Dulfo and Kremer (2003) 
suggest more proper and accurate evaluation techniques (i.e. RCTs) for the World Bank‘s 
operations evaluation department (and eventually more aid organizations).
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 In other words, 
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adopting the practitioner role recommends finding the mean of the treatment effect in 
randomized evaluation methods/RCTs.  
However, from a theoretical/academic perspective, it is apparent that RCTs do not 
indicate what the other features of the distribution are. It is important to use the practical and 
conceptual problems associated with randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to argue that rather 
than solely evaluating development and education projects (e.g. FAS), there should be a trend 
towards evaluating the ―theory‖ or framework behind these projects (Deaton, 2009). 
Econometric methods are often used even when their assumptions do not apply to the case at 
hand. Deaton (2009) suggests that rather than focusing on the particular method and project, it is 
more important to look at the ―why‖ versus the ―if‖ of why certain policy interventions succeed 
or fail and the theoretical mechanisms behind them. Regarding research in this dissertation, I 
attempt to analyze the mechanism or ―why‖ behind higher test scores of PPP schools after seeing 
―if‖ the PPP schools (FAS program) achieve higher scores than public or private schools. 
However, more research through causal inference strategies is required for both ―why‖ and ―if‖ 
before Deaton‘s premise of ―technique is never a substitute for the business of doing economics‖ 
can be met (Deaton, 2009, p. 47). 
This implies that unlike the mean treatment effect that Duflo and Kremer (2003) support, 
the median treatment effect could also be useful to policy makers in international agencies as 
could information on how different subgroups of the sample are affected by the treatment 
(Deaton, 2009). However, the difference in treatment effects is not clear through RCTs. This is 
especially important when designing national or international development policies because a 





from subsidized school costs or even if they all benefit, if one student benefiting more than 
others drives up the mean treatment effect, it is not sufficient to implement a subsidized school 
cost policy on a large scale. Regarding this dissertation, the treatment ―effect‖ is not necessarily 
uniform for boys and girls or for each tehsil so that a province or nation-wide RCT using the 
FAS program model might not be very useful in providing results that inform policy. 
This and other problems with RCTs – externality versus exogeneity, proper implemention 
etc. – can lead us to question the preference they receive as tools for causal inference (Deaton, 
2009). Moreover, there can be financial and ethical issues with conducting RCTs that incorporate 
both the public and private sector, especially if they are implemented on a large scale and then 
possibly become the precondition for international agencies providing funding for development 
projects. It is important to note that ethical and financial issues will vary from field to field; they 
might be more expensive to conduct in the education sector than in the health sector and vice 
versa. In addition, there are many stakeholders and social interactions involved (Manski, 2000) 
in PPPs (e.g. the provincial and district governments, schools, students etc. in the FAS program) 
so that actual policy is not implemented as it is in the RCT, which presents highly controlled and 
unrealistically ideal conditions for testing the effect of a treatment (Deaton, 2009). Therefore, 
there is no better or worse research method as long as the causal inference question under 
consideration (and not the supposed reliability and validity of the method itself) is the primary 
reason for choosing a certain research method (Deaton, 2009). This has to be kept in mind for 
future studies on PPPs because according to Manski (2000), even ―subjective‖ data gathered 
through qualitative methods can be useful given the context, especially if there are unobservable 





Another possible research area, especially from a policy perspective, is to compare results 
from different provinces in Pakistan and other countries in order to increase external validity of 
results from any one study. Many developing countries besides Pakistan also have compulsory 
schooling requirements (although these are often until primary education levels) so that in order 
to increase external validity, the same relationship can be studied in another context, including 
other Pakistani provinces, to see if it has similar or different results than the FAS program in 
Punjab, Pakistan. More school, individual, and family background variables can be included 
(which are so far unavailable in Pakistan) in a form that makes research possible. This calls for 
large-scale, research and policy oriented data collection by government ministries in Pakistan. It 
also calls for alternative measures of student achievement than just standardized test scores, 
which can involve separate research advisory commissions consisting of both domestic and 
international academics and policy makers. 
For only PPP schools, it can be interesting to determine the potential causal effect of the 
FAS program on student achievement at a longitudinal scale. One study that seeks to answer a 
similar question is conducted by Barrerra-Osorio and Raju (2011). Their outcome variables are 
student learning, school size, and schooling inputs. It is possible to only look at student 
learning/achievement as an outcome variable not only because the other two – school size and 
inputs – can be considered as inputs in the schooling production function (Hanushek, 1996), but 
also because examining PPPs focuses on institutions and their relationship with educational 
outcomes. Since now there is more recent data available from PEF concerning the Quality 
Assessment Tests as well as more student-based information (PEF, 2012), a main advantage of 





This analysis can potentially incorporate a regression discontinuity design (RDD) relating the 
outcome variable – average student learning – with the main explanatory variable – whether or 
not a school participates (or is qualified to participate) in the FAS program.
172
 I describe this 
particular future research possibility in more detail because it deals specifically with the FAS 
program that was the focus of this dissertation. 
The main premise for an RDD study on only FAS program schools is that the assignment 
of a school to the FAS program is not random since the assignment depends on, for instance, past 
school quality and student learning ability. This prevents using the difference in test scores as the 
causal effect (average treatment effect or ATT) of participation in the FAS program
173
. However, 
the selection bias problem can be mitigated by the FAS program policy of schools being eligible 
for student subsidies only if they attain a 67% passing score (cut-off point) on the Quality 
Assessment Tests (QATs)
174
 held twice a year in each FAS program school.
175
  
This decision rule of participation eligibility can be used in a sharp regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) identification strategy. This is true especially if schools close to the 
cut-off score are used so that the selection bias is eliminated or at least minimized. Under RDD 
assumptions, the difference between the marginal passers in the QATs and marginal failers in the 
QAT shows the ATT at the 67% cut-off. Therefore, the ATT will simply be the difference in 
scores of non- participant and participant schools below and above the cut-off respectively. Since 
                                                 
172
 Barrera-Osorio and Raju (2011) follow van der Klaauw (2007) in this regard. 
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 This is why I claim that this dissertation is an exploratory study and not a causal inference strategy. 
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 Manipulation of QAT scores can or cannot be taken  into account although in reality there can be both partial and 
complete manipulation by the PEF staff, the budget etc. (Barrera-Osorio & Raju, 2011). 
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 However, some schools also cease to participate in the FAS program if their enrollment exceeds 500 students so 





there have been 6 complete phases of the QATs (the 7
th
 one is in process), the most recent phase 
shows a sharp RDD rather than the previous phases where schools have had the opportunity to 
re-apply and re-participate in the FAS program. Previous phases will fit more closely into a 
fuzzy RDD (Barrera-Osorio & Raju, 2011).  
However, the RDD research used in calculating the effect of the FAS program on average 
student achievement can have similar internal validity problems as those described in chapter 4 
of this dissertation‘s quantitative analysis. One problem can be the spillover effects from 
program schools to non-program schools that are mostly in the same locality and perhaps even 
compete for the same market (consumers – parents and students). A second internal validity 
problem can occur due to school ―anticipation‖ that could alter their behavior and resources in 
order to participate in the FAS program at a future date since there have been multiple calls for 
applications. It can also be argued that using RDD as an identification strategy reduces external 
validity because it only looks at observations close to the cut-off. Yet, it is still a useful analysis 
if the school observable characteristics are similar as shown by the propensity scores. It is also 
possible to conduct an instrumental variable RDD analysis after identifying instruments that 
determine why past FAS schools participate or do not participate in the subsequent phases. 
Additional analysis for the entire education distribution – ignoring the cut-off score – should also 
be conducted so that the different types of analyses can serve as a ―double-check‖ (Card & 
Krueger, 1992). Therefore, both a local/neighborhood and full sample RDD analysis should be 
conducted. 
Other possible future research questions could be those that combine quantitative and 





child is doing in school – academically, socially, physically, etc. - and whether or not they feel 
their school choice was the correct one. If it was the correct choice, which aspect was most 
significant and how can it be measured empirically so that it can be studied at a larger scale? If 
parents feel their school choice for their child(ren) was an incorrect one, which aspect(s) make it 
the incorrect choice and how can its influence be determined on a larger scale and in various 
contexts? Answering such questions can further inform policy about which types of schools the 
government should fund and promote, and also about which aspects (geographical, gender, 
curriculum etc.) the government should focus on in order to increase educational quality.  
Moreover, although Hirschman‘s (1970) model of maintaining educational quality by 
examining decisions to change, leave, or accept a school‘s quality is from an economic 
standpoint, it can still inform qualitative questions about information availability to parents. For 
instance, how much information about a school‘s function and curriculum is available to parents? 
How can this information be used to make an informed decision about increasing their private 
(and perhaps social) utility through targeting the relevant educational outcome in the education 
production function? These questions can be answered through qualitative methods, such as 
interviews of both parents and school personnel. 
In forming and answering questions that are either purely qualitative or that combine 
quantitative and qualitative methods, the sample size can be expanded to other districts in Punjab 
and ultimately even in Pakistan so that it is more representative of the population. Other groups 
that are not interviewed in this dissertation, such as students or policy makers, can also be 
interviewed to get multiple viewpoints that can help in putting qualitative data and analysis into 





detailed observations in schools and classrooms so that the triangulation approach can be used in 
more depth. Moreover, the sample selection methods can be more advanced, perhaps with the 
help of the Population Census Bureau and more updated data can be used through the new 
Census that is underway. Software for qualitative analysis, such as NVIVO, can be used to code 
the data instead of manual coding because the sample size will be larger and the information will 
be wider and deeper in scale.  
This dissertation forms a springboard for answering these future research questions 
because as mentioned in the first chapter, it provides the first comparative exploration of school 
types in Pakistan, especially through including PPP schools. The next section concludes the 
dissertation. 
 
7.4 - Conclusion 
 Through an exploratory analysis to add to understanding about the topic in Pakistan‘s 
context, this dissertation aimed to answer two research questions – how do public, private, and 
public-private partnership schools relate to student achievement?; and how does Islam relate to 
parental decision making about school choice for their child(ren)? Answering these two 
questions entailed using two methodologies – quantitative methods for the first research 
question, and qualitative methods for the second research question. While not inferring causality, 
findings for the first research question showed that private schools are related to slightly higher 
scores while FAS program schools are related to considerably higher test scores than public 
schools. This implies that rather than being just a private school, being a FAS program private 





well. Since FAS program schools are examples of PPPs, it is possible that the PPP contract, 
finance and management rules in the partnership contract, and accountability are some of these 
unobservable characteristics that make FAS program schools stand out from other private 
schools. Findings for the second research question emphasized the second educational outcome 
to show that although parents have chosen schools based on their priorities, backgrounds, aims, 
and socio-economic status preferences, these schools do not impart the ideal education parents 
would like for their children. In turn, the ideal type of education would be a combination of high 
quality ―secular‖ or contemporary education and an education that fosters character building, 
civic values, religiosity, and ethics. This can have implications for the types of schools that the 
government establishes or private schools that it partners with. 
 More research including a longitudinal examination of the FAS program and other PEF 
programs is necessary before causality can be inferred between PPPs and any educational 
outcome. This implies that parental preferences can be significant in investigating the reason(s) 
for dropping out of school, and PPPs can be significant in countering the dropout issue. 
Moreover, if religion, ethics, and civic identity are important aspects of the type of education 
parents prefer for their children, the government can consciously consider these educational 
outcomes when it establishes PPPs because it can influence its type of school partners.
176
 
Keeping in mind all these findings as well as government aims of education (such as efficiency, 
equity, school choice, and social cohesion), it is possible to bring forth a policy framework and 
future research areas that can take into account various school types, components of PPP, and 
grass-root educational preferences in order to attain higher social utility through education. 
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 Many of the current FAS program schools are already those with a social objective that they attempt to achieve 
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Appendix A - Tables 
 
 
Table 1 – Mean test scores of Full sample Public, Private, and FAS program schools 
 
Subject Mean Score (standard deviations) 
 School Type 







 grade      
Total  -0.041 0.065*** 0.531*** 
Math  -0.009 0.014*** 0.158*** 
English  -0.041 0.066*** 0.419*** 
Urdu  -0.027 0.042*** 0.451*** 
Islamic Studies  -0.047 0.075*** 0.339*** 
Science  -0.026 0.042*** 0.600*** 
     
8
th
 grade      
Total  -0.008 0.012*** 0.255*** 
Math  0.002 -0.003 0.215*** 
English  -0.005 0.008*** 0.209*** 
Urdu  -0.010 0.015*** 0.182*** 
Islamic Studies  -0.004 0.007*** 0.162*** 
Science  -0.009 0.015*** 0.225*** 
     
1
Private schools compared to public schools 
2
FAS program schools compared to non-FAS schools 
























Table 2 – Mean test scores for first matched sample (public and private schools) 
 
Subject School Type 





 grade     
Total  -0.040 0.106*** 
Math  -0.010 0.025*** 
English  -0.039 0.103*** 
Urdu  -0.029 0.075*** 
Islamic Studies  -0.044 0.116*** 
Science  -0.030 0.079*** 
    
8
th
 grade     
Total  -0.010 0.026*** 
Math  -0.009 0.024*** 
English  -0.009 0.024*** 
Urdu  -0.006 0.017*** 
Islamic Studies  -0.007 0.020*** 




Note: Scores are in standard deviations.  
Total scores for the exams also include other subjects that are not included in the analysis, such as social studies, Arabic, and 
any elective subject in 8th grade.  
*=sig. at 10%; **=sig. at 5%; ***=sig. at 1% 
1



















   
PUBLIC PRIVATE 






 = 52602 N =19852 
School background 
 
    
   
    





   
    









   
    







    
   
    
Main medium of  
 
    





   
    





 0.98 0.53 
   
    
School Infrastructure 
 
    
Any new construct 
 
    
(%) Repair 0.03 0.03 
  
Toilet 0.94 0.94 
  
Classroom 0.03 0.03 
   
    
School area (no. of kanals)
 5
 6.16 8.33 
   
    
Covered area (sq. ft). 
 
3663.4 5648.93 
   
    
No. of classrooms 
 
4.04 4.34 
   
    
No. of open air classrooms 2.31 2.44 
   
    
Drinking water (%) Yes 0.87 0.87 
   
    
Electricity(%) Yes 0.60 0.59 
   
    
Toilet (%) Yes 0.79 0.79 
   
    







   
    
Boundary wall (%) Yes 0.79 1.00 
   
    
Main gate(%) Yes 0.78 0.77 
   
    
Sewerage (%) Yes 0.78 0.62 
   
    
Playground (%) Yes 0.43 0.42 
   
    
Library (%) Yes 0.26 0.26 
   
    
Physics lab (%) Yes 0.01 0.01 
   
    
Chemistry (%) Yes 0.01 0.01 
   
    
Biology lab (%) Yes 0.01 0.01 
   
    
Home-economics lab (%) Yes 0.01 0.01 
   
    
Combined lab (%) Yes 0.05 0.04 
   
    
   
    
School teacher and student 
characteristics     
   
    
Difference (sanctioned 
 
0.96   
minus filled) (no.) 
 
    
   
    
Student-teacher ratio 
 
40.51          22.18 
   
    




   
    
School size (total enrollment)  261.30  218.49 
     Boys enrolled (%)             0.52           0.51  
   
    
School community characteristics     
   
    
School management committee 7.3   
 
(no. of meetings)     
   
    
School management committee     
Members (no.) Total 7.72   















 0.52   
  
Teacher 0.18   
  
General 0.30   
  
Chair 0.26   
Notes: 
1 
Graphical tests of normality (including histograms, normal quantile plots, normal probability plots, and kernel 




PSUs are primary sampling units in the survey, which are schools in this case. 125 strata/tehsils are used. 
3 Overall, school age for all types of schools have a wide range. Some schools are more than a century old and were 
set up during British colonial times and are now operated by Punjab‘s Ministry of Education. The maximum is 286 
years. School age of 0 means that the school has been established the same year as the information was collected. 
4 
The remaining 2% could possibly be due to reporting error or some newly established schools that are still in the 
process of being registered. Answers between unregistered and under process can overlap depending on how the 
respondent understand the questions and answers ―no‖ or ―under process.‖ 
5
1 kanal is equal to 605 square feet. 
6 
There are more parents than teachers (4 versus 1.4, or 52 versus 18%) or general members. This can point towards 
laying a heavier emphasis on parental school choice, especially at the primary and middle levels. The qualitative 






























Table 4 – Mean test scores for second matched sample (public and FAS program schools) 
 
Subject School Type 





 grade     
Total  -0.015 0.521*** 
Math  -0.005 0.184*** 
English  -0.012 0.407*** 
Urdu  -0.012 0.425*** 
Islamic Studies  -0.010 0.352*** 
Science  -0.017 0.584*** 
    
8
th
 grade     
Total  -0.007 0.253*** 
Math  -0.006 0.205*** 
English  -0.006 0.204*** 
Urdu  -0.005 0.176*** 
Islamic Studies  -0.004 0.158*** 
Science  -0.006 0.225*** 
 
 
Note: Scores are in standard deviations.  
Total scores for the exams also include other subjects that are not included in the analysis, such as social studies, Arabic, and 
any elective subject in 8th grade.  
*=sig. at 10%; **=sig. at 5%; ***=sig. at 1% 
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PUBLIC FAS 






=53162; FAS = 1779 
School background 
 
    
   
    





   
    









   
    







    
   
    
Main medium of  
 
    





   
    
School Registration Status     
(%) 
 
Registered 0.98 0.94 
   
    
School Infrastructure 
 
    
Any new construct 
 
    
(%) Repair 0.03 0.03 
  
Toilet 0.94 0.94 
  
Classroom 0.03 0.03 
   
    
School area (no. of kanals)
 
 6.56 6.40 
   
    
Covered area (sq. ft). 
 
      4002.15 5648.93 
   
    
No. of classrooms 
 
4.10 4.05 
   
    
No. of open air classrooms 2.32 2.30 
  
    
Drinking water (%) Yes 0.87 0.87 
   
    
Electricity(%) Yes 0.79 0.84 
   
    
Toilet (%) Yes 0.82 0.82 
   
    







   
    
Boundary wall (%) Yes 0.79 1.00 
   
    
Main gate(%) Yes 0.78 0.77 
   
    
Sewerage (%) Yes 0.83 0.83 
   
    
Playground (%) Yes 0.43 0.42 
   
    
Library (%) Yes 0.26 0.26 
   
    
Physics lab (%) Yes 0.01 0.00 
   
    
Chemistry (%) Yes 0.01 0.00 
  
    
Biology lab (%) Yes 0.01 0.00 
   
    
Home-economics lab (%) Yes 0.00 0.00 
   
    
Combined lab (%) Yes 0.05 0.00 
   
    
   
    
School teacher and student 
characteristics     
   
    
Difference (sanctioned 
 
0.92   
minus filled) (no.) 
 
    
   
    
Student-teacher ratio 
 
40.51          21.70 
   
    




   
    
School size (total enrollment)  303.27  316.49 
     Boys enrolled (%)             0.49            0.51 
   
    
School community characteristics     
   
    
School management committee 7.29   
 
(no. of meetings)     
   
    
School management committee     
Members (no.) Total 7.73   











Female 0.27   
  
Parent 0.52   
  
Teacher 0.18   
  
General 0.30   
  
Chair 0.25   
Notes: 
1 
Graphical tests of normality (including histograms, normal quantile plots, normal probability plots, and kernel 




PSUs are primary sampling units in the survey, which are schools in this case. 124 strata/tehsils are used. 
3 Overall, school age for all types of schools have a wide range. Some schools are more than a century old and were 
set up during British colonial times and are now operated by Punjab‘s Ministry of Education. The maximum is 286 
years. School age of 0 means that the school has been established the same year as the information was collected. 
4 
The remaining 2% could possibly be due to reporting error or some newly established schools that are still in the 
process of being registered. Answers between unregistered and under process can overlap depending on how the 
respondent understand the questions and answers ―no‖ or ―under process.‖ 
5
1 kanal is equal to 605 square feet. 
6 
There are more parents than teachers (4 versus 1.4, or 52 versus 18%) or general members. This can point towards 
laying a heavier emphasis on parental school choice, especially at the primary and middle levels. The qualitative 


















Table 6 – 5th grade Private schools PSM analysis 
 Dependent Variables – Total and Subject scores 
 Total Math English Urdu Islamic 
Studies 
Science 
Independent variables       
School background       
       
Private 0.119*** 0.047*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.130*** 0.097*** 
Urban 0.045*** 0.018** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.047** 0.021* 
Registered? 0.082*** 0.038*** 0.067*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.099*** 
Primary level 0.068*** 0.022*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.044*** 0.051** 
Medium of instruction 0.105*** 0.022*** 0.101*** 0.055*** 0.102*** 0.046*** 
School age (s.d.) 0.001 -0.000 0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.004 
       
School infrastructure       
       
Any new construct? -0.075*** -0.023*** -0.053*** -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.078*** 
Drinking water? -0.044*** -0.021*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.004 -0.053*** 
Electricity? -0.018** -0.003 -0.010 0.007 -0.032*** -0.017** 
Toilet? -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.013 
No. toilets -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.005 -0.009** -0.014*** 
Sewerage? -0.014** -0.011*** -0.030*** -0.009 -0.012* 0.001 
Playground? -0.038*** -0.005 -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
Library? 0.091*** 0.030*** 0.062*** 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.100*** 
School area (s.d.) 0.003 0.003* 0.005 -0.003 0.000 0.003 
Covered school area (s.d) -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.001 
No. of classrooms (s.d.) -0.002 0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.007 
       
Teacher  and student 
characteristics 
      
Sanctioned-filled (s.d.) -0.002*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*** 
% Male teachers 0.037*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.033*** 0.014*** 0.047*** 
Teacher-student ratio(s.d.) 0.007*** 0.002 0.006** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.009*** 
Total enrollment (s.d.) -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 0.007 -0.014*** -0.002 
%  boys 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.012* 0.006 0.012* 
       
Community       
SMC meetings -0.025*** -0.003* -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** 
SMC total members -0.020*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.018** 
SMC % women 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.006** 0.007*** -0.001 
SMC % men -0.008*** 0.003* 0.006* 0.009*** 0.005 0.008*** 
SMC % parent member -0.004 -0.004** 0.001 -0.001 -0.009** 0.000 
SMC % teacher member 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 
SMC % general member -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.009** -0.003 
SMC % chair member -0.002 -0.003* -0.007** -0.003 0.002 0.005* 
       
Constant -0.086*** -0.032*** -0.094*** -0.077*** -0.074*** -0.067*** 
R-squared 0.0136 0.0033 0.0100 0.0081 0.0120 0.0117 
Note: All test scores and labeled coefficients are in s.d. with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Sig. level :*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 





Table 7 – 8th grade Private schools PSM analysis 
 Dependent Variables – Total and Subject scores 
 Total Math English Urdu Islamic 
Studies 
Science 
Independent variables       
School background       
Private 0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.016 0.004 0.006 
Urban 0.019*** 0.028** 0.014** -0.005 0.029** 0.025*** 
Registered? -0.002 -0.013 -0.040*** 0.032*** -0.007 -0.036*** 
Middle level 0.003* 0.040** 0.002 0.015** 0.005** 0.007 
Medium of instruction 0.072*** 0.064*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 
School age (s.d.) 0.000 0.008*** 0.002 -0.006*** -0.002 0.002 
       
School infrastructure       
Any new construct? -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 
Drinking water?  0.000  0.007 -0.002 0.000 -0.009 0.006 
Electricity? -0.009** -0.006 0.004 -0.009** -0.004 -0.009** 
Toilet?  0.010** -0.004 0.002 0.024** 0.005 0.013** 
No. toilets -0.000* -0.009*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.006*** 
Sewerage? 0.004 -0.000 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006* 
Playground? -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.016*** 
Library? 0.020*** 0.012 0.011** 0.017*** 0.014 0.015*** 
School area (s.d.) -0.005** 0.002 -0.005** -0.007*** 0.005** -0.005** 
Covered school area (s.d) -0.001 -0.006** 0.001 -0.006** -0.002 -0.002 
No. of classrooms (s.d.) -0.003 -0.008*** -0.010*** 0.002 0.003 -0.004* 
       
Teacher  and student 
characteristics 
      
Sanctioned-filled (s.d.) -0.004** -0.005** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003* -0.000 
% Male teachers 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 
Teacher-student ratio(s.d.) 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.001** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.002*** 
Total enrollment (s.d.) 0.017 -0.007** -0.008 0.002 -0.001** 0.002 
%  boys -0.003** 0.007** -0.0018*** -0.009* -0.015*** 0.013** 
       
Community       
SMC meetings -0.025*** -0.003* -0.005* -0.003 -0.001** -0.003*** 
SMC total members -0.006** -0.003 -0.008*** -0.003** 0.002 -0.011*** 
SMC % women 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.004** 0.004** 0.003* 
SMC % men -0.002 0.026*** 0.006*** -0.017*** -0.014** 0.011*** 
SMC % parent member 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 
SMC % teacher member 0.011*** 0.005** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.004** 
SMC % general member 0.000 -0.006*** -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.008** 
SMC % chair member 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003** -0.006*** 0.0054** 
Constant -0.002 -0.020 0.030** -0.036*** 0.007*** 0.031*** 
R-squared 0.0025 0.0034 0.0019 0.0019 0.0015 0.0017 
Note: All test scores and labeled coefficients are in s.d. with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Sig. level :*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 






Table 8 – 5th grade FAS program schools PSM analysis 
 Dependent Variable – Total and Subject test scores 
Independent Variables Total Math English Urdu Islamic 
Studies 
Science 
School background       
       
FAS program school 0.537*** 0.204*** 0.433*** 0.407*** 0.310*** 0.630*** 
Registered? 0.054* 0.030* 0.074** 0.029 0.001 0.076** 
Medium of instruction 0.086*** 0.020** 0.036** 0.114*** 0.144*** 0.061*** 
School location 0.055*** 0.021*** 0.049*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.021 
Primary school level 0.013 0.012 -0.007 0.013 0.031 0.017 
School age (s.d.) -0.003 -0.003 0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.009* 
       
School Infrastructure       
Any new construct? -0.098*** -0.033*** -0.065*** -0.084*** -0.090*** -0.102*** 
School area (s.d.) 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.007 -0.000 0.001 
Covered school area (s.d.) 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.007 
Drinking water? -0.056*** -0.028*** -0.040*** -0.043*** 0.002 -0.073*** 
Electricity? -0.009 -0.008 -0.026** 0.001 -0.013 0.007 
No. of toilets -0.020*** -0.012*** -0.012** -0.008 -0.018*** -0.022*** 
No. of classrooms (s.d.) -0.018*** -0.002 -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.009 -0.020*** 
Playground? -0.057*** -0.012*** -0.032** -0.039*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
Library? 0.112*** 0.043*** 0.071*** 0.102*** 0.090*** 0.129*** 
       
Teacher and Student 
Characteristics 
      
       
Sanctioned-filled (s.d.) -0.012** -0.007*** -0.005 -0.009* -0.006 -0.012** 
% Male teacher 0.014*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 
Teacher-student ratio (s.d.) 0.021*** 0.040*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
% boys students 0.016 -0.010 0.005 0.005 0.001** 0.003 
       
Community characteristics       
SMC meetings -0.005*** -0.002 -0.006*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.006** 
SMC total members -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.024*** -0.010** -0.000 -0.008** 
SMC % women 0.001 -0.004** 0.002 0.007** 0.008*** 0.000 
SMC % men 0.012*** 0.004** 0.009** 0.016*** 0.007* 0.011*** 
SMC % parents -0.001 -0.004* 0.003 0.005 -0.005 0.006 
SMC % teachers 0.016*** 0.004* 0.014*** 0.017** 0.020*** 0.016*** 
SMC % general member 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.011** -0.001 
SMC % chair member -0.002 -0.005** -0.009* -0.003 0.004 0.010** 
       
Constant 0.145** 0.068* 0.184** 0.087 0.012 0.066 
R-squared 0.0170 0.0066 0.0101 0.0116 0.0107 0.0200 
Note: All test scores and labeled coefficients are in s.d. with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Sig. level :*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 






Table 9 – 8th grade FAS program schools PSM analysis 
 Dependent Variable – Total and Subject test scores 
Independent Variables Total Math English Urdu Islamic 
Studies 
Science 
School background       
FAS program school 0.245*** 0.178*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 0.158*** 0.212*** 
Registered?
 
 -0.015 -0.025 -0.054*** 0.016 0.015 -0.034** 
Medium of instruction 0.031*** 0.022** 0.022** 0.034*** 0.012 0.016 
School location 0.016** 0.025*** 0.011 -0.006 0.026*** 0.022*** 
Secondary school level 0.015* 0.001 0.002 0.021** 0.030*** 0.020 
School age (s.d.) 0.003 0.014*** 0.006** -0.005* -0.002 0.006*** 
       
School Infrastructure       
Any new construct? -0.-22*** -0.027*** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.008* -0.016*** 
School area (s.d.) -0.007*** 0.000 -0.006** -0.009*** 0.004 -0.010*** 
Covered area (s.d.) 0.002 -0.005** 0.002 -0.006** 0.003 -0.003 
Drinking water? 0.001 0.006 -0.002 0.007 -0.009 0.008 
Electricity? 0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 
No. of toilets 0.004 -0.010*** 0.003 0.005* -0.003 -0.001 
No. of classrooms (s.d.) -0.006* -0.018*** -0.016*** 0.000 0.001 -0.009*** 
Playground? -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.020*** 
Library? 0.032*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.021* 0.0927*** 
       
Teacher and Student  
Characteristics 
      
Sanctioned-filled (s.d.) -0.009*** -0.018*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.001 
% Male teacher 0.013** 0.002*** 0.003*** -0.009*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Teacher-student ratio 0.026*** 0.004 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Total Enrollment (s.d.) -0.003*** -0.010*** -0.001** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.002* 
% boys enrollment -0.019** 0.000 -0.011** 0.002 0.002*** -0.001 
       
Community 
characteristics 
      
SMC meetings -0.018 -0.002*** 0.006 0.005 -0.004* -0.001*** 
SMC total members -0.004* -0.000 -0.007** -0.001 0.001 -0.003* 
SMC % women 0.003 -0.004* -0.003 0.005** 0.005** 0.001 
SMC % men -0.006*** 0.030*** 0.004* -0.023*** -0.017*** 0.011*** 
SMC % parents 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
SMC % teachers 0.012*** 0.004* 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.005** 
SMC % general 
member 
0.001 -0.007** -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.006** 
SMC % chair member -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.008*** 0.003 
Constant 0.074*** 0.078* 0.122*** -0.036 0.031 0.104** 
R-squared 0.0032 0.0041 0.0022 0.0024 0.0017 0.0027 
Note: All test scores and labeled coefficients are in s.d. with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Sig. level :*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Figure 3 – Overlap between Public and FAS Program Schools from Propensity 
score matching 





















































































































































































































































































Appendix C – FAS program details 
 
 

















Attock 1 2 0 0 3 
Bahawalnagar 35 142 9 0 186 
Bahawalpur 82 151 24 1 258 
Bhakkar 39 7 5 0 51 
Chakwal 19 17 1 0 37 
Chiniot 2 12 2 0 16 
D.G.Khan 17 33 3 0 53 
Gujrat 18 2 0 0 20 
Jehlum 0 2 3 0 5 
Jhang 85 35 6 0 126 
Khushab 2 21 13 1 37 
Lahore 27 15 0 1 43 
Layyah 1 29 10 0 40 
Lodhran 22 89 7 0 118 
M.B.Din 1 1 2 0 4 
Mianwali 20 8 6 0 34 
Multan 134 20 37 0 191 
Muzaffargarh 25 160 35 0 220 
Nankana 2 2 3 0 7 
Narowal 0 5 5 0 10 
Okara 2 18 9 0 29 
Pakpattan 1 17 5 0 23 
R.Y.Khan 6 16 11 0 33 
Rajanpur 18 75 14 0 107 
Rawalpindi 0 2 3 0 5 
Sargodha 2 14 8 0 24 
Sheikhupura 0 2 5 0 7 
Sialkot 13 1 9 0 23 
Vehari 35 27 7 0 69 























Attock 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
Bahawalnagar 0 0 14 112 41 19 0 186 
Bahawalpur 1 10 15 110 86 36 0 258 
Bhakkar 0 0 11 0 0 0 40 51 
Chakwal 0 9 16 0 0 0 12 37 
Chiniot 0 0 0 7 3 1 5 16 
D.G.Khan 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 53 
Gujrat 0 0 14 0 0 0 6 20 
Jehlum 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Jhang 0 0 0 30 41 55 0 126 
Khushab 1 10 19 0 0 0 7 37 
Lahore 1 7 11 0 0 0 24 43 
Layyah 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 40 
Lodhran 0 0 0 42 49 27 0 118 
M.B.Din 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Mianwali 0 0 12 0 0 0 22 34 
Multan 0 0 0 58 80 53 0 191 
Muzaffargarh 0 0 1 69 79 71 0 220 
Nankana 0 0 1 0 0 0 6 7 
Narowal 0 0 4 0 0 0 6 10 
Okara 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 29 
Pakpattan 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 23 
R.Y.Khan 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 33 
Rajanpur 0 0 0 32 33 42 0 107 
Rawalpindi 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Sargodha 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 24 
Sheikhupura 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 7 
Sialkot 0 6 9 0 0 0 8 23 
Vehari 0 0 1 0 0 0 68 69 
TOTAL 3 44 128 460 412 304 428 1779 





Table 11c - District-wise Schools and Enrollment in FAS program schools 
 
Districts Total Schools Total Enrollment 
Attock 3 1188 
Bahawalnagar 186 81979 
Bahawalpur 258 118639 
Bhakkar 51 21075 
Chakwal 37 17011 
Chiniot 16 7231 
D.G.Khan 53 19492 
Gujrat 20 11107 
Jehlum 5 1952 
Jhang 126 54314 
Khushab 37 19003 
Lahore 43 20841 
Layyah 40 14406 
Lodhran 118 58624 
M.B.Din 4 1298 
Mianwali 34 14232 
Multan 191 99438 
Muzaffargarh 220 108524 
Nankana 7 2338 
Narowal 10 5273 
Okara 29 10778 
Pakpattan 23 9378 
R.Y.Khan 33 11346 
Rajanpur 107 44783 
Rawalpindi 5 2137 
Sargodha 24 8549 
Sheikhupura 7 3693 
Sialkot 23 12624 
Vehari 69 26757 
TOTAL 1779 808010 
 






Figure 5 – Proportion of Schools Phase-Wise 
 
 
















Contract between Foundation Assisted Schools Program and Partner Private School 
 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
 
This agreement of partnership is made at Lahore on this __________________between Punjab Education 
Foundation 78-B1, MM Alam Road, Gulberg-III, Lahore (hereinafter called the first party) and 
________________________________________________(hereinafter called the second party) and the 
terms and conditions set forth herein:-   
 
The parties aforementioned mutually, voluntarily and willingly agree that:- 
   
1. That under the Punjab Education Foundation Act 2004 the executive and managing authority of the 
Punjab Education Foundation (hereinafter called the Foundation) vests with Board of Directors 
(BOD) so the BOD shall have the sole authority to take all decisions to run FAS program effectively.  
2. The partnership agreement shall continue and would deem to have been extended from year to year 
basis till terminated by the first party. The partnership agreement may also be terminated by the first 
party anytime on violation by the second party of any terms and conditions of the agreement.  
3. That public money is a sacred trust with the first party and it is the statutory responsibility of the first 
party to ensure that funds are being utilized for the purposes for which they are provided with. 
Therefore, in the event that second party violating any of the terms and conditions of this partnership 
agreement the first party reserves the right to withdraw its financial support with immediate effect 
without serving prior notice to the second party.  
4. That the first party will provide funding/agreed financial assistance to the partner schools on time and 
assist schools through technical training of its staff for effective running of schools and maintaining 
the required educational standards.  The funding will be disbursed to the recipient schools through 
Bank of Punjab online branches for transfer of funds.  
5. That in case the existing partnership agreement is terminated due to any reason and if the BOD 
decides to continue FAS program with the second party a new agreement shall be made subject to the 
terms and conditions, from time to time made and approved by the BOD. That the concerned policy 
decisions taken in and approved by the BOD in its subsequent meetings regarding the effective 
running of FAS program shall be duly communicated to the second party and if needed shall be 
deemed to be added in the partnership agreement. 
6. That the second party shall register itself with the District Registration Authority within one year after 
entering into partnership with the first party and in default thereof the first party may discontinue the 
provision of financial assistance under this partnership agreement. The administration of the second 
party is hereby held responsible for ensuring the availability of quality infrastructure, furniture and 
hygienic, congenial and conducive conditions within 6 months of the date of execution of this 





7. That the second party will display on its main gate or any other conspicuous place a board depicting 
on the format and text provided by the first party.  
8. That the amount as financial assistance to be provided to the second party shall be determined/fixed 
by the BOD on the basis of per child enrolled per month to cover tuition fee, stationary charges, paper 
money and allied charges like lab, library, co-curricular activities etc. At the sole discretion of the 
BOD of the First Party this amount may be increased or decreased due to any consideration.  
9. That from the date of execution of this partnership agreement the second party shall not charge any 
tuition fee from enrolled students in whatsoever form. Notified examination fee by the concerned 
Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education may, however, be collected from the students against 
a token of receipt, with the prior approval of the First Party. The first party on receiving complaints 
against the second party of charging fee, fine or any charges whatsoever without taking the prior 
permission/consent of the first party, or any other violation of this partnership agreement, the first 
party reserves the right to cancel the partnership agreement forthwith without giving any prior notice 
or impose penalty as per judgment.  
10. That the first party will administer bi-annual Quality Assurance Tests (QATs) of the students of the 
second party to assess eligibility for continued financial assistance under this partnership agreement. 
In addition to biannual QAT the first party reserves the right to conduct surprise/planned QAT with 
any partner school on receiving of any complaints, misrepresentation of facts, or happening of any 
event which lead to Force Majure (includes acts of God, war, epidemic, earthquake, floods, 
insurrection). The second party is required to maintain quality standards by ensuring the students of 
the school to pass the Quality Assurance Tests (QATs), as per criteria fixed by BOD of PEF, 
conducted by, or on behalf of, the first party. In case of two consecutive failures of the second party 
in passing of these QATs, the first party reserves the right to immediately terminate any financial 
assistance or even terminate the partnership agreement without serving any prior notice to the second 
party. 
11. That the second party must abide by the rules and regulations, timings and schedules, formats and 
methods prescribed by the first party for maintaining the overall school building, educational 
environment, campus hygiene and passing of bi-annual QATs. The second party will observe all rules 
and regulations regarding school timings and holidays, failing which the first party may charge the 
penalties or what so ever. Provision of infrastructure, furniture, light system ventilation etc will be the 
responsibility of the second party, failing of which give right to the first party to impose penalties as 
per its judgment. 
12. That in case enrollment data/information furnished by the second party has been proved incorrectly or 
in case of any other false statement as verified by PEF through its monitoring and evaluation section 
or concerned staff by conducting physical inspection, inquiry of facts or documentation maintained 
by the school or based on testimonials of students or teachers of the second party, the first party shall 
reserve the right to discontinue forthwith any financial assistance or even terminate the partnership 
agreement without serving any prior notice.  
13. That the first party will exercise a no-tolerance policy against overcrowding. No single room may 
host more than one class at one time. If the second party is reported to be overcrowded or congested 
the first party will impose heavy penalties upon the second party and/or may cancel this partnership 
agreement and cease all financial support to the second party forthwith.  
14. That the minimum strength of enrolment should not be less than 100 students. The second party must 
ensure the provision of proper physical infrastructure and all relevant facilities for additional students; 
the availability of all these facilities will be inspected and approved by a representative of the first 
party prior to the enrolling of more students by the second party.  
15. That the physical infrastructure of school in terms of building, class rooms, toilets, library and 





and airy according to the standards specified by the first party. Information regarding any changes 
made in the present building infrastructure shall be communicated to the first party on monthly basis 
along with the earlier verified report of PEF.  
16. That if the enrolment of the second party has increased or decreased during the period of partnership 
agreement of the last reviewed and verified level of enrolment then financial assistance to the second 
party will be revised for the subsequent period on the basis of variance in the enrolment subject to the 
physical verification or following the prescribed procedure by the first party.  
17. That the first party may carry out class-wise random inspections to check/verify the veracity of earlier 
reported enrolment, improvements made in the infrastructure and standard of cleanliness and hygiene 
at any time without serving the prior notice during the working hours of the school run by the second 
party. Students, teachers and other school staff may also be interviewed and must be directly 
accessible to the representatives of the first party even in the absence of the second party or its 
representatives.  
18. That by the 5
th
 day of every month, the second party shall communicate accurate figures of the 
enrolment of the students, on forms supplied by first party, providing class-wise break-up and gender-
wise information of enrolment shall be submitted. In case of late submission of enrolment data, 
financial assistance will be provided on the basis of the data communicated and recorded in the last 
available inspection report of the first party.  
19. That the second party shall not conduct any after-hours/second-time classes within its premises. The 
second party shall not conduct tuition academies or any other profit making venture within the 
premises of the institution declared as under this partnership agreement.  
20. That the second party must ensure that the students of all relevant classes appear in the annual tests 
conducted by the Punjab Examination Commission (PEC) or any other institution recommended by 
the BOD. The second party will submit whatever information the first party requires with respect to 
PEC examination including results etc. The second party will be permitted to collect notified fee, 
from the students, required by the PEC for participation in the said examination. 
21.  That in case of outstanding performance by the second party in providing quality education, 
determined on the basis of results of students of examination conducted by PEC and assessed through 
six monthly Quality Assurance Tests (QATs), administered under the auspices of first party, the 
Board of Directors of the first party may give awards to the second party and/or its staff. The Board 
of Directors of the first party shall determine the rules and the criteria for award of such incentives.   
22. That this agreement is non-transferable and, therefore, in case of sale of school to a third party this 
partnership agreement will stand cancelled automatically. In case of any default pertaining to the title 
of ownership of the school or any relevant dispute/civil litigation, thereof, regarding the second party, 
that develop before or after entering into this partnership agreement, the first party may cancel the 
partnership agreement unilaterally without serving the prior notice to the second party.  
23. That the second party shall not spend the financial assistance on any other educational institution 
other than the one named in the partnership agreement. The second party must nominate his/her 
successor or declare its ‗next of kin‘ at the time of signing of this partnership agreement that in case 
of the demise or any eventuality making the original signatory incapable to execute partnership 
agreement, the second party, who is the signatory of the partnership agreement, his/her successor 
assignee will be deemed to have automatically become a party and shall be bound to observe all the 
terms and conditions of this partnership agreement.  
24. That if any dispute, disagreement, reference or question at anytime arises between the parties during 
the period of agreement the aggrieved party may refer the matter Executive Committee of the 
Foundation. The matter shall be referred in writing to the Executive Committee. Aggrieved party 
shall be given an opportunity of being heard. The decision of the Executive Committee shall be final 





25. That this document is executed to provide financial assistance under the scheme of FAS only to the 
second party on the recommendation and approval of the BOD of the first party. That the partnership 
agreement shall be terminated by the first party on violation of any stipulation or terms or conditions 
by the second party of this signed agreement. The first party reserves the right to take any legal action 
or to initiate proceedings under the concerned law or signed partnership agreement including penalty 
or cancellation of the partnership agreement in case that it is proved that the second party is 
malafidely involved in any activity amounting to defame the name and reputation, good will and 
cause of the first party or depending upon the nature of the violation on the cost of the second party.  
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties aforementioned have signed this agreement of the partnership. 
 
 



























FAS program schools‟ criteria for choosing partner schools 
 
 
In terms of candidate selection, according to the PEF website, the criteria for selection of 
private schools include (PEF, 2010): 
 
1) The private school should have a minimum enrollment of 100 students and maximum of 
500 students. 
 
2) Private schools in rural areas and/or urban slums are preferred. 
 
 
3) Physical infrastructure of schools in terms of building, classrooms, library and 
laboratories should be hygienic and conducive to learning.  
 
4) The school should have qualified teachers.  
 
 
5) Students in short listed schools will take a skill-based test in English, Urdu, Science and 
Mathematics before the school can enter into a partnership with PEF.  
 



























Appendix D – Background and PPPs in general 
 
Figure 6 - The Relationship between Schooling and Trust (Trust as an example and determinant 




Source: Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2009). The sample includes 25-40 year olds from the 1972-2000 General Social 






Table 12 – Different religious sects in Pakistan. 
Name Doctrinal Affiliation Headquarters Date Established 
Wafaq-ul-Madaris Deobandi Multan 1959 
Tanzim-ul-Madaris Barelwi Lahore 1960 
Wafaq-ul-Madaris Shia Shia Lahore 1959 
Rabitatul-Madaris-al-Islamia Jamaat-e-Islami Lahore 1983 
Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Salafia Ahl-e-Hadith Faisalabad 1955 





Figure 7 - Long-term contracts versus vertical integration by the government 
 
Source: Crocker and Masten (1996). 
 
According to Kelman (2002), contracts should be designed keeping the following in mind: 
• Candidate selection: services suitable for outsourcing;  
• Source selection: sole source, limited competition, or open competition;  
• Type of contract: fixed price or cost reimbursement; completion contract (performance 
contract) or best-effort contract;  
• Contract for multiple provision: delivery order, task order, or indefinite-quantity 
procurement;  
• Contract incentives and modifications, and resolution of claims and disputes;  
• Criteria for evaluating bids;  
• Degree of allowable official discretion;  








Moreover, Kelman (2000) argues that contracting is likely to be better than direct, in-house provision 
under the following circumstances:  
 
1. the more precisely a task or result can be specified in advance;  
2. the more easily performance can be measured and evaluated;  
3. the more competition there is among potential providers;  
4. the less the activity is core to the agency‘s mission;  
5. the more the demand for service varies over time;  
6. the private providers can hire people with the needed skills more easily than 
government can;  
7. the private providers have greater economies of scale in producing the service 
 
Source: From Savas (2000). Steven J. Kelman, ―Contracting,‖ in Lester M. Salamon, ed., The Tools of 


































Figure 8 - Public-private spectrum: 
 
 
Source: Patrinos et al., 2009. 
 
Table 13 – Forms of PPPs and Education Goals 
Contract 
Effect on increasing 
enrollment 









Strong: number of 
students who receive 
the voucher 




private sector is 
more efficient 
Subsidies 
Strong: use of already 
built private 
infrastructure 
Moderate: limited by 
available p laces and quality 








Moderate: limited by 
the supply of private 
school operators 
Moderate: limited by 













Source: Authors‘ compilation based on World Bank 2003a, 2006; Harding 2002; Latham 2005; LaRocque and 
















Coverage Scope of Regulations and 
Practices 
Monetary Value of 
Voucher 
Bangladesh Females Grades 
6-10 
Selected localities Public or private schools, 
minimum progress and 
attendance required 
From $12 in G6 to $36.25 
in G10 




Over one third of 
total enrollments. All 
income groups 
Receiving schools can 
also charge fees 
Average value in 1991 
4.359 pesos 
Belize Elementary and 
secondary 
school attendees 
75 percent of 
primary, 50 percent 
of secondary 
Strong government 
partnership with the 
churches 
n/a 
Lesotho All secondary 
and primary 
school attendees 
Most schools Government trains and 
appoints teachers. Strong 
partnership with churches 
n/a 
Colombia Low income 
students 
Operational in 216 
municipalities. 
Vouchers usable in 
private schools 
Program participation 
renewable if student 
performance satisfactory 







All municipal areas State finance of schools 
for each religion where 
local demand 
demonstrated. Secular 
private schools also state 
financed 
Public and private schools 
are financed on a 
completely equal basis 
Japan School children 
over 15 years 
old 
Public and private 
high schools 
Private schools must 
submit financial 
statements to the 
Foundation for the 
promotion of private 
schools 
40 percent of the cost in 
private high schools 
covered by government – 
approximately 140 yen per 















Coverage Scope of Regulations and 
Practices 











Public inspection. Teachers 
must have same 
qualifications as in public 
schools. Same curriculum 
60 percent of the costs 
of public schooling (80 
percent for schools ―in 















Private schools Curriculum, teacher 
qualifications, enrollment 
55 percent of public 







Private schools Curriculum, teacher 
qualifications, language 
requirements 
50 percent of public 
school cost 

















Appendix E – PEC sample exam and Interview Questions 
 




















Reading Natural Numbers up to a 
billion
X 2 1
2 Writing Natural Numbers up to a billion X 1 1
3 Inter conversion in lacs and millions  X 23 1
4
Distinguish between smaller and larger 
numbers up to a billion
X 3 1
5








Simplify reducible fraction to 
irreducible fraction
X 6 1
8 Rounding off continued fraction X 7 1
9
Inter conversion of common fractions 
and decimal fractions
X 8 1
10 Apply basic operations on fractions X  9, 1
11
Use brackets to give priority to 
operations
X X 10,11 2
12






X  12 1
X X 13,14 2
14
Solve every day life problems involving 
direct and inverse proportion
X X X 31(I,II,III) 4
15 Calculate the average of given numbers X X 15 1
16
Solve every day context problems 
using averages













Recognise perpendicular and parallel 
line
X  18 1
20
Construct triangle in case two sides 
and included angle is given 
21
Construct triangle in case angles and 
included side is given 
Kinds of Quadrilateral 22








Solving word problems involving area of 
square and rectangle
 X  20 1
Volume 25
Find Volume of cube, 
cuboid,cylinder,cone & sphere




















































Competency Chart Of Form B (Mathematics)
X 3 10
 
 
